Appeal
From Lexington County William P. Keesley, Circuit Court Judge
PER
CURIAM.
Affirmed
pursuant to Rule 220(b), SCACR, and the following
authorities:
1. As
to Sheriff Lott's argument he was entitled to a directed
verdict or JNOV on Paschal's malicious prosecution cause
of action based on Paschal's failure to show a lack of
probable cause: Sabb v. S.C. State Univ., 350 S.C
416, 427, 567 S.E.2d 231, 236 (2002) ("In ruling on
directed verdict or JNOV motions, the trial court is required
to view the evidence and the inferences that reasonably can
be drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the party
opposing the motions."); id. ("The trial
court must deny the motions when the evidence yields more
than one inference or its inference is in doubt.");
Hinkle v. Nat'l Cas. Ins. Co., 354 S.C. 92, 96
579 S.E.2d 616, 618 (2003) ("[An appellate court] will
reverse the trial court's rulings on these motions only
[when] there is no evidence to support the rulings or [when]
the rulings are controlled by an error of law.");
McBride v. Sch. Dist. of Greenville Cty., 389 S.C
546, 565, 698 S.E.2d 845, 855 (Ct. App. 2010) (listing the
elements of a malicious prosecution cause of action); Law
v. S.C. Dep't of Corr., 368 S.C. 424, 436, 629
S.E.2d 642, 649 (2006) ("Probable cause means 'the
extent of such facts and circumstances as would excite the
belief in a reasonable mind acting on the facts within the
knowledge of the prosecutor that the person charged was
guilty of a crime for which he has been charged, and only
those facts and circumstances which were or should have been
known to the prosecutor at the time he instituted the
prosecution should be considered.'" (quoting
Parrott v. Plowden Motor Co., 246 S.C. 318, 322, 143
S.E.2d 607, 609 (1965))); id. ("Although the
question of whether probable cause exists is ordinarily a
jury question, it may be decided as a matter of law when the
evidence yields but one conclusion.").
2. As
to Sheriff Lott's argument he was entitled to a directed
verdict or JNOV on Paschal's malicious prosecution cause
of action based on Paschal's failure to show termination
of the proceedings in her favor: Sabb, 350 S.C. at
427, 567 S.E.2d at 236 ("In ruling on directed verdict
or JNOV motions, the trial court is required to view the
evidence and the inferences that reasonably can be drawn
therefrom in the light most favorable to the party opposing
the motions."); id. ("The trial court must
deny the motions when the evidence yields more than one
inference or its inference is in doubt.");
Hinkle, 354 S.C. at 96, 579 S.E.2d at 618 ("[An
appellate court] will reverse the trial court's rulings
on these motions only [when] there is no evidence to support
the rulings or [when] the rulings are controlled by an error
of law."); McBride, 389 S.C. at 565, 698 S.E.2d
at 855 (listing the elements of a malicious prosecution cause
of action); Rule 2(a), SCRCrimP ("Any defendant charged
with a crime not triable by a magistrate shall be brought
before a magistrate and shall be given notice of his right to
a preliminary hearing solely to determine whether sufficient
evidence exists to warrant the defendant's detention and
trial."); Rule 2(c), SCRCrimP ("If probable cause
be found by the magistrate, the defendant shall be bound over
to the Court of General Sessions. If there be a lack of
probable cause, the defendant shall be discharged; but his
discharge shall not prevent the State from instituting
another prosecution for the same offense.");
Harrelson v. Johnson, 119 S.C. 59, 63, 111 S.E. 882,
883 (1922) (highlighting the distinction between a
magistrate's order dismissing charges, which terminates
the prosecution, and a solicitor's entry of a nolle
prosequi, which can be recalled), overruled on other
grounds by McKenney v. Jack Eckerd Co., 304 S.C. 21, 22,
402 S.E.2d 887, 888 (1991); State v. Gaskins, 263
S.C. 343, 347, 210 S.E.2d 590, 592 (1974) ("A [n]olle
prosequi is a formal entry on the record by the prosecuting
officer by which he declares he will not prosecute the case
further."); State v. Ridge, 269 S.C. 61, 64,
236 S.E.2d 401, 402 (1977) ("[T]he entering of a nolle
prosequi at any time before the jury is impaneled and sworn
is within the discretion of the solicitor; the trial judge
may not direct or prevent a [nolle prosequi] at that
time."); Ruff v. Eckerds Drugs, Inc., 265 S.C.
563, 566, 220 S.E.2d 649, 651 (1975) (holding a
magistrate's dismissal of a disorderly conduct charge was
a termination of the proceedings in favor of the plaintiff in
a malicious prosecution action); Mack v. Riley, 282
S.C. 100, 102, 316 S.E.2d 731, 732 (Ct. App. 1984)
("[T]he discharge of the accused by a magistrate on a
preliminary investigation is a sufficient termination as will
sustain [a malicious prosecution action]."),
overruled on other grounds by McKenney, 304 S.C. at
22, 402 S.E.2d at 888; Jennings v. Clearwater Mfg.
Co., 171 S.C. 498, 505- 06, 172 S.E. 870, 873 (1934)
("[T]he remedy accorded a citizen of damages for a
malicious prosecution is intended to prevent and redress the
malicious abuse of the process of the law, and . . . when the
particular proceeding instituted in malice ha[s] been legally
terminated, the remedy of the injured party has matured; he
is not required to await an acquittal, an adjudication of his
innocence, which may never come[] and may be purposely
prevented." (quoting Harrelson, 119 S. C. at
61, 111 S. E. at 882, overruled on other grounds by
McKenney, 304 S.C. at 22, 402 S.E.2d at 888)).
3. As
to Sheriff Lott's argument he was entitled to a directed
verdict or JNOV on Paschal's abuse of process cause of
action: Sabb, 350 S.C. at 427, 567 S.E.2d at 236
("In ruling on directed verdict or JNOV motions, the
trial court is required to view the evidence and the
inferences that reasonably can be drawn therefrom in the
light most favorable to the party opposing the
motions."); id. ("The trial court must
deny the motions when the evidence yields more than one
inference or its inference is in doubt.");
Hinkle, 354 S.C. at 96, 579 S.E.2d at 618 ("[An
appellate court] will reverse the trial court's rulings
on these motions only [when] there is no evidence to support
the rulings or [when] the rulings are controlled by an error
of law."); Pallares v. Seinar, 407
S.C. 359, 370, 756 S.E.2d 128, 133 (2014) ("The tort of
abuse of process is intended to compensate a party for harm
resulting from another party's misuse of the legal
system."); Swicegood v. Lott, 379 S.C. 346,
351-52, 665 S.E.2d 211, 213 (Ct. App. 2008) (holding an abuse
of process cause of action "consists of two elements: an
ulterior purpose, and a willful act in the use of the process
that is not proper in the regular conduct of the
proceeding"); Pallares, 407 S.C. at 370-71, 756
S.E.2d at 133 (holding the ulterior or improper purpose
element "exists if the process is used to secure an
objective that is 'not legitimate in the use of the
process.'" (quoting D.R. Horton, Inc. v. Wescott
Land Co., 398 S.C. 528, 551, 730 S.E.2d 340, 352 (Ct.
App. 2012))); Swicegood, 379 S.C. at 353, 665 S.E.2d
at 214 ("[T]he isolated statement in Guider v.
Churpeyes, Inc. that
'[r]egardless, there is no liability
when the process has been carried out to its authorized
conclusion, even though with bad intentions[]' . . .
should not be interpreted to mean that no liability may ever
arise [when] the process is carried to its authorized
conclusion." (first alteration and emphasis by court)
(quoting Guider, 370 S.C. 424, 432, 635 S.E.2d 562,
566 (Ct. App. 2006))); id. ("[T]he essence of
the tort of abuse of process centers on events occurring
outside of the process . . . ."); id. at
353-54, 665 S.E.2d at 215 ("The 'willful act'
element of the abuse of process tort has been interpreted by
this court to consist of three different components: 1) an
act that is either willful or overt; 2) in the use of the
process; 3) that is ultimately reprehensible because it is
either (a) unauthorized or (b) aimed at an illegitimate
collateral objective.").
4. As
to Sheriff Lott's argument the trial court erred by
submitting to the jury the question of whether Sheriff
Lott's employee complied with the procedure in section
22-5-110 of the South Carolina Code (Supp. 2017) when she
obtained warrants for Paschal's arrest: §
22-5-110(B)(1) ("An arrest warrant may not be issued for
the arrest of a person unless sought by a law enforcement
officer acting in their official capacity."); State
v. Sweat, 386 S.C. 339, 350, 688 S.E.2d 569, 575 (2010)
("A statute as a whole must receive a practical
reasonable, and fair interpretation consonant with the
purpose, design, and policy of the lawmakers." (quoting
Browning v. Hartvigsen, 307 S.C. 122, 125, 414
S.E.2d 115, 117 (1992))); Kennedy v. Griffin, 358
S.C. 122, 130, 595 S.E.2d 248, 252 (Ct. App. 2004)
("[When] there is evidence from which...
