Parsons v. State
| Decision Date | 21 October 1987 |
| Docket Number | No. 16672,16672 |
| Citation | 745 P.2d 300,113 Idaho 421 |
| Parties | Bethea PARSONS, Petitioner-Appellant, v. STATE of Idaho, Respondent. |
| Court | Idaho Court of Appeals |
Bethea Parsons, pro se.
Jim Jones, Atty. Gen., Myrna A.I. Stahman, Boise, for respondent.
Bethea Parsons' application for post-conviction relief from a misdemeanor conviction was summarily dismissed in the magistrate division. She appealed to the district court only to have her appeal dismissed. She has appealed from the district court's decision, questioning the procedures employed and the conclusions reached by both the magistrate and the district judge. We must determine whether the procedures used by the lower courts were proper. We must also determine whether, as a matter of law, the claims in Parsons' application entitle her to relief. We conclude that the lower courts erred in their decisions on procedure; but, as will be explained, the errors are harmless. We hold that Parsons' substantive claims do not entitle her to relief for reasons given in this opinion.
Parsons was convicted in the magistrate division of failure to renew her automobile registration--a misdemeanor. She appealed the judgment of conviction. While that appeal was pending, she made application to the district court for post-conviction relief. She was directed by the district judge to file her application in the magistrate division, which she did. The state then moved for summary judgment on the ground that post-conviction proceedings could not be maintained while a direct appeal was pending. Parsons responded, declaring that post-conviction proceedings may be commenced at any time within the limitation period of I.C. § 19-4902.
The magistrate then gave notice of intent to dismiss, indicating two reasons: first, that post-conviction relief is not available for misdemeanors; and second, that post-conviction proceedings cannot be maintained while an appeal is pending, especially when the application recites verbatim the grounds presented for the appeal. Parsons' reply to this notice challenged the court's legal conclusions and asserted broad-based claims of due process and natural rights. The magistrate then dismissed the application, noting that he had reviewed the reply and found, as a matter of law, that Parsons was not entitled to relief.
Parsons appealed the dismissal to the district court. She then moved for entry of default against the state. No default entry was made. The district court dismissed the appeal. After noting his agreement with the two reasons mentioned by the magistrate, the district judge concluded that Parsons should have processed her appeal directly to the Supreme Court, not to the district court. Parsons timely appealed the district court's decision.
This appeal presents many questions concerning post-conviction procedures: (1) whether misdemeanor offenses are within the scope of post-conviction relief; (2) whether an application for relief from a misdemeanor judgment should be filed in the magistrate division; (3) whether the appeal from the magistrate division to the district court was proper; (4) whether post-conviction proceedings may be maintained while an appeal is pending; and (5) whether the motion for entry of default was proper. We find, as explained below, that the lower courts' conclusions on procedure are erroneous. However, because the merits of Parsons' application were reached, and her substantial rights were not affected, we conclude that the procedural defects were harmless. I.R.C.P. 61.
Parsons also mounts a general attack on the summary dismissal of her application. This raises the following substantive issues: (1) whether the lower courts had jurisdiction over Parsons; (2) whether Parsons is subject to the laws of this state; (3) whether Parsons was denied due process; and (4) whether federal reserve notes are legal tender. We agree with the magistrate that, as a matter of law, Parsons' application fails to state a claim for relief.
Parsons asserts that post-conviction relief is not limited to any class of offenses. On appeal, the state concedes that misdemeanors come within the scope of post-conviction relief. We agree.
Idaho Code § 19-4901(a) governs the scope of post-conviction relief. In relevant part it provides: "Any person who has been convicted of, or sentenced for, a crime ... [may seek relief]." (Emphasis added.) There is no language limiting the scope of relief to a certain class of crime. We hold that any person convicted of, or sentenced for, a misdemeanor may seek post-conviction relief if he meets the requirements outlined in I.C. § 19-4901.
As noted, Parsons initially attempted to file her application with the district court. The district judge, however, directed her to file the application in the magistrate division, where the conviction took place. Together with the question of where to file, we must determine whether the magistrate had jurisdiction.
The filing of applications for post-conviction relief is controlled by I.C. § 19-4902. That section provides that the application is to be filed with "the clerk of the district court where conviction took place." Clearly, the application is to be filed with the district court clerk. It matters not that the conviction took place in the magistrate division of the district court. Moreover, the district court is a unified entity embracing the magistrate division. Filing with the district court clerk is proper regardless of whether the matter is directed to a district judge or assigned to a magistrate for disposition. We hold that an application for post-conviction relief is properly filed when it is filed with the district court clerk. We now turn to the question whether an application for post-conviction relief from a misdemeanor judgment, having been filed with the district court clerk, may be assigned to a magistrate.
We begin with the premise that the jurisdiction of attorney magistrates can be as broad as that of district judges. I.R.C.P. 82(c)(2). However, cases assignable to such magistrates are limited by statute and rule. Under I.C. § 1-2208, magistrates may hear quasi-criminal proceedings and specific civil proceedings. Post-conviction proceedings are not mentioned. Similarly, I.R.C.P. 82(c) (1) categorizes specific cases assignable to magistrates; but again, post-conviction proceedings are not specifically included. Under I.R.C.P. 82(c)(2)(A), however, an attorney magistrate may be assigned "[c]ivil actions regardless of the nature of the action...." Post-conviction proceedings are civil actions. E.g., Clark v. State, 92 Idaho 827, 452 P.2d 54 (1969).
Consequently, it would appear that attorney magistrates may be assigned post-conviction proceedings stemming from misdemeanor judgments entered in their courts. Such assignments must be approved by the administrative district judge of the judicial district, and notice of such assignments must be given as outlined in I.R.C.P. 82(c)(2)(D). The Seventh Judicial District has published notice that all magistrates are assigned those cases allowed by I.R.C.P. 82(c)(1) and I.R.C.P. 82(c)(2). Local District Court Rules And Calendars, Seventh Judicial District, IDAHO STATE BAR DESK BOOK (rule dated December 27, 1979). Whether this broad local rule was intended to assign post-conviction proceedings to magistrates is not clear. Nevertheless, we conclude that attorney magistrates may be assigned post-conviction proceedings stemming from misdemeanor judgments entered in their courts. Furthermore, if there is an objection to the assignment of a case to a magistrate it must be expressed in writing prior to hearing or trial, or the objection is waived. I.R.C.P. 82(c)(3); I.C. § 1-2214. Finding no timely objection, we hold that the magistrate's decision in this case is neither void nor subject to collateral attack.
We next consider whether Parsons' appeal from the magistrate division should have gone to the district court or directly to the Supreme Court. We consider this issue only to clarify a procedural point. Relying upon I.C. § 19-4909, the district judge indicated that Parsons should have appealed directly to the Supreme Court. We disagree.
Idaho Code § 19-4909 provides that a final judgment in a post-conviction proceeding may be reviewed by the Supreme Court. Typically, post-conviction proceedings are conducted by district courts from which a direct appeal can be processed to the Supreme Court. In the present case, however, the magistrate was assigned to handle this matter. All appealable judgments from the magistrate division must first be taken to the district court. I.R.C.P. 83(a). We hold that until a district court has acted upon a magistrate's decision the judgment is not subject to higher appellate review. Although the district court here dismissed Parsons' appeal as procedurally improper, the fact remains that an appeal was taken to the district court, providing the necessary step for further appellate review by our Court.
We now reach the issue of whether post-conviction proceedings can be maintained while an appeal is pending. By construing the provisions of I.C. § 19-4902, the lower courts concluded that post-conviction relief is not available while an appeal is pending. We think they have read more into the statute than is present. The relevant part of I.C. § 19-4902 provides: "An application may be filed at any time within five (5) years from the expiration of the time for appeal or from the determination of an appeal or from the determination of a proceeding following an appeal, whichever is later." We fail to see how this language bars post-conviction proceedings while an appeal is pending. Rather, this language reflects the limitation period for such proceedings. We hold that generally post-conviction...
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