PASCAGOULA MUN. SEPARATE SCHOOL DIST. v. Barton, 2000-CC-00035-SCT.

• Decision Date: 01 February 2001
• Docket Number: No. 2000-CC-00035-SCT.,2000-CC-00035-SCT.
• Citation: 776 So.2d 683
• Parties: PASCAGOULA MUNICIPAL SEPARATE SCHOOL DISTRICT v. W. Harvey BARTON and Renee Barton, As Parents and Next Friends of William Gentry Barton, A Minor.
• Court: Mississippi Supreme Court

776 So.2d 683

PASCAGOULA MUNICIPAL SEPARATE SCHOOL DISTRICT v. W. Harvey BARTON and Renee Barton, As Parents and Next Friends of William Gentry Barton, A Minor.

No. 2000-CC-00035-SCT.

Supreme Court of Mississippi.

February 1, 2001.

Raymond L. Brown, A. Kelly Sessoms, III, Pascagoula, Attorneys for Appellant.

Skip Edward Lynch, Gautier, Attorney for Appellees.

EN BANC.

MILLS, Justice, for the Court:

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

¶ 1. The Pascagoula Municipal Separate School District appeals the Jackson County Circuit Court's decision ordering the transfer of a student from his current elementary school to his sister's school when a space becomes available.

FACTS

¶ 2. Harvey and Renee Barton registered their son Gentry with the Pascagoula Municipal Separate School District (the District) in July, 1999. The District assigned Gentry to Eastlawn Elementary. The Bartons requested that Gentry be transferred "in-district" to Beach Elementary, where his sister attends. The District denied the transfer request on the grounds that no space was available at Beach Elementary at the time of the request. The Bartons assert that the District failed to give effect to a policy adopted May 19, 1998, allowing a child to transfer from one school to another if the child's sibling attends the latter school. The District contends that this policy applied only to middle-school students.

¶ 3. The Bartons appeared before the school board and requested reconsideration of the denial of Gentry's transfer. The request was again denied. The Bartons then sought a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction to prevent the school from denying Gentry's transfer. The chancellor denied the T.R.O. and the requested injunctive relief. The Bartons then filed a circuit court appeal which was dismissed without prejudice to allow a supplemental school board hearing where the Bartons could present additional evidence. Following this hearing, the Bartons appealed once again to the circuit court.

¶ 4. The circuit court entered judgment on December 3, 1999. The judge ruled that at the time of the denial of the transfer request, the school board's decision was not arbitrary and capricious. He further found that the board's reasons for denial were temporary and that a denial when space becomes available would be arbitrary and capricious. The court, therefore, rendered a judgment allowing Gentry's transfer when space allows. Aggrieved by the court's decision to allow Gentry's ultimate transfer, the District timely perfected this appeal.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

¶ 5. A circuit court sitting as an appellate court reviewing a decision of a county school board may not substitute its judgment for the judgment and discretion of the administrative agency on facts introduced. County Bd. of Educ. v. Parents & Custodians of Students at Rienzi Sch. Attendance Ctr., 251 Miss. 195, 208, 168 So.2d 814, 819 (1964). The court must determine whether or not the action of the school board was arbitrary and capricious, unreasonable, or constituted an abuse of discretion. Id. The court must sustain the legal action of the agency if that action is based on substantial evidence. Id.

ANALYSIS

WHETHER THE CIRCUIT COURT ERRED BY ORDERING THE PASCAGOULA MUNICIPAL SEPARATE SCHOOL DISTRICT TO TRANSFER GENTRY BARTON TO BEACH ELEMENTARY SCHOOL AS SOON AS SPACE PERMITS.

Whether the circuit court's ruling amounts to an improper grant of mandamus relief.

¶ 6. The District asserts that the circuit court exceeded its scope of review of an administrative agency's decision by ordering that Gentry Barton be transferred from Eastlawn to Beach Elementary as soon as the next slot becomes available. The District argues that since the court found its action in denying the transfer to be based on substantial evidence and not arbitrary and capricious, the court cannot justify ordering the transfer as soon as space permits. The District argues that "[w]hat the court has done by granting the next slot available is essentially a form of mandamus relief which was not requested nor pled."

¶ 7. The Bartons contend that space availability was the only legitimate reason the school board presented in denying Gentry's request and that such a reason is of a temporary nature. The Bartons assert that no action was brought pursuant to a writ of mandamus and that mandamus has never been an issue in this matter.

¶ 8. In support of its argument that the circuit court improperly granted mandamus relief, the District cites three cases. In Ladner v. Deposit Guar. Nat'l Bank, 290 So.2d 263, 267 (Miss.1973), we stated that "if an administrative officer has discretion in a matter, mandamus may compel the officer to act, but may not control or dictate his discretion for a desired result." In Hinds County Democratic Executive Comm. v. Muirhead, 259 So.2d 692, 695 (Miss.1972), we discussed the rule concerning mandamus:

It is not within the purposes of a writ of mandamus to direct an inferior tribunal to decide an issue of fact in a particular way, when the law has invested that tribunal with original jurisdiction to decide the question for itself. If this were not the rule, the determination of issues of fact, although committed to many different officers and boards in the first instance, would be only advisory to the courts, and local government of all grades would or could be absorbed by, and transferred to, the courts.

Id. (citing City of Jackson v. McPherson, 158 Miss. 152, 155, 130 So. 287, 288 (1930)). The District argues that the court's order directing that Gentry be granted the next available slot usurps the administrative functions of the school board in assigning and approving transfers of students. According to the District's argument, the court may not interfere with the discretion of a school board in this manner by way of "mandamus-type" relief.

¶ 9. Whether the circuit court's ruling is an improper grant of "mandamus-type" relief becomes a question of semantics. The District would interpret the judgment as follows: that the circuit court correctly held the District's action to be neither arbitrary and capricious but then acted contrary to that finding and ordered Gentry's transfer as soon as a slot becomes available. The Bartons would read the judgment as follows: that the circuit court found the temporary denial of Gentry's transfer request to be neither arbitrary or capricious but found the permanent denial to be arbitrary and capricious. Both readings of the judgment are essentially the same, but the former sounds like mandamus while the latter appears to be the result of a legitimate review of an agency decision.

¶ 10. Further, the cases cited by the District are not applicable to the case sub judice. Ladner, Muirhead, and McPherson, each involved actual writs of mandamus against governmental agencies. The case sub judice involves a direct appeal from a school board's decision pursuant to Miss.Code Ann. § 37-15-21(1996) and is not a mandamus action. While the cases cited do outline the limits of a court's authority in actual mandamus actions, they do not offer insight into the District's theory regarding "mandamus-type" relief. In fact, the District has failed to cite any authority in furtherance of its proposition that a court's actions may be characterized as "mandamus-type" or "constructive mandamus" relief. We find this argument to be without merit.

¶ 11. Furthermore, even accepting the District's position that the circuit court's judgment amounts to some form of mandamus, the District has not shown that the circuit court acted improperly. The District asserts that the circuit court, sitting as an appellate court, does not have the authority to "encroach upon the administrative powers of the District in telling the District that it has to transfer William Gentry Barton ... once a slot becomes available at Beach Elementary." Our case law, however, contains many examples of an appellate court modifying an agency decision and mandating a result. In Richmond v. Mississippi Dep't of Human Servs., 745 So.2d 254, 257 (Miss.1999), we found the agency's decision to terminate an employee to be arbitrary and capricious and mandated the imposition of an appropriate penalty less than dismissal or, alternatively, the accumulation of detailed findings on the record why no penalty should be imposed. See also Burns v. Public Employees Ret. Sys., 748 So.2d 181, 183 (Miss.Ct.App.1999) (finding an agency's denial of disability benefits to be arbitrary and capricious and mandating that the Public Employees Retirement System of Mississippi conduct "a neutral and unbiased review of [the claimant's] disability claim"). Thus, contrary to the District's assertions, an appellate court may modify an agency decision and mandate a result. Again, we reject the District's "mandamus" arguments.

Whether the District's assignment and transfer policy complies with Miss. Code Ann. § 37-15-15.

¶ 12. The District asserts that its policy and its refusal of Gentry's transfer comply with Miss.Code Ann. § 37-15-15(1996). That section states:

In making assignments of children to schools or attendance centers, the school board shall take into consideration the educational needs and welfare of the child involved, the welfare and best interest of all the pupils attending the school or schools involved, the availability of school facilities, sanitary conditions and facilities at the school or schools involved, health and moral factors at the school or schools, and in the community involved, and all other factors which the school board may consider pertinent, relevant or material in their effect on the welfare and best interest of the school district and the particular school or schools involved. All such assignments shall be on an individual basis as to the particular child involved and, in making such assignment, the school board shall not be limited or circumscribed by the boundaries of any attendance areas which may have

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