Patin v. Patin, 77-2030

Decision Date23 May 1979
Docket NumberNo. 77-2030,77-2030
Citation371 So.2d 682
PartiesMarie L. PATIN, Appellant, v. Carl A. PATIN, Appellee.
CourtFlorida District Court of Appeals

Royce D. Pipkins and Robert H. Walker, Casselberry, for appellant.

Robert O. Marks, Marvin E. Newman and Jon S. Rosenberg & Marks, Orlando, for appellee.

LETTS, Judge.

The wife here appeals a final judgment of dissolution awarding no periodic alimony for the first 6 years after which, permanent alimony of $25.00 per week is to commence. We reverse in part.

This involves yet another breakup of a long-term marriage of 20 years duration with 4 children, three of them minors, the youngest aged 12. Apart from a small award of lump-sum alimony, which we conclude involved no abuse of discretion, the final judgment awarded custody and $80.00 per week child support. No immediate periodic alimony was awarded except that when the last child became of age, permanent alimony of $25.00 per week was to commence.

Both parties are in their early forties, the wife never having worked since very early on in the marriage (before that she was in the service) and the husband having recently retired from the Navy as a lieutenant commander with a take-home after tax weekly pension of $251. At the time of the final hearing he was studying for his masters degree and also receiving V.A. educational benefits of $440 per month. The wife is unemployed and has virtually no income, 1 but possesses limited clerical skills. Both are in good health although the wife claims some emotional problems.

The state of the law is clear that based on the foregoing facts the wife was entitled to permanent alimony on the day of dissolution, McAllister v. McAllister, 345 So.2d 352 (Fla. 4th DCA 1977) and McCloskey v. McCloskey, 359 So.2d 494 (Fla. 4th DCA 1978). It also appears that the trial judge himself felt she was so entitled because he Did award it, although not to commence until a later date. It is clear that if she is entitled to any alimony, she needs support Now. The husband has the present ability to pay alimony, his wife needs it and her former position and circumstance as a lieutenant commander's wife was considerable, Caracristi v. Caracristi, 324 So.2d 634 (Fla. 2d DCA 1976). The husband is also preparing himself, with generous assistance from the V.A., to earn much much more.

As to the $25.00 awarded, it is admitted that the wife left the husband and went to live with another woman. The wife denies any marital...

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6 cases
  • In re Blanchflower
    • United States
    • New Hampshire Supreme Court
    • November 7, 2003
    ...sexual activity by a spouse is consonant with the decisions of other courts that have considered this issue. See Patin v. Patin, 371 So.2d 682, 683 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1979) ; Owens v. Owens, 247 Ga. 139, 274 S.E.2d 484, 485–86 (1981) ; S.B. , 609 A.2d at 126–27; RGM v. DEM, 306 S.C. 145, 410 ......
  • Kaylor v. Kaylor, 78-2167
    • United States
    • Florida District Court of Appeals
    • October 29, 1980
    ...1980); Bashaw v. Bashaw, 382 So.2d 1352 (Fla. 4th DCA 1980); Garrison v. Garrison, 380 So.2d 473 (Fla. 4th DCA 1980); Patin v. Patin, 371 So.2d 682 (Fla. 4th DCA 1979); Kvittem v. Kvittem, 365 So.2d 791 (Fla. 4th DCA 1978); Langstaff v. Langstaff, 363 So.2d 399 (Fla. 4th 1978); West v. West......
  • RGM v. DEM
    • United States
    • South Carolina Supreme Court
    • April 1, 1991
    ...we find no substantial distinction, because both involve extra-marital sex and therefore marital misconduct. Patin v. Patin, 371 So.2d 682 at 683 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1979). In Patin, the trial court made no finding as to the wife's relationship with her female friend, and the appellate court r......
  • Owens v. Owens
    • United States
    • Georgia Supreme Court
    • February 11, 1981
    ...pp. 1249, 1300). Therefore, both extramarital homosexual, as well as heterosexual, relations constitute adultery. See Patin v. Patin, 371 So.2d 682 (Fla.App.1979); Adams v. Adams, 357 So.2d 881 3. We reject the appellant's argument that to construe "adultery" as that term is used in § 38-16......
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