Pate v. Plymouth Mfg. Co.

• Decision Date: 08 November 1941
• Docket Number: 15316.
• Citation: 17 S.E.2d 146,198 S.C. 159
• Parties: PATE v. PLYMOUTH MFG. CO. et al.
• Court: South Carolina Supreme Court

17 S.E.2d 146

198 S.C. 159

PATE v. PLYMOUTH MFG. CO. et al.

No. 15316.

Supreme Court of South Carolina

November 8, 1941

Norbert A. Theodore, of Columbia, and J. E. Dudley, of Bennettsville for appellant.

Stevenson & Lindsay of Bennettsville, for respondents.

L. D LIDE, Acting Associate Justice.

Eugene Pate, the appellant above named, was a regular employee of Plymouth Manufacturing Company at its mill plant at McColl, in Marlboro County, as a doffer. He was injured on July 29, 1940, in an automobile collision a number of miles from the mill property, while returning from a baseball game, in which presumably he had participated, and claimed compensation for such injury under the Workmen's Compensation Act, alleging that it was "the result of an accident arising out of and in the course of his employment with the Plymouth Manufacturing Company," American Mutual Liability Insurance Company being its insurance carrier.

The claim came on for a hearing before Coleman C. Martin, Esq. one of the Commissioners, who in due time filed his opinion and award in favor of claimant, which was thereafter reviewed by the full Commission, which by a majority sustained the hearing Commissioner, their opinion and award being filed on April 8, 1941. Thereupon an appeal was taken to the Court of Common Pleas for Marlboro County, which was heard before Honorable E. C. Dennis, presiding Judge, who handed down his order dated May 30, 1941, reversing the Commission. The claimant then appealed to this Court upon five exceptions but counsel for the appellant state in their argument that the sole question for decision in this case is: "Is the evidence as shown by the record and the testimony in the case sufficient to support the findings of facts of the South Carolina Industrial Commission that the injuries received by Eugene Pate were sustained as the result of an accident which arose out of and in the course of his employment with the Plymouth Manufacturing Company, and that such injury was compensable?"

We are of course in full accord with counsel for appellant in the view that the Commission's findings of fact are conclusive, if there is any reasonable basis for the same in the evidence; but the single ultimate question involved in this appeal is, whether or not the injuries sustained by the claimant arose "out of and in the course of the employment," within the meaning of Section 2(f) of the Compensation Act, 39 St. at Large, p. 1233?

This may ordinarily be termed a mixed question of law and of fact. But where the evidence is undisputed the question is really one of law only; and upon a careful review of the record in the case at bar we find that there is no real conflict in the testimony as to any material point. The following excerpt from the carefully prepared order of Judge Dennis is a fair statement of the evidence as contained in the transcript:

"The evidence shows that the claimant, then working as a doffer in the mill with others prevailed upon the Superintendent of the mill to obtain from the corporate authorities financial assistance for a baseball team. A meeting of those interested in baseball was called and at such meeting an organization was perfected by those in attendance. This organization selected the name of the team, elected various officers, including a manager, a coach and a secretary and treasurer; and these officers had entire charge of the affairs of the club. They arranged the schedule of the games, sold tickets, collected in all monies, were responsible for all debts and arranged for the transportation of the team to places where the games were played. At the time of the injury, claimant was riding in the car of a Mr. Tyler, the score-keeper for the club and whose car had been procured by the club in consideration of its furnishing the gasoline. The corporate authorities furnished the initial equipment for the team, consisting of uniforms, gloves, bats, etc., at a cost between Four Hundred and Fifty and Five Hundred Dollars. These supplies were not given to the players but at the end of the season were taken up and placed in storage.

"There is no evidence that the mill exercised or attempted to exercise any control or domination of the club or endeavored to direct its activities, but the entire inference is to the contrary. No extra compensation was given the players and they practiced, as well as played ball, on their own time. Mr. Johnson, the Superintendent, appears to have been a baseball fan and assisted the club in its organization. On one or two occasions he let the club have the use of a car which was furnished to him by the mill for his work, but when this car was used the club furnished the gasoline. Even when they used the telephone in the mill office to arrange games, the toll fee was paid by the club. One or two of the players were not employees of the Plymouth Company. One of them was paid by the club to play ball--another played without compensation. So far as the record shows, no player received from the mill any additional consideration because of his baseball activities. It may be inferentially said that the mill transferred the baseball players to the morning shift, which was from six until two because the majority of the players worked during those hours, but Mr. Johnson, the Superintendent, testified that he could not recall any player being shifted and there was one player who worked the afternoon shift. These stated facts are without dispute in the record and it is impossible for me to see where the corporation had any connection with the ball club, other than from a charitable or benevolent standpoint to...