Partain v. Sta-Home Health Agency of Jackson, Inc., No. 2003-CA-00804-COA.

• Decision Date: 12 October 2004
• Docket Number: No. 2003-CA-00804-COA.
• Parties: Deborah L. PARTAIN, Appellant v. STA-HOME HEALTH AGENCY OF JACKSON, INC., Appellee.
• Court: Mississippi Court of Appeals

904 So.2d 1112

Deborah L. PARTAIN, Appellant v. STA-HOME HEALTH AGENCY OF JACKSON, INC., Appellee.

No. 2003-CA-00804-COA.

Court of Appeals of Mississippi.

October 12, 2004.

Myles A. Parker, Jackson, Alicia Kate Margolis, attorneys for appellant.

Donald James Blackwood, Thomas L. Kirkland, Ridgeland, attorneys for appellee.

Before KING, C.J., IRVING and MYERS, JJ.

MYERS, J., for the Court.

¶ 1. Deborah L. Partain appeals from a final judgment of the Circuit Court of Hinds County in favor of the defendant, Sta-Home Health Agency of Jackson, Inc., granting a motion for directed verdict. Partain appeals raising the following issues:

I. WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING STA-HOME HEALTH AGENCY'S MOTION FOR DIRECTED VERDICT.

II. WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN EXCLUDING EVIDENCE OF DAVID HERRINGTON'S PREGNANCY RELATED COMMENTS.

III. WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING PARTAIN'S MOTION IN LIMINE AND OTHER EVIDENTIARY RULINGS.

Finding no error, we affirm.

STATEMENT OF FACTS

¶ 2. Debbie Partain began working for Sta-Home Health Agency of Jackson, Inc. as a secretary in April 1992. After being employed by Sta-Home for a period of approximately three years, Sta-Home agreed to pay Partain's tuition to Hinds Community College to earn a degree as a registered nurse. In December 1996, Partain graduated with her nursing degree and began working in this capacity for Sta-Home in January 1997. One requirement of the employment and tuition agreement was for Partain to complete 192 hours of clinical work in a hospital of her choosing.

¶ 3. During Partain's employment, the economic climate for Medicare and Medicaid reimbursed healthcare organizations such as Sta-Home became unstable. This instability was brought about by the Balanced Budget Act of 1997, in which Medicare and Medicaid expenditures were significantly decreased. As a result of lower Medicare and Medicaid budgets, organizations such as Sta-Home were forced to reorganize their operations in order to survive.

¶ 4. The reorganization of Sta-Home involved the elimination of roughly thirty positions from the company's 300 person workforce, an approximate ten percent reduction. In order to determine which employees would be released, Sta-Home conducted an evaluation which ranked each employee on a scale of negative three to three. In making their determination, Sta-Home used three criteria which were given a value of negative one to one, and the score was tallied giving a range from negative three to three. The criteria included skill level, productivity, and overall performance. Partain ranked poorly on her evaluation, in which her failure to complete the required 192 hours of clinical work was noted. Partain was one of thirty employees dismissed.

¶ 5. Partain brought a claim against Sta-Home under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 in which she alleged that her termination was motivated by her gender and her pregnancy. Partain alleged that Ronald Thorp, a male nurse with less experience and skill, was retained in her position. Upon the close of Partain's case-in-chief, Sta-Home moved for a directed verdict which was granted.

LEGAL ANALYSIS

I. WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING STA-HOME HEALTH AGENCY'S MOTION FOR DIRECTED VERDICT.

¶ 6. Partain asserts that the trial court erred in granting Sta-Home's motion for directed verdict. In making this determination, this Court must view the evidence in the same light as the trial court. Thus, this Court must review the circuit court's ruling de novo. Fulton v. Robinson Indus., Inc., 664 So.2d 170, 172 (Miss. 1995).

¶ 7. Upon the close of Partain's case, Sta-Home moved for directed verdict pursuant to rule 50(a) of the Mississippi Rules of Civil Procedure. In making a determination, the trial court may grant a directed verdict for the defendant at the close of the plaintiff's case if, in the opinion of the court, the plaintiff has failed to present credible evidence establishing the necessary elements of his or her right to recover. Thomas v. Smith, 786 So.2d 418, 419(¶ 2) (Miss.Ct.App.2001). When the defendant moves for a directed verdict at the close of the plaintiff's case-in-chief, the court must consider the evidence before it at that time in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, giving the plaintiff the benefit of all favorable inferences that reasonably may be drawn from that evidence. Benjamin v. Hooper Electronic Supply Co., 568 So.2d 1182, 1187 (Miss.1990). Only, when viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, should the court determine that the matter is so overwhelmingly in favor of the defendant that no reasonable juror could find for the plaintiff, should the court direct a defendant's verdict. Id.

¶ 8. In making its determination for directed verdict on a matter concerning Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the trial court will apply the burden shifting test prescribed by McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973). In making his or her prima facie case, the plaintiff must show (i) he or she is a member of a protected class, (ii) he or she was qualified for the position lost, (iii) he or she suffered an adverse employment action, and (iv) that others similarly situated were more favorably treated. Urbano v. Continental Airlines, Inc., 138 F.3d 204, 206 (5th Cir. 1998) (citing McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 792-793, 93 S.Ct. 1817). Upon presentation of the plaintiff's prima facie case, the burden then shifts to the employer to articulate some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the adverse employment action. McDonnell Douglas. Id. at 804, 93 S.Ct. 1817. If there is a showing of some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the action, the burden shifts back to the plaintiff who must demonstrate that the proffered reason(s) for the action were merely "pretext" for a decision made based upon discriminatory criteria. Id. at 804, 93 S.Ct. 1817.

¶ 9. In determining whether the plaintiff has met his or her burden of proving a prima facie case, the court views the four factors outlined above. In the case sub judice, Partain has not proven all of the necessary elements of a prima facie case. Partain, as a pregnant woman, falls within a protected class. Partain also has suffered adverse employment action by losing her position with Sta-Home. Thus, factors one and three have arguably been met.

¶ 10. Where Partain fails to meet her burden of proof is with the second factor, that she is qualified for the position lost. Partain argues that previous employment reports were conducted giving her very high marks. Though positive peer reviews occurred, the peer reviews do not ultimately determine whether one is or is not qualified for the position lost. The fact remains that Partain has failed to meet an express requirement of her tuition agreement and employment contract; therefore, she can not completely meet the second prong of this four part test.

¶ 11. Partain next fails to meet the fourth prong of the McDonnell Douglas test, that others similarly situated were more favorably treated. Partain contends that she was replaced by someone similarly situated, namely Ronald Thorp, a member of Partain's graduating class. Though both Partain and Thorp may have possessed their degrees for the same duration, Thorp obtained over 600 hours of clinical work, in comparison with Partain's zero hours. Secondly, the trial record does not indicate that there was any direct comparison made between Partain and Thorp, and in fact it indicates the converse, that there was never a direct comparison made between the two. The record indicates only that each nurse was evaluated on a scale of negative three to three and comparisons of the nurses were made cumulatively. There was a reduction in personnel at Sta-Home. Partain did not meet all of the employment requirements. Thorp did meet all of the employment requirements. In making the decision on which employees to retain and which employees to dismiss for the cutback, Sta-Home retained those which were most qualified for each position. Sta-Home felt that other nurses were more qualified for the available positions than Partain.

¶ 12. Partain raises the issue that the length of time that an employee has with the company was a factor in determining which employees would be discharged. It is undisputed that Partain worked at Sta-Home for a considerably greater amount of time than Thorp. It is also clear that the length of time consideration would act as a "tie-breaker" in the event that a determination had to be made between which of two employees to retain. Such was not the case, as the decision of Sta-Home was never between retaining Thorp or Partain.

¶ 13. If Partain had proven each element of her prima facie case, Sta-Home would then have to prove some legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for its actions. Though a prima facie case was not presented, Sta-Home has accomplished this task. Sta-Home presented five legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons for Partain's dismissal. First, Sta-Home adduced evidence that Partain's release was in response to budget setbacks caused by the Balanced Budget Act of 1997. Second, Sta-Home followed a consistent procedure in making evaluations regarding which employees should be retained. Three factors, skill and certification level, overall productivity, and overall performance were weighted and given a score of negative one to one to arrive at a composite score for each employee. Retention decisions were based upon each employee's overall score. This was a neutral method for making this determination. Third, Partain was in breach of her tuition agreement with Sta-Home. Partain never acquired the requisite number of clinical hours as agreed upon in paragraph four of her tuition agreement with Sta-Home. In this tuition agreement, Sta-Home agreed to pay for all tuition costs Partain would incur during pursuit of her nursing degree in consideration for...