Passons v. Christensen
| Docket Number | 1:18-cv-00344-DCN |
| Decision Date | 07 September 2023 |
| Parties | RUSSELL ALLEN PASSONS, Petitioner, v. JAY CHRISTENSEN, Respondent. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Idaho |
Previously in this matter, the Court dismissed several of Petitioner Russell Allen Passons' claims on procedural grounds Claims 1, 3(e), 4(a), 5 (a), 5(b), 5(c). Dkt. 30. Petitioner was permitted to proceed to the merits of the following claims in his Amended Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Dkt. 17): 2, a double jeopardy violation; 3(a), 3(b), and 3(c), prejudicial trial court evidentiary rulings characterized as Sixth/Fourteenth Amendment fair trial claims; 3(d), cumulative error, brought as a Fourteenth Amendment due process claim; and 4(b), trial court error in not conducting an adequate inquiry into Petitioner's waiver of the right to self-representation. Respondent has filed an Answer requesting denial of these claims. Dkt. 37. Petitioner has filed a Traverse/Reply. Dkt. 41. The Court has considered these filings.
The Court notified Petitioner that it had a potential conflict of interest in cases where the Idaho attorney general's office represents the Respondent, including this one. Dkt 42.
Petitioner filed a waiver of any conflict of interest. Dkt 43.
Petitioner has requested copies of various cases cited by Respondent. Dkt. 35. However, the law does not provide for free copies of case law to indigent prisoners; therefore, the motion will be denied. However, the Court has revisited the cases Petitioner requested to determine whether any has particular application to Petitioner's claims.
Most of the cases explain the law of procedural default, which is not applicable here. For example, Swarthout v. Cooke, 562 U.S. 216 (2011) stands for the proposition that federal habeas relief does not lie for violations of state law. Because the Court has construed Petitioner's claims liberally as federal claims, Swarthout is inapplicable here.
The case, Langford v. Day, 110 F.3d 1380 (1996), holds that a petitioner “may not transform a state-law issue into a federal one merely by asserting a violation of due process”' that case is also inapplicable because this Court has liberally construed Petitioner's state law fair trial claims as federal due process fair trial claims. Holley v. Yarborough, 568 F.3d 1091 (9th Cir. 2009), stands for the same principle as Langford.
The Court will address below the principle that “state courts are the ultimate expositors of state law,” and federal courts “are bound by the state's construction except when it appears that its interpretation is an obvious subterfuge to evade the consideration of a federal issue.” Peltier v. Wright, 15 F.3d 860, 862 (9th Cir. 1994), Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684, 691 (1975).
Petitioner's last request is for a copy of Respondent's recent lodging of certain missing pages of the record. Dkt. 39. This missing portion spanned pages 238-45 from State's Lodging A-2. These pages cover the second motion for a mistrial addressing the officer's comment about a robbery and the court's curative instruction. Respondent has provided copies to Petitioner, thus mooting Petitioner's motion. Dkts. 39. 40.
On direct appeal, the Idaho Court of Appeals described the underlying facts as follows:
The State alleged that Passons entered a retail store in Post Falls and took a car seat and stroller combination (stroller) without paying for it and placed it in his car. Passons then reentered the store, placed a television into a shopping cart, and again exited without paying. However, two store employees observed Passons exit without paying and confronted him in the parking lot. These employees asserted that Passons pulled a knife and pointed it at them and then ran to his car and drove away, leaving the television in the shopping cart.
At trial, Desiree Storck, an acquaintance of Petitioner, testified that Petitioner asked her to try to return the stroller to a different Walmart store. This occurred the day after Petitioner had stolen the stroller. Walmart did not accept the return, and Walmart security staff were watching them and wrote down Petitioner's license plate number after he loaded the stroller back into his car. State's Lodging A-2, pp. 228-30. Police officers then began pursuing Petitioner's car, and after about 25 minutes, Petitioner hit a curb, ending the pursuit. Police officers apprehended Petitioner at gunpoint. Id. at 230-32.
Petitioner was charged with one count of burglary and two counts of aggravated assault in a criminal action in the First Judicial District Court in Kootenai County, Idaho. He was also charged with using a deadly weapon in the commission of a crime and with being a persistent violator. State's Lodging A-1, pp. 54-56. The theme of Petitioner's defense was that the employees were mistaken or lying about the presence of the knife, escalating a simple shoplifting case into a serious criminal matter with a much longer prison sentence.
Petitioner initially was represented by an attorney from the public defender's office, Brad Chapman, but Petitioner later moved to represent himself. State's Lodging A-1, pp. 20, 35-37. Chapman remained on the case as stand-by counsel. Id., p.41; State's Lodging F-4, p. 2. Shortly afterward, Petitioner complained about his limited pro se resources, and the Court strongly encouraged Petitioner to allow Chapman to represent him; Petitioner agreed. State's Lodgings A-1, pp. 95-97; F-4, p. 2. Chapman represented Petitioner at trial. State's Lodgings A-1, pp. 213-36 & A-2, pp. 6-329.
Witnesses for the prosecution included Desiree Storck, several Walmart employees (including the victims), and a law enforcement officer. See State's Lodging A-2. Before concluding the trial, the judge carefully reviewed with Petitioner whether he understood he had the right to testify and the right to remain silent, and that it was his choice, not his attorney's choice, to testify or remain silent. Id., pp. 254-56. Petitioner chose to remain silent, and his attorney called no witnesses to testify on his behalf. Id. at 254-256.
The jury found Petitioner guilty of burglary and both counts of aggravated assault. State's Lodgings A-1, p.273 & A-7, pp. 296-297. Petitioner waived his right to a jury trial on the two sentence enhancements. State's Lodging A-7, pp. 302-05. The trial court found the State had proved the deadly weapon enhancement on one count but did not prove the persistent violator enhancement. State's Lodgings A-1, p. 303; A-2, pp. 325-339. Petitioner was sentenced to five years fixed for the first assault count; ten years fixed with twenty years indeterminate for the second assault count (including the deadly weapon enhancement); and five years fixed with ten years indeterminate for the burglary count, all to run concurrently. State's Lodging A-1, pp. 315-17.
Federal habeas corpus relief may be granted where a petitioner “is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a). A challenge to a state court judgment that addressed the merits of any federal claims is governed by Title 28 U.S.C.§ 2254(d), as amended by the Anti-terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”).
The AEDPA limits relief to instances where the state court's adjudication of the petitioner's claim:
To assess whether habeas corpus review is warranted, the federal district court reviews “the last state-court adjudication on the merits.” Greene v. Fisher, 565 U.S. 34, 40 (2011). The deferential standard of § 2254(d) applies regardless of whether the state court decision “is unaccompanied by an opinion explaining the reasons relief has been denied.” Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 98 (2011). “When a federal claim has been presented to a state court and the state court has denied relief, it may be presumed that the state court adjudicated the claim on the merits in the absence of any indication or state-law procedural principles to the contrary.” Id. at 99. When the last adjudication on the merits provides a reasoned opinion, federal courts evaluate the opinion as the grounds for denial. 28 U.S.C. 2254(d).
As to the facts, the United States Supreme Court has clarified “that review under § 2254(d)(1) is limited to the record that was before the state court that adjudicated the claim on the merits.” Cullen v. Pinholster, 563 U.S. 170, 180 (2011); 28 U.S.C. §2254(e)(2). This means that evidence not presented to the state court may not be introduced on federal habeas review if a claim (1) was adjudicated on the merits in state court and (2) the underlying factual determination of the state court is not unreasonable. See Murray v. Schriro, 745 F.3d 984, 999 (9th Cir. 2014). In such case, a “determination of a factual issue made by a State court shall be presumed to be correct,” and the petitioner must show, by clear and convincing evidence, that the factual findings are not just erroneous, but unreasonable, in light of the evidence presented to the state courts. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1); § 2254(d)(2).
Where a petitioner contests the state court's legal conclusions including application of the law to the facts, § 2254(d)(1) governs...
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