Parsons v. Ryan

• Decision Date: 20 December 2018
• Docket Number: No. 17-15302,17-15352,Nos. 16-17282,s. 16-17282,17-15302
• Citation: 912 F.3d 486
• Parties: Victor Antonio PARSONS; Shawn Jensen ; Stephen Swartz; Sonia Rodriguez; Christina Verduzco; Jackie Thomas; Jeremy Smith; Robert Carrasco Gamez, Jr.; Maryanne Chisholm; Desiree Licci; Joseph Hefner; Joshua Polson; Charlotte Wells; Arizona Center for Disability Law, Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. Charles L. RYAN, Warden, Director, Arizona Department of Corrections; Richard Pratt, Interim Division Director, Division of Health Services, Arizona Department of Corrections, Defendants-Appellants. Victor Antonio Parsons; Shawn Jensen ; Stephen Swartz; Sonia Rodriguez; Christina Verduzco; Jackie Thomas; Jeremy Smith; Robert Carrasco Gamez, Jr.; Maryanne Chisholm; Desiree Licci; Joseph Hefner; Joshua Polson; Charlotte Wells; Arizona Center for Disability Law, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. Charles L. Ryan, Warden, Director, Arizona Department of Corrections; Richard Pratt, Interim Division Director, Division of Health Services, Arizona Department of Corrections, Defendants-Appellees.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Ninth Circuit

912 F.3d 486

Victor Antonio PARSONS; Shawn Jensen ; Stephen Swartz; Sonia Rodriguez; Christina Verduzco; Jackie Thomas; Jeremy Smith; Robert Carrasco Gamez, Jr.; Maryanne Chisholm; Desiree Licci; Joseph Hefner; Joshua Polson; Charlotte Wells; Arizona Center for Disability Law, Plaintiffs-Appellees,
v.
Charles L. RYAN, Warden, Director, Arizona Department of Corrections; Richard Pratt, Interim Division Director, Division of Health Services, Arizona Department of Corrections, Defendants-Appellants.

Victor Antonio Parsons; Shawn Jensen ; Stephen Swartz; Sonia Rodriguez; Christina Verduzco; Jackie Thomas; Jeremy Smith; Robert Carrasco Gamez, Jr.; Maryanne Chisholm; Desiree Licci; Joseph Hefner; Joshua Polson; Charlotte Wells; Arizona Center for Disability Law, Plaintiffs-Appellants,
v.
Charles L. Ryan, Warden, Director, Arizona Department of Corrections; Richard Pratt, Interim Division Director, Division of Health Services, Arizona Department of Corrections, Defendants-Appellees.

Nos. 16-17282
17-15352
No. 17-15302

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Argued and Submitted October 18, 2017, San Francisco, California
Filed December 20, 2018

WALLACE, Circuit Judge:

912 F.3d 493

In March 2012, prisoners in the custody of the Arizona Department of Corrections (ADC), together with the Arizona Center for Disability Law, brought a civil rights class action against senior ADC officials alleging systemic Eighth Amendment violations in Arizona’s prison system. The inmates alleged that ADC’s policies and practices governing health care delivery in ADC prisons and conditions of confinement in ADC isolation units expose them to a substantial risk of serious harm to which Defendants are deliberately indifferent. On the eve of trial, the parties signed a settlement agreement (Stipulation) by which Defendants agreed to comply with more than 100 "performance measures" designed to improve the ADC health care system and reduce the harmful effects of prisoner isolation. Since the action settled, the parties have engaged in several disputes over Defendants’ alleged non-compliance with the performance measures, which has required the assigned magistrate judge to issue various rulings interpreting and enforcing the Stipulation. These rulings are the subject of the consolidated appeals now before us.

I.

The Stipulation went into effect on February 25, 2015, the date on which Magistrate Judge David Duncan granted final approval. Consistent with the district court’s earlier class certification order, Parsons v. Ryan , 289 F.R.D. 513 (D. Ariz. 2013), aff’d , 754 F.3d 657 (9th Cir. 2014), the Stipulation defines one class and one subclass. The class is defined as "[a]ll prisoners who are now, or will in the future be, subjected to the medical, mental health, and dental care policies and practices of the ADC." Stipulation ¶ 3. This covers approximately 33,000 inmates in 10 state-operated prisons. The subclass is defined as "[a]ll prisoners who are now, or will in the future be, subjected by the ADC to isolation, defined as confinement in a cell for 22 hours or more each day or confinement in [five enumerated] housing units." Id. This isolation subclass covers the approximately 3,000 inmates in ADC custody classified as "maximum custody."

The Stipulation requires Defendants to comply with 103 health care performance measures at each of the 10 state-operated prisons. The performance measures obligate Defendants to adopt certain standards and practices across a wide spectrum of health care categories, including diagnostic services, preventative services, mental health, and access to care. For example, Performance Measure 13 provides that "[c]hronic care and psychotropic medication renewals will be completed in a manner such that there is no interruption or lapse in medication." Performance Measure 33 mandates that "[a]ll inmates will receive a health screening by an LPN [licensed practical nurse] or RN [registered nurse] within one day of arrival at the intake facility." Defendants are required to measure and report their compliance with the health care performance measures on a monthly basis.

912 F.3d 494

The Stipulation also requires Defendants to comply with nine performance measures specific to "maximum custody" inmates. For example, pursuant to Maximum Custody Performance Measure 1, all maximum custody inmates housed at the ADC’s maximum custody facilities must be offered a minimum number of hours of out-of-cell time per week. As with the health care performance measures, Defendants must measure and report their compliance with the maximum custody performance measures on a monthly basis.

The performance measures require Defendants to meet or exceed a certain threshold rate of compliance based upon how long the Stipulation has been in effect. For example, for the first 12 months after the Stipulation went into effect, Defendants were required to meet or exceed a 75 percent rate of compliance. Stipulation ¶¶ 10, 20. For the second 12 months, the required threshold increased to 80 percent. Id. Defendants’ duty to measure and report on a particular performance measure terminates if (1) the performance measure meets the required compliance threshold for 18 months out of a 24-month period and (2) the performance measure has not been out of compliance for three or more consecutive months within the previous 18-month period.

The Stipulation also provides the process by which the parties resolve disputes over compliance. In the event Plaintiffs believe Defendants are in non-compliance with one or more of the performance measures, Plaintiffs must first provide Defendants a written statement describing the alleged non-compliance, to which Defendants must provide a written response. Stipulation ¶ 30. The parties must then meet and confer in an attempt to resolve the dispute informally and, if informal efforts fail, participate in formal mediation. Id. ¶¶ 30, 31. If the dispute is not resolved through formal mediation, either party may file a motion to enforce the Stipulation in the district court. Id. ¶ 31.

Finally, the Stipulation explains the nature and scope of the magistrate judge’s authority to resolve disputes arising out of the Stipulation. The relevant provision, Paragraph 36, provides as follows:

In the event the Court finds that Defendants have not complied with the Stipulation, it shall in the first instance require Defendants to submit a plan approved by the Court to remedy the deficiencies identified by the Court. In the event the Court subsequently determines that the Defendants’ plan did not remedy the deficiencies, the Court shall retain the power to enforce this Stipulation through all remedies provided by law, except that the Court shall not have the authority to order Defendants to construct a new prison or to hire a specific number or type of staff unless Defendants propose to do so as part of a plan to remedy a failure to comply with any provision of this Stipulation. In determining the subsequent remedies the Court shall consider whether to require Defendants to submit a revised plan.

Stipulation ¶ 36.

The appeals now before us are from various rulings of Magistrate Judge Duncan (acting on behalf of the district court) interpreting and enforcing the Stipulation. The first appeal involves Plaintiffs’ challenge to the district court’s ruling that the Stipulation precludes the court from ordering Defendants to develop a general staffing plan as a remedy for Defendants’ non-compliance. The second appeal concerns Defendants’ challenge to the magistrate judge’s order dated November 10, 2016, in which he ordered Defendants to use "all available community health care services" to meet their obligations under the Stipulation.

912 F.3d 495

The final appeal concerns Defendants’ challenge to the magistrate judge’s interpretation of the Stipulation’s subclass to include inmates classified as "close custody." For the reasons set forth below, we affirm the district court’s November 10, 2016 order, but reverse the other two rulings.

II.

We review de novo the district court’s interpretation of a stipulation of settlement. See Jeff D. v. Andrus , 899 F.2d 753, 759 (9th Cir. 1989). "[W]e defer to any factual findings made by the district court in interpreting the settlement agreement unless they are clearly erroneous." City of Emeryville v. Robinson , 621 F.3d 1251, 1261 (9th Cir. 2010).

We review the district court’s enforcement of a settlement agreement for abuse of discretion. Wilcox v. Arpaio , 753 F.3d 872, 875 (9th Cir. 2014). Under abuse-of-discretion review, we will reverse only if the district court made an error of law, or reached a result that was illogical, implausible, or without support in the record. United States v. Hinkson , 585 F.3d 1247, 1261–63 (9th Cir. 2009).

III.

Before turning the merits, we consider first the issue of subject matter jurisdiction over all three appeals. See Munoz v. Mabus , 630 F.3d 856, 860 (9th Cir. 2010). After three and a half years of litigating this case, Defendants move to dismiss the appeals on the ground that Magistrate Judge Duncan did not have jurisdiction to enter the orders at issue. "We review de novo whether a magistrate judge has jurisdiction," Wilhelm v. Rotman , 680 F.3d 1113, 1118 (9th Cir. 2012), recognizing that "our appellate jurisdiction depends on the proper...