Paszkowski v. Stony Brook Paper Co.

• Decision Date: 17 October 1911
• Citation: 96 N.E. 129,210 Mass. 86
• Parties: RASZKOWSKI v. STONY BROOK PAPER CO.
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court

210 Mass. 86

96 N.E. 129

RASZKOWSKI v. STONY BROOK PAPER CO.

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Hampden.

October 17, 1911

COUNSEL

James O'Shea, for plaintiff.

Brooks & Hamilton, for defendant.

OPINION

BRALEY J.

The plaintiff concedes, that an action for personal injuries resulting from a defective condition of the premises 'which is caused by or consists in part of snow or ice' cannot be maintained at common law since the St. of 1908, c. 305, unless within ten days after the injury, notice of the time, place, and cause is given to the persons or corporations responsible therefor. Baird v. Baptist Society, 208 Mass. 29, 94 N.E. 296; O'Donoughue v. Woods, 208 Mass. 473, 94 N.E. 749. But having relied only on the thrid count of the declaration, which states a case under St. of 1909, c. 514, § 127, governing under certain conditions the defendant's liability as an employer, he contends that the earlier statute is inapplicable. The St. of 1908, c. 305, while broad and comprehensive does not in terms purport to be an amendment of existing statutes, yet, as was said in Baird v. Baptist Society, 208 Mass. 29, 94 N.E. 296, 'it must be held that its scope is not limited to defects in ways, public or private, for which a person or corporation may be answerable at common law, but extends to any defect upon the premises whether or not it may be in a way.' It was enacted when Rev. Laws, c. 106, §§ 70-75, were in force, but which subsequently were codified with other laws, 'relating to labor' by the St. of 1909, c. 514, §§ 127-132. The Legislature when it passed the statute in question must be presumed to have known of the provisions of the employer's liability act subjecting the employer if notice was given within sixty days, under section 75, to an action for damages for injuries caused to employés by defective ways, works and machinery which of course, would include the premises used in the business. It also had been decided, that if the premises became unsafe from accumulated snow and ice, there was evidence for the jury under the statute of the defendant's negligence; and that if the plaintiff's due care and the defendant's negligence were proved, he could have prevailed at common law, and resort to the statutory remedy did not enlarge the cause of action. Ryalls v. Mechanics' Mills, 150 Mass. 190, 22 N.E. 766, 5 L. R. A. 667; Urquhart v. Smith & Anthony Stone Co., 192 Mass. 257, 78 N.E. 410. It having been deemed expedient as the law stood to provide, that the notice required by St. of 1908, c. 305, should be a condition precedent to recovery, where the injury was caused in the manner described, no distinction was made as to the class of persons who might be affected, and section 75 having been modified accordingly, the defendant's liability to an action for damages depended upon compliance with the requirement, and not upon the from of procedure by which it could be enforced. By the St....