Pate v Pate
| Decision Date | 27 August 2001 |
| Docket Number | 98-00947 |
| Parties | LONNIE GEORGE PATE v. CYNTHIA MARIE PATEIN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE AT NASHVILLE |
| Court | Tennessee Court of Appeals |
Appeal from the Chancery Court for Wayne County, No. 9887
This appeal involves the dissolution of a 23-year marriage. The husband first filed a petition for divorce in the Chancery Court for Wayne County alleging that the wife was chemically dependent and had committed adultery. The wife counterclaimed for divorce, alleging that the husband had abused her physically and psychologically during the marriage. Following a bench trial, the trial court declared the parties divorced in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-4-129(b) (Supp. 2000) and divided the remaining disputed items of marital property. On this appeal, the husband asserts (1) that there is no evidentiary foundation for the trial court's finding that the wife had suffered physical and psychological abuse throughout the marriage, (2) that the trial court erred by declaring the parties divorced, and (3) that the division of the marital estate was inequitable. We have concluded that the evidence does not preponderate against the trial court's finding that the husband engaged in inappropriate conduct during the marriage and, therefore, that the trial court did not err by declaring the parties divorced. We have also concluded that the trial court erred by awarding the wife more than an equal share of the value of the marital residence and by failing to award the husband an equal share of the remaining disputed items of marital property. Therefore, we modify the division of the marital estate accordingly.
and Affirmed
William C. Koch, Jr., J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which William B. Cain and Patricia J. Cottrell, JJ., joined.
W. Andrew Yarbrough, Waynesboro, Tennessee, for the appellant, Lonnie George Pate.
George G. Gray, Waynesboro, Tennessee, for the appellee, Cynthia Marie Pate.
OPINIONCynthia Marie Pate and Lonnie George Pate were married in 1974 in Florida. Ms. Pate was twenty-three years old at the time, and Mr. Pate was twenty-eight. Both parties had been married before. Mr. Pate had two daughters from his previous marriage, but the parties had no children of their own. After the parties had lived in St. Augustine, Florida for over fifteen years, Mr. Pate's health problems prompted them to move to Tennessee and to build a house on property given to them by Mr. Pate's parents. They lived in a rustic farmhouse while their house was being built. During this six- to seven-month period, both parties worked on the house and did not seek other employment. Once the house was completed, Mr. Pate found work in a local hardware store, and Ms. Pate opened her own medical transcription and secretarial business.
Both parties regularly consumed alcohol and marijuana throughout the marriage. On several occasions Mr. Pate stopped smoking marijuana and reduced his consumption of alcohol. During one of three periods of relative abstinence, Mr. Pate became concerned that they were abusing these substances and even shared with Ms. Pate's mother and other acquaintances his concerns about Ms. Pate's dependency. At the same time, Ms. Pate began confiding that she had endured physical and psychological abuse during the latter part of the marriage and that she had been involved in two extramarital affairs.
All this came to a head in April 1997 during a five-day visit by Mr. Pate's former son-in-law, his granddaughter, and his former son-in-law's current wife. Mr. Pate did not use marijuana and abuse alcohol during this visit, but Ms. Pate consumed both alcohol and marijuana throughout the entire visit. Soon after the guests left, Mr. Pate confronted Ms. Pate about her substance abuse. He retrieved a box containing Ms. Pate's marijuana from its usual hiding place in the bathroom and set out to throw it into a stream near the back of their house. Ms. Pate followed Mr. Pate and attempted to stop Mr. Pate from throwing $200 worth of marijuana into the stream. Ms. Pate asserted that Mr. Pate pushed her into the stream during the ensuing altercation, but Mr. Pate asserted that Ms. Pate fell on the slippery stones in the creek. Ms. Pate was slightly injured.
Following this incident, Ms. Pate moved in with her parents who lived nearby. For several days, she returned to the parties' house while Mr. Pate was at work to retrieve her belongings and the equipment she needed to operate her business. Soon thereafter, Mr. Pate changed the locks on the doors of the parties' house and, in April 1997, filed a complaint in the Chancery Court for Wayne County seeking a divorce on the grounds of inappropriate marital conduct and irreconcilable differences. Ms. Pate later filed a counterclaim seeking a divorce on the same grounds and asserting that Mr. Pate had physically and psychologically abused her during the marriage.
The parties had divided most of their marital property by the time the case came on for trial. Accordingly, the trial focused chiefly on the parties' opposing claims of inappropriate marital conduct and the division of the remainder of their marital estate. At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court directed the parties to submit letters detailing their proposed classification and division of the remaining martial property. After waiting sixteen days for the parties' letters, the trial court entered an order on January 28, 1998, declaring the parties divorced pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-4-129(b) and awarding Ms. Pate $55,550 of the equity in the martial home, as well as the other items of personal property she had requested.
Mr. Pate filed a timely Tenn. R. Civ. P. 59.04 motion taking issue with the evidentiary basis for the trial court's decisions with regard to the divorce and the division of the remaining items of marital property. On June 25, 1998, the trial court filed an order denying Mr. Pate's request for post-trial relief concluding that "there was ample evidence of mental and physical abuse during the marriage from the testimony of the wife" and that "both parties were at fault in this case." Mr. Pate has appealed and now takes issue both with the trial court's decision to declare the parties divorced and with the manner in which the trial court divided the parties' remaining marital property.
Mr. Pate challenges the trial court's decision to declare the parties divorced on two fronts. First, he asserts that the evidence preponderates against the trial court's finding that Ms. Pate "suffered physical and mental abuse throughout this marriage." Second, he argues that the trial court erred by declaring the parties divorced under Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-4-129(b) and that he should have been awarded the divorce. We have concluded that the evidence does not preponderate against the trial court's conclusion that Mr. Pate engaged in inappropriate conduct during the marriage. From this conclusion, it necessarily follows that the trial court did not err by concluding that both parties were at fault and declaring them divorced in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-4-129(b).
Appellate courts employ the familiar standards in Tenn. R. App. P. 13(d) to review a trial court's findings of fact regarding the grounds for divorce. Earls v. Earls, 42 S.W.3d 877, 911 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2000); Hobbs v. Hobbs, 987 S.W.2d 844, 846 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1998). This standard requires us to defer to the trial court's findings of fact, Fell v. Rambo, 36 S.W.3d 837, 846 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2000), and to presume that these findings are correct "unless the preponderance of the evidence is otherwise." This presumption, however, does not come into play when the trial court has not made specific findings of fact on a particular matter. Burlew v. Burlew, 40 S.W.3d 465, 470 (Tenn. 2001); Crabtree v. Crabtree, 16 S.W.3d 356, 360 (Tenn. 2000).
Reviewing findings of fact under Tenn. R. App. P. 13(d) necessarily requires an appellate court to weigh the evidence to determine in which party's favor the aggregate weight of the evidence falls. The prevailing party is the one in whose favor the evidentiary scale tips, no matter how slightly. McBee v. Bowman, 89 Tenn. 132, 140, 14 S.W. 481, 483 (1890). Accordingly, the presumption of correctness in Tenn. R. App. P. 13(d) requires us to leave a trial court's finding of fact undisturbed unless we determine that the aggregate weight of the evidence demonstrates that a factual finding other than the one found by the trial court is more probably true. Realty Shop, Inc. v. RR Westminster Holding, Inc., 7 S.W.3d 581, 596 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1999).
Our review of a trial court's findings of fact is constrained by the practical recognition that the trial judge, as the trier-of-fact, has a better opportunity to observe the manner and demeanor of all the witnesses when they testify. Whitaker v. Whitaker, 957 S.W.2d 834, 837 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1997); Lindsey v. Lindsey, 930 S.W.2d 553, 556 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1996). Accordingly, we give great weight to a trial court's factual findings when they rest on the trial court's determination of the credibility of the witnesses. Randolph v. Randolph, 937 S.W.2d 815, 819 (Tenn. 1996); Hobbs v. Hobbs, 987 S.W.2d at 847; Umstot v. Umstot, 968 S.W.2d 819, 825 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1997).
Ms. Pate testified extensively regarding Mr. Pate's physical and psychological abuse during the marriage. She recounted two occasions in Florida when he choked her, as well as a similar incident in 1991. She also described how Mr. Pate pushed her in the stream during their confrontation over the marijuana and produced medical evidence substantiating her injuries during that incident. In addition to...
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