Pate v. Insurance Co. of Va.

• Decision Date: 20 March 1917
• Docket Number: 7871.
• Citation: 91 S.E. 883,19 Ga.App. 597
• Parties: PATE v. INSURANCE CO. OF VIRGINIA.
• Court: Georgia Court of Appeals

91 S.E. 883

19 Ga.App. 597

PATE v. INSURANCE CO. OF VIRGINIA.

No. 7871.

Court of Appeals of Georgia, Second Division

March 20, 1917

Syllabus by the Court.

Ordinarily a policy of insurance upon the life of a married man, where no person is named therein as the beneficiary, is not payable to his wife, but is payable to the executor or administrator of his estate. Where, however, the provisions of the policy can be so construed as to raise a fair inference that it was the intention of the parties to the contract that the amount due under the policy upon the death of the insured should be paid to the wife, she has a right of action against the company, upon its refusal to pay her the amount due at his death.

The court erred in dismissing the action, on general demurrer.

Error from City Court of Columbus; G. Y. Tigner, Judge.

Action by Mrs. Ruth Pate against the Insurance Company of Virginia. Judgment for defendant, and plaintiff brings error. Reversed.

Ed Wohlwender and Hatcher & Hatcher, both of Columbus, for plaintiff in error.

J. L Willis, of Columbus, for defendant in error.

BROYLES P.J.

Mrs Ruth Pate brought an action upon two insurance policies issued by the Life Insurance Company of Virginia to Carl L. Pate, her husband. The defendant filed demurrers, both general and special, to the petition as amended. The court sustained the demurrers and dismissed the petition, and the plaintiff excepted. No beneficiary was named in the policies declared upon, but Mrs. Pate alleged that under the terms of the policies she, as the wife of the insured, was virtually made the beneficiary. Her petition as amended showed that no administrator had been appointed for the estate of her husband, that no administration upon his estate was necessary, and that no other person beside herself was claiming to be the beneficiary under the policies. The general demurrer interposed was, in substance, that no cause of action was in the wife, and that, as no beneficiary had been named in the policies, the personal representative of the insured was the only person who could bring suit upon the policies.

Ordinarily, where no person is named as the beneficiary in a policy of life insurance, upon the death of the insured the amount of the policy is payable to his estate. Boyden v. Massachusetts Masonic Life Ass'n, 167 Mass. 242, 45 N.E. 735. It has been held by the Supreme Court of this state that:

"A stipulation in a policy of life insurance that payment of the amount of the policy to any relative of the insured belonging to a designated class will discharge the company from liability is valid, but such a stipulation does not have the effect to make the person actually receiving the money * * * the beneficiary of the policy. It is merely an appointment, by the parties to the contract, of a person who may collect the amount due under the policy for the benefit of the person ultimately entitled thereto." Ogletree v. Hutchinson, 126 Ga. 454, 55 S.E. 179(2).

In Providence Savings Bank v. Vadnais, 26 R.I. 122, 58 A 454, the Supreme Court of Rhode Island ruled that no one person of a designated class has an exclusive right to recover the amount of the policy, and consequently no one of them has an attachable interest in the insurance funds. A similar ruling was made in Lewis v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 178 Mass. 52, 59 N.E. 439, 86 Am.St.Rep. 463, where it was held that a son could not recover the...