Partanen v. Gallagher

• Decision Date: 04 October 2016
• Docket Number: SJC–12018.
• Citation: 59 N.E.3d 1133,475 Mass. 632
• Parties: Karen PARTANEN v. Julie GALLAGHER.
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court

475 Mass. 632

59 N.E.3d 1133

Karen PARTANEN

v.Julie GALLAGHER.

SJC–12018.

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Middlesex.

Submitted April 5, 2016.

Decided Oct. 4, 2016.

Mary Lisa Bonauto (Elizabeth A. Roberts, Boston, Teresa Harkins La Vita, Danvers, Patience Crozier, & Joyce Kauffman, Cambridge, with her) for the plaintiff.

Jennifer M. Lamanna, Revere, for the defendant.

The following submitted briefs for amicus curiae:

C. Thomas Brown for Greater Boston Legal Services & others.

Emily R. Shulman, Brook Hopkins, Boston, & Adam M. Cambier for American Academy of Assisted Reproductive Technology Attorneys & others.

Abigail Taylor, Gail Garinger, Brittany Williams, & Andrea C. Kramer, Assistant Attorneys General, for the Attorney General.

Shannon Minter, of California, Marco J. Quina, & Emma S. Winer, Boston, for forty-two law professors & another.

Present: GANTS, C.J., SPINA, CORDY, BOTSFORD, DUFFLY, LENK, & HINES, JJ.¹

LENK, J.

In 2014, the plaintiff, Karen Partanen, filed a complaint in the Probate and Family Court seeking to establish legal parentage of two young children. The complaint alleged that she and the defendant, Julie Gallagher, had been in a committed, nonmarital relationship between 2001 and 2013. Using in vitro fertilization, and with Partanen's “full acknowledgment, participation, and consent,” Gallagher gave birth to the two children. Thereafter, Partanen and Gallagher represented themselves publicly as the children's parents, and jointly raised the children until their 2013 separation. On the basis of these allegations, Partanen's complaint sought a declaration of parentage pursuant to, among other things, G.L. c. 209C, § 6 (a ) (4). That statute provides that “a man is presumed to be the father of a child” born out of wedlock if “he, jointly with the mother, received the child into their home and openly held out the child as their child.” Concluding that Partanen could not be deemed a presumed parent under G.L. c. 209C, § 6 (a ) (4), because it was undisputed that she was not the children's biological parent, a judge of the Probate and Family Court dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. See Mass. R. Dom. Rel. P. 12(b)(6).

In addressing Partanen's claims on direct appellate review, we consider the question whether a person may establish herself as a child's presumptive parent under G.L. c. 209C, § 6 (a ) (4), in the absence of a biological relationship with the child. We conclude that she may. We conclude further that, here, the assertions in Partanen's complaint are sufficient to state a claim of parentage under G.L. c. 209C (statute). Therefore, we reverse the judgment of dismissal and remand the matter to the Probate and Family Court for further proceedings.²

1. Background. The facts are largely undisputed. The following facts are drawn from the complaint, which we take as true in reviewing a dismissal under Mass. R. Dom. Rel. P. 12(b)(6), with certain minor, undisputed details drawn from elsewhere in the record. See Schaer v. Brandeis Univ., 432 Mass. 474, 477, 735 N.E.2d 373 (2000).

In February, 2001, while they were both living in Massachusetts, Partanen and Gallagher entered into a committed relationship. They moved to Florida in 2002, and, the following year, together purchased a house there. In 2005, they decided to start a family “with the shared intention that they would both be parents to the resulting children.” That year, Partanen unsuccessfully underwent fertility treatment using a sperm donor and in vitro fertilization. In 2007, Gallagher underwent similar treatment “with the full acknowledgment, participation, and consent of” Partanen. This treatment was successful, and, with Partanen present, Gallagher gave birth to a daughter, Jo.³ In 2011, Gallagher again underwent fertility treatment, “with the full acknowledgment, participation, and consent of” Partanen.⁴ The treatment was successful, and, in 2012, Gallagher gave birth to a son, Ja.

Though Partanen did not formally adopt the children,⁵ she participated in raising them from the time of their birth. Her participation included “waking for night-time feedings, bathing, meal preparation, grocery shopping, transportation to/from day care and school, staying home with the children during times of illness, clothes shopping, providing appropriate discipline as necessary, addressing their developmental needs, [and] comforting” them. Partanen was involved also “in all decision-making for the children,” including in matters related to their education and healthcare. Partanen “provided [the children] consistent financial support,” and both children referred to Partanen as “Mommy.” Partanen and Gallagher represented themselves publicly as the children's parents in formal contexts such as at the children's schools and for medical appointments, as well as in their interactions with friends and family. They vacationed as a family, shared expenses, purchased joint assets, and sent family holiday cards.

In May, 2012, after the birth of Ja, Partanen and Gallagher returnedto Massachusetts with the children.⁶ In November, 2013, the couple separated, and Partanen moved out of the family home. Partanen filed an action to establish de facto parentage in February, 2014. She requested visitation with the children and shared legal custody. In September, 2015, a judge of the Probate and Family Court ruled that Partanen was a de facto parent of the children, issued orders regarding visitation, and required her to pay child support.⁷

In October, 2014, Partanen filed the present action in the Probate and Family Court “to establish [full legal] parentage.”⁸ In February, 2015, Gallagher's motion to dismiss the complaint for “[f]ailure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted,” Mass. R. Dom. Rel. P. 12(b)(6), was allowed.

2. Discussion. a. Standard of review. In reviewing the dismissal of a complaint pursuant to Mass. R. Dom. Rel. P. 12(b)(6), “[w]e accept as true the facts alleged in the ... complaint as well as any favorable inferences that reasonably can be drawn from them.” See Polay v. McMahon, 468 Mass. 379, 382, 10 N.E.3d 1122 (2014), quoting Galiastro v. Mortgage Elec. Registration Sys., Inc., 467 Mass. 160, 164, 4 N.E.3d 270 (2014).⁹

b. Statutory language. General Laws c. 209C, § 1, provides “[c]hildren born to parents who are not married to each other” “a means” to obtain an “adjudication of their [parentage.]”¹⁰ Actions to establish parentage under G.L. c. 209C may be brought by, among others, “a person presumed to be” the child's parent. See G.L. c. 209C, § 5 (enumerating persons entitled to bring actions to establish “paternity, support, visitation or custody of a child” born out of wedlock); G.L. c. 209C, § 6 (defining presumed parentage). Here, Partanen contends that she is “presumed to be” the children's mother, and therefore may pursue an action for parentage.

To survive a motion to dismiss, Partanen must allege facts sufficient to establish that she is a “presumed parent” under G.L. c. 209C, two provisions of which are relevant here. First, she must allege that Jo and Ja are “children” as that term is used in the statute, i.e., people “born to a man and woman who are not married to each other.” See G.L. c. 209C, § 1. Read in gender-neutral terms, see G.L. c. 209C, § 21 ; G.L. c. 4, § 6, Fourth, this requires an allegation that the children were “born to [two people] who are not married to each other.”

Second, Partanen must allege adequately that she satisfied the “holding out” provision of G.L. c. 209C, § 6 (a ), which states:

“(a ) In all actions under this chapter a man is presumed to be the father of a child ... if:

“...

“(4) while the child is under the age of majority, he, jointly with the mother, received the child into their home and openly held out the child as their child.”

In gender-neutral terms, Partanen must allege that she, “jointly with the mother [i.e., Gallagher], received the child[ren] into their home, and openly held out the child[ren] as their child[ren].”

Partanen maintains that the facts alleged in her complaint satisfy both the “born to” and “holding out” provisions. With respect to the requirement that the children be “born to” two people, G.L. c. 209C, § 1, Partanen asserts that the children were born both to her and to Gallagher, because Gallagher's pregnancies and the children's births took place with Partanen's “full acknowledgment, participation, and consent.”¹¹ She asserts also, with respect to the “holding out” provision, that she and Gallagher jointly received the children into their home and openly held out the children as theirs. See G.L. c. 209C, § 6 (a ). Gallagher contends, however, that Partanen's complaint cannot survive a motion to dismiss because the provisions of G.L. c. 209C—and, in particular, those in G.L. c. 209C, § 6, concerning presumed parentage—were intended only as a means of establishing biological parentage, and are inapplicable where, as here, it is known that no biological connection exists.

The question we must address, then, is whether Partanen may establish that she is the children's “presumed parent” under G.L. c. 209C, § 6 (a ), by alleging that the children were born to her and to Gallagher, were received jointly into their home, and were openly held out as the couple's children, where it is known that she has no biological relationship to the children.

c. Statutory construction. As with all statutes, G.L. c. 209C must be construed “according to the intent of the Legislature ascertained from all its words construed by the ordinary and approved usage of the language, considered in connection with the cause of its enactment, the mischief or imperfection to be remedied and the main object to be accomplished, to the end that the purpose of its framers may be effectuated.” Seideman v. Newton, 452 Mass. 472, 477, 895 N.E.2d 439 (2008), quoting Hanlon v. Rollins, 286 Mass. 444, 447, 190 N.E. 606 (1934).

We turn first to the statutory language. Se...