Patchette v. Nix
| Decision Date | 29 November 1991 |
| Docket Number | Nos. 90-1853,90-1868,s. 90-1853 |
| Citation | 952 F.2d 158 |
| Parties | William Leroy PATCHETTE; Wayne Pickerell; Frank Longstreet; Don Steel; Steve Kick; and Richard Taylor, Appellees/Cross-Appellants, v. Crispus C. NIX and Paul Grossheim, Appellants/Cross-Appellees. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Eighth Circuit |
William Hill, Asst. Atty. Gen., Des Moines, Iowa, argued , for appellants.
Philip B. Mears, Iowa City, Iowa, argued, for appellees.
Before JOHN R. GIBSON and BOWMAN, Circuit Judges, and SACHS, * District Judge.
William Leroy Patchette, a prisoner at Iowa State Penitentiary Farm I, sometimes referred to as the Augusta Unit, cross-appeals the decision of the United States District Court for the Southern District of Iowa 1 that conditions at Farm I do not violate the Eighth Amendment of the United States Constitution. Farm I prison officials appeal the district court's decision that they restricted visitation privileges in violation of the inmates' due process rights.
Farm I is a minimum security facility originally designed to hold 65 inmates. Prison officials gradually increased the population of Farm I to 120 inmates because they anticipated the transfer of inmates from Farm I to a nearby facility, Farm III, which was closed but expected to reopen.
To accommodate the increased number of prisoners, prison officials converted Farm I's downstairs visiting room into a dormitory for 30 inmates. The overcrowding allegedly caused excessive noise and poor ventilation, and overburdened Farm I's toilets, urinals, showers, and sinks. The most egregious claim presented, and the issue developed and argued on cross-appeal, relates to insufficiency of toilet facilities.
To alleviate the effects caused by the overcrowding, prison authorities extended the hours during which inmates could use the showers, telephones, and dining hall. The prison officials also modified the visitation schedule to reflect the reduction in visitation area, effectively diminishing weekend visitation privileges by one half.
Patchette instituted this action in October 1989, contending that the inmates had a liberty interest in the existing visitation regulations and schedule which were altered without complying with state standards for regulation changes. Patchette also claims that the overcrowded prison conditions violated the Eighth Amendment. Responding quickly to the complaint, the district court scheduled a prompt hearing, attempting to develop the facts without appointment of counsel. Upon learning that the move to Farm III would not be feasible in February 1990, as originally forecast, but would be delayed until mid-April 1990, the court appointed counsel and held a further hearing as soon as counsel were prepared. The district court ultimately agreed that the regulations provided a liberty interest in the existing visitation hours and that defendants had summarily changed rather than applied the visitation rights of inmates, contrary to due process. The court did not find an Eighth Amendment violation. Patchette and the prison officials appealed.
A liberty interest may arise from state laws. Kentucky Dept. of Corrections v. Thompson, 490 U.S. 454, 460, 109 S.Ct. 1904, 1908, 104 L.Ed.2d 506 (1989). To determine whether state laws create a liberty interest, the state regulations and procedures must 1) place "substantive limitations on the exercise of official discretion;" and 2) contain " 'explicitly mandatory language,' i.e., specific directives to the decision maker that if the regulations' substantive predicates are present, a particular outcome must follow." Id. at 462-63, 109 S.Ct. at 1909-10. This method of inquiry requires the court to examine closely the language of the relevant statutes and regulations. Id. at 461, 109 S.Ct. at 1909.
Section 21.5(1) of the Iowa Administrative Code relating to the Corrections Department governs prison visitation. The relevant visitation rule for minimum security units (including Farm I) provided: "Visiting hours are Saturday, Sunday, and state holidays from 8:30 a.m. to 3:30 p.m."
On October 5, 1989, the warden at the Iowa Men's Penitentiary implemented "emergency visitation procedures" limiting visitation to alternate weekends rather than every weekend. The prison officials contend that Section 20.3(16) and the current Section 20.3(246) authorize such summary modification of the visiting hours. These sections provided:
(16) Visiting procedures may be temporarily modified or suspended in the following circumstances: riot, disturbance, fire, labor dispute, space restriction, natural disaster, or other extreme emergency.
(246) Inmates are encouraged to maintain and strengthen relationships with family members and friends. Though visits are encouraged as a means to accomplish this, the number and length of visits may be limited by the institution's schedule, space, personnel constraints, treatment consideration, or other substantial reasons relating to the safety and security of the institution and its operations.
The district court held that Administrative Code §§ 20.3 and 21.5 established a liberty interest in weekend visitation under the Thompson test. Therefore, it ruled that defendants violated the plaintiffs' constitutional rights under the Fourteenth Amendment by unreasonably and unnecessarily restricting weekend visitation without having the Code changed prospectively or otherwise providing due process. Although the "emergency visitation restrictions" ended when inmates were moved into Farm III on April 16, 1990, the district court concluded that a reasonable likelihood existed that prison officials would restrict visitation again should Farm I become overcrowded. Consequently, the district court entered a decree enjoining the prison officials from modifying visitation without complying with due process. 2
We agree with the district court that the visitation regulations created a liberty interest. Much like the Kentucky regulations in Thompson, the regulations and procedures at issue provide certain substantive predicates to guide the decision maker. Section 21.5 fixes visitation hours at certain times. Sections 20.3(16) and (246) allow modification only when the listed conditions exist; i.e., extreme emergency or substantial reasons related to the safety and security of the institution. These regulations limit prison officials' discretion when establishing visitation schedules and determine whether the visitation privileges should be altered.
The Administrative Code regulations satisfy the second part of the Thompson test requiring relevant mandatory language. Absent the circumstances listed in Section 20.3, the regulations establish that visitation will occur every weekend as provided by Section 21.5. While the usual mandatory form of words is not used, the language committing the institutions to certain visitation privileges is unqualified by a general retention of discretion. Decision makers and inmates alike are told what hours and days "are" to be set aside for visitation. This is recognized as mandatory language. Thompson, 490 U.S. at 464 n. 4, 109 S.Ct. at 1910 n. 4. 3 We are satisfied that the district court properly found that Section 21.5 of the Iowa Administrative Code creates a liberty interest in weekend visitation which could not be abridged without affording the inmates due process.
The prison officials contend that the overcrowding created an "extreme emergency" or "space restrictions" which allowed summary modification of the visiting schedule. Section 20.3(16). They also contend the visitation restrictions were necessary for the safety and security of the institution. Section 20.3(246).
The district court rejected these contentions because the officials failed to show that the overcrowded conditions created an extreme emergency, safety and security concerns, or space restrictions which necessitated temporarily and suddenly abridging the inmates' visitation rights. The overcrowded prison resulted from the prison officials' decision to house inmates at Farm I until Farm III opened. The Board of Corrections predicted in June 1989 that the loss of the downstairs visitation room would create visitation difficulties but recognized that the unavailability of the downstairs visiting area could be offset by providing alternative visitation areas rather than by restricting visitation.
It will be noted that all of the described events in Section 20.3(16) which would allow a temporary modification or suspension of visiting procedures are clearly within the general descriptive language referring to "extreme emergenc[ies]," with the debated exception of "space restriction[s]." Under normal rules of construction, in common sense and legal parlance, the "space restriction" term should reasonably be understood in context as a restriction occurring suddenly rather than a condition that has been predicted for many weeks or months. As the district court noted, when prison officials planned it that way an event can hardly be described as another "extreme emergency."
The more general provisions of Section 20.3(246) do not supersede the specification of conditions allowing summary action. The wording indicates that the section relates to restrictions on individualized visitation, as when some inmates or visitors abuse the privilege by excessive usage which would so overcrowd the visiting facilities as to inconvenience or frustrate the usage of others. In any event, the section should not be construed in a manner that would place it in conflict with Section 20.3(16).
The court recognizes that the proper reading of rules and regulations should often be left to the parties charged with administration. In the present instance, however, we believe the district court was plainly correct and that defendants' actions were more nearly attributable to a...
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... ... Williams v. Nix, 1 F.3d 712, 717 (8th Cir. 1993) (citing Patchette v. Nix, 952 F.2d 158, 160 (8th Cir.1991), and Thompson, 490 U.S. at 462), 109 S.Ct. at 1909-10; see also Bagley v. Rogerson, 5 F.3d 325, 327 (8th Cir.1993) ("It is commonly said that no liberty interest of this kind is created unless the state statute or regulation involved uses mandatory ... ...
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Madrid v. Gomez
... ... Patchette v. Nix, 952 F.2d 158, 163 (8th Cir.1991) (Eighth Amendment "`draws its meaning from the evolving standards of decency that mark the process of a maturing society'"); Michenfelder, 860 F.2d at 335; Spain v. Procunier, 600 F.2d 189, 200 (9th Cir.1979) (Eighth Amendment is based on the ... ...
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Conway v. Cumming
... ... I also find the search for state-created liberty rights from mandatory language impossible to administer in a fair and principled fashion. Some federal courts following Thompson have expressed unease about the emphasis on mandatory language. See Patchette v. Nix, 952 F.2d 158, 161 (8th Cir.1991) (despite absence of the "usual mandatory form of words," court concluded that "mandatory" language was used); Smith v. Shettle, 946 F.2d 1250, 1253 (7th Cir.1991) ("We are skeptical about placing so much weight on grammatical distinctions, such as those ... ...
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Wilson v. Harper, Civil No. 4-94-70620.
... ... Id. at ___ - ___, 115 S.Ct. at 2298-2300, 132 L.Ed.2d at 426-30; see Patchette v. Nix, 952 F.2d 158, 161-62 (8th Cir.1991); Taylor v. Armontrout, 894 F.2d 961, 963 (8th Cir.1989). The Court observed this analysis "encouraged prisoners to comb regulations in search of mandatory language on which to base entitlements to various state-conferred privileges." Sandin, ___ U.S ... ...