Patel v. Searles

• Decision Date: 30 September 2002
• Docket Number: Docket No. 00-9552.
• Citation: 305 F.3d 130
• Parties: Jatin PATEL, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Kevin SEARLES and Debra Swanson, Defendants-Appellants.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Second Circuit

305 F.3d 130

Jatin PATEL, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Kevin SEARLES and Debra Swanson, Defendants-Appellants.

Docket No. 00-9552.

United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.

Argued: December 12, 2001.

Decided: September 30, 2002.

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Scott M. Karsten, West Hartford, CT (Sack, Spector & Karsten, LLP, West Hartford, CT, of counsel), for Defendants-Appellants.

Jon L. Schoenhorn, Hartford, CT (Schoenhorn & Associates, Hartford, CT, of counsel), for Plaintiff-Appellee.

Before CARDAMONE, POOLER, and B.D. PARKER, Circuit Judges.

CARDAMONE, Circuit Judge.

This appeal deals with the constitutional right of intimate association. Although clearly recognized in a general way by the Supreme Court and in scholarly writings, all of its boundaries have not yet been fixed. We think it unnecessary for our purposes to attempt to fully remedy that lack. Like the wind that blows where it wills and can be heard, yet no one knows "from where it cometh and whither it goeth" John 3:8, this constitutional right is real despite the lack of exact knowledge regarding its derivation and contours.

Plaintiff Jatin Patel sued defendants Kevin Searles, Chief of Police for the Town of Windsor, Connecticut, and Debra Swanson, a detective for the same town, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, seeking compensatory and punitive damages for alleged violations of his constitutional right to intimate association. Plaintiff also asserted state common law causes of action and, in an amended complaint, a substantive due process claim of defamation under the Fourteenth Amendment. We have before us an interlocutory appeal from a decision and order of the United States District Court for the District of Connecticut (Underhill, J.), dated November 14, 2000, denying defendants' motion for judgment on the pleadings under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c). See Patel v. Searles, No. Civ.A. 3:99CV1230SRU, 2000 WL 1731338 (D.Conn. Nov.14, 2000). We have jurisdiction to hear this interlocutory appeal under the collateral order doctrine. See Locurto v. Safir, 264 F.3d 154, 162 (2d Cir.2001).

In moving for Rule 12(c) judgment on the pleadings, defendants contended that they are entitled to qualified immunity protecting them from suit on the constitutional claims Patel alleged and that no basis exists for the asserted supplemental state common law claims. In denying defendants' motion, the district court held that plaintiff had stated a cognizable claim for the violation of his constitutional right to intimate association, and that the state law claims were sufficient on their face. The court did not address plaintiff's defamation claim. Defendants do not challenge on appeal the trial court's ruling with regard to the common law claims. Since we affirm with respect to the alleged violations of plaintiff's right to intimate association, we need not reach the defamation issue, and leave it therefore for the district court to decide in the first instance.

BACKGROUND

Because we are faced with a motion for judgment on the pleadings, we accept the allegations in the amended complaint as true and construe them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. King v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 284 F.3d 352, 355 (2d Cir.2002). Those allegations describe the circumstances in which this case arises as follows: on March 21, 1996 the plaintiff's mother and sister, Champa and Anita Patel, were found murdered in their home in the Town of Windsor, Connecticut. Under the direction of Chief Searles, Detective Swanson began investigating this crime. After two months of police work, Swanson had not uncovered sufficient evidence to arrest a suspect. Frustrated by the lack of progress, defendants allegedly focused the criminal inquiry on plaintiff by concocting and disseminating false evidence about him. The officers' intention, according to Patel, was to create hostility and mistrust among the members of his family towards him with the hope that the resulting animosity would produce accusations against him.

Specifically, the complaint asserts that the officers began their scheme in April or May 1996 when one or both of them drafted fake confession letters blaming plaintiff's cousin for the deaths. They mailed the fake letters to two daily newspapers and to plaintiff's father, falsely claiming they came from plaintiff's typewriter. Further, a year later, the officers drafted and disseminated a memorandum that listed the reasons the police suspected plaintiff committed the murders. This memorandum, as summarized in the amended complaint, allegedly contained the following four falsehoods:

a. That a "rift" between the plaintiff and his deceased sister [Anita] was "so severe" that the plaintiff's niece (Anita's daughter) "would not recognize" him. This falsehood is significant because the plaintiff's niece was an eyewitness to the murders, who told investigators that she did not recognize the perpetrator;

b. That the plaintiff's "net worth plummeted from approximately $300,000 in 1995 to $32,000 in April 1996;"

c. That the plaintiff failed a polygraph test and then refused to take further tests;

d. That the defendant [plaintiff] "refused to grant further interviews to answer still open questions."

In November 1997, still without any real leads, Detective Swanson traveled to Tennessee, where Patel had moved as a result, he said, of the officers' actions. There she delivered a handwritten letter to, among others, plaintiff's wife. In the letter, Swanson again falsely accused Patel of the brutal torture and murder of his mother and sister, and further related that Patel was leading a double life — one that Seema, his wife, would likely be the last to know about. For this reason, Swanson stated, Seema and her children's lives were in danger, as Patel "could reach `that point of anger again.'"

Patel declares that because of defendants' conduct he has been completely ostracized from the majority of his family and friends. For example, he states that his siblings and father refuse even to talk to him. Moreover, he contends these actions by defendants forced him to leave his former employment and home in Connecticut. In sum, plaintiff insists defendants Searles and Swanson acted dishonestly and recklessly, leading to the complete destruction of his family and community life.

DISCUSSION

I Standard of Review

We review the district court's denial of defendants' motion to dismiss on the pleadings de novo, Sheppard v. Beerman, 18 F.3d 147, 150 (2d Cir.1994), accepting the allegations in the amended complaint as true and drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party, here the plaintiff. D'Alessio v. N.Y. Stock Exch., Inc., 258 F.3d 93, 99 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 122 S.Ct. 666, 151 L.Ed.2d 580 (2001). A complaint will only be dismissed if "it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief." Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46, 78 S.Ct. 99, 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957). Moreover, where the complaint alleges a civil rights violation, we apply this standard with particular strictness. Sheppard, 18 F.3d at 150.

II Constitutional Right to Intimate Association

As stated, plaintiff avers defendants violated his constitutional right to intimate association and that they are thereby subject to liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. This civil rights law provides a cause of action to individuals who have been deprived by government officials acting under color of law "of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution." 42 U.S.C. § 1983; see Johnson v. Newburgh Enlarged Sch. Dist., 239 F.3d 246, 250 (2d Cir.2001). Defendants respond that they are entitled to judgment on the basis of the affirmative defense of qualified immunity. This defense shields government actors from liability if they did not violate clearly established law, or if it was objectively reasonable for such actors to believe that their actions did not violate clearly established law. Salim v. Proulx, 93 F.3d 86, 89 (2d Cir.1996); see Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640-41, 107 S.Ct. 3034, 97 L.Ed.2d 523 (1987).

We proceed in two steps. First, we address the threshold question of whether the amended complaint alleges the deprivation of an actual constitutional right. Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 609, 119 S.Ct. 1692, 143 L.Ed.2d 818 (1999). If it does, we then decide whether the right was clearly established at the time of the officers' alleged misdeeds. Id. "`[C]learly established' for purposes of qualified immunity means that `[t]he contours of the right must be sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would understand that what he is doing violates that right.'" Id. at 614-15, 119 S.Ct. 1692 (alterations in original).

A. Recognition of Such Right

Defendants concede that the Constitution in at least some circumstances protects familial relationships from unwarranted government interference. This protection derives, in part, from a broader constitutional right to association. See Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 617-18, 104 S.Ct. 3244, 82 L.Ed.2d 462 (1984). In Roberts, the Supreme Court addressed the right to association in two forms: freedom of expressive association and freedom of intimate association. With regard to the latter right, which is the one at issue in this case, the Supreme Court stated such a right is constitutionally protected "as a fundamental element of personal liberty." Id. at 618, 104 S.Ct. 3244. For this proposition it cited a number of substantive due process cases, and noted its long tradition of affording "highly personal relationships a substantial measure of sanctuary from unjustified interference by the State." Id. at 618-19, 104 S.Ct. 3244; see also Wilkinson ex rel. Wilkinson v. Russell, 182 F.3d 89, 103 (2d Cir.1999) ("`parent's interest in the custody of a child [is] a constitutionally protected liberty interest...