Passini v. Industrial Commission of Colorado

• Citation: 64 Colo. 349,171 P. 369
• Decision Date: 04 March 1918
• Docket Number: 9294.
• Parties: PASSINI v. INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF COLORADO et al.
• Court: Colorado Supreme Court

171 P. 369

64 Colo. 349

PASSINI v. INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF COLORADO et al.

No. 9294.

Supreme Court of Colorado, En Banc.

March 4, 1918

Error to District Court, City and County of Denver; John I Mullins, Judge.

Workmen's compensation proceedings by Pietro Passini against the American Smelting & Refining Company. From an award by the Industrial Commission, the claimant appealed to the district court, and from a judgment sustaining a demurrer to his complaint, he brings error. Affirmed.

George Allan Smith, of Denver, for plaintiff in error.

Henry A. Dubbs and Henry C. Vidal, both of Denver, for defendant in error American Smelting & Refining Co.

Leslie E. Hubbard, Atty. Gen., and John L. Schweigert, Asst. Atty Gen., for defendant in error Industrial Commission.

BAILEY J.

This case is here on writ of error to review a judgment of the district court sustaining a demurrer to the complaint in an appeal from the findings of the State Industrial Commission.

The claimant was injured in May, 1916, by falling from a platform. From the time of the injury until the hearing before the Commission he had received compensation from, and had been cared for and received medical attention through the defendant, the American Smelting &amp Refining Company, in whose employment he was when injured. On December 8th, 1916, he was awarded compensation to January 5th, 1917, by the Commission. At that time his injuries were found to consist of a bruised shoulder, and traumatic neurosis, which latter was held to be the proximate result of the accident. On February 16th, 1917, the case was reopened by the Commission, for the purpose of determining the extent of other alleged disabilities. The defendant company denied further liability, but expressed willingness to provide additional treatment. It was thereupon ordered by the Commission that if claimant would subject himself to medical and hospital treatment he should be awarded compensation from and after January 5th, 1917. But should he fail and refuse to avail himself of the proposed treatment, that the original order, denying compensation after such date, should stand.

On April 7th, 1917, he filed a petition for rehearing, which was denied. On May 19th he filed another petition for rehearing, which was granted, and on June 11th, after what was to all intents and purposes a primary or original trial, the Commission set aside the February award and affirmed the award of December 8th. Without applying for a new trial he brought action in the district court, where his complaint was dismissed on demurrer, and the findings and award of the Commission sustained.

In considering questions arising out of the sufficiency of the evidence which supports the award, it must be borne in mind that the court is expressly bound by statute. Section 83, chapter 179, Laws 1915, is as follows:

'The Commission or any party who may consider himself aggrieved by a judgment entered upon a review of any such finding, order or award, may have questions of law only reviewed * * * by the supreme court.'

This court may consider only the legal question of whether there is evidence to support the findings, and not whether the Commission has misconstrued its probative effect. The award is conclusive upon all matters of fact properly in dispute before the Commission, where supported by evidence, or reasonable inference to be drawn therefrom. Papinaw v. Grand Trunk Ry. Co., 189 Mich. 441, 155 N.W. 545; Redfield v. Michigan Ins. Co., 183 Mich. 633, 150 N.W. 362; William Rahr Co. v. Industrial Com. (Wis.) 163 N.W. 646; In re Von Ette, 223 Mass. 56, 111 N.E. 696, L.R.A. 1916D, 641; Oniji v. Studebaker Corp. (Mich.) 163 N.W. 23; Honnold on Workmen's Compensation, § 242.

So far as the merits of the case are concerned, there is nothing in the record upon which the findings of the Commission may be properly set aside. It appears, however, that the district court sustained the demurrer to the...