Pate v. Goyne

Decision Date13 October 1947
Docket Number4-8254
Citation204 S.W.2d 900,212 Ark. 51
PartiesPate v. Goyne
CourtArkansas Supreme Court

Appeal from Sevier Circuit Court; Wesley Howard, Judge.

Affirmed.

Boyd Tackett, for appellant.

Abe Collins, for appellee.

OPINION

Griffin Smith, Chief Justice.

W. B Goyne, a resident of Kilgore, Texas, authorized his son, L A. Goyne, to sell 450 acres of Sevier County land. The son who lived at Lockesburg, Ark., listed the property with Oscar J. Pate, a realtor, at $ 11,500. There was a dispute regarding the son's authority, but this becomes unimportant in view of conclusions we have reached. [1]

The contract of June 22, 1945, was that for a period of twelve months Pate should have the exclusive right to sell. Such agency should continue until terminated by written or oral notice. If the property were sold by Pate "during the twelve-month period", Goyne was obligated for a commission of $ 575. The concluding paragraph is: "I further agree to pay said commission to Oscar J. Pate if said property be sold or otherwise disposed of by any other person, firm, or corporation including the undersigned, during the above period, or after the above period, on information given, received, or obtained through this agency".

L. A. Goyne made a direct sale, for $ 11,500, without reference to Pate. The latter claimed five per cent. and sued when refused. With completion of evidence each side requested a directed verdict and neither asked other instructions. The Court then made findings of fact and declarations of law. An appeal is from a judgment disallowing the commission.

Pate testified that immediately after the contract was signed he began making seller-buyer contacts. A prospective purchaser in Louisiana desired information not disclosed with the listing. Thereupon the agent wrote L. A. Goyne that an interested "prospect" wanted to be clear as to certain details. This letter was dated June 27th. Goyne replied the following day, stating that during the preceding night he had sold. He also said, "If you have been out any money I will pay you when I see you". Pate construed the contract to mean that even if the landowner made a direct sale irrespective of information given or effort exerted by him, the commission had been earned because the contract was exclusive.

The Court found (a) on a disputed question of fact that L. A. Goyne was authorized by his father to make the contract, but (b) that the owner reserved the right to act on his own account ". . . unless said property be sold by, or through information given, received, or obtained through [Pate]".

We sustain the Court's declaration of law.

The instrument was prepared by or for Pate. The caption is, "Exclusive Listing Contract". The consideration mentioned in paragraph 1 is services rendered and to be rendered "in selling or assisting [Goyne] to sell or exchange the property". The second paragraph provides that if the lands are "sold or otherwise disposed of by Oscar J. Pate" the commission is earned.

Clearly the two paragraphs are so worded as to justify the belief by one to whom a service offer is made that compensation does not become due until a sale has been effectuated through efforts exerted by the agent or by reason of services, for there is the expression "if the property be sold or otherwise disposed of". But the final paragraph adds materially to what has gone before. Here it is stipulated that the commission is earned "if said property be sold or otherwise disposed of by any other person, firm or corporation including the undersigned". If the contract...

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12 cases
  • MISSOURI PACIFIC RAILROAD COMPANY v. Winburn Tile Mfg. Co.
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — Eighth Circuit
    • June 6, 1972
    ...specific provisions of a contract, the specific provisions ordinarily qualify the meaning of the general provisions. Pate v. Goyne, 212 Ark. 51, 204 S.W.2d 900 (1947); English v. Shelby, 116 Ark. 212, 172 S.W. 817 (1915); United States v. R. D. Wilmans & Sons, 147 F.Supp. 232, 238 (E.D.Ark.......
  • Taylor v. Hinkle, 04-471.
    • United States
    • Arkansas Supreme Court
    • December 16, 2004
    ...While it is true that, as a general rule, the specific provisions of a contract control the general provisions, see Pate v. Goyne, 212 Ark. 51, 204 S.W.2d 900 (1947), under the facts of this case, the appellants are In its order, the trial court cited Article 3, Section 5 of the bylaws, whi......
  • Neece v. A.A.A. Realty Co.
    • United States
    • Texas Supreme Court
    • February 18, 1959
    ...be, without regard to what it is labelled.' Bailey v. Mullens, Tex.Civ.App., 313 S.W.2d 99, loc.cit. 103, wr. ref., n.r.e.; Pate v. Goyne, 212 Ark. 51, 204 S.W.2d 900. The form of contract or listing card involved in this suit contains two captions or labels. One reads, 'Open Listing Agreem......
  • Murphy Oil Corp. v. Liberty Mut. Fire Ins. Co.
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — Eighth Circuit
    • April 21, 2020
    ...Exclusion cannot supersede the specific Alienated Premises Coverage endorsement that was added to the Policy." See Pate v. Goyne , 212 Ark. 51, 204 S.W.2d 900, 901 (1947) ("Where there is inconsistency between general and specific provisions, the specific provisions ordinarily qualify meani......
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