Paton v. LaPrade

• Decision Date: 01 May 1979
• Docket Number: No. 73-1091.,73-1091.
• Citation: 471 F. Supp. 166
• Parties: Lori PATON, a minor under 18, suing by her father, Arthur Paton, Plaintiffs, v. J. Wallace LaPRADE, Special Agent in Charge, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Newark, New Jersey, John Patrick Devlin, Peter McDede, Jr., John Hugh Bryan, Agents for the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and Clarence M. Kelley, The Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, Postmaster General, United States Postal Service, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of New Jersey

471 F. Supp. 166

Lori PATON, a minor under 18, suing by her father, Arthur Paton, Plaintiffs, v. J. Wallace LaPRADE, Special Agent in Charge, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Newark, New Jersey, John Patrick Devlin, Peter McDede, Jr., John Hugh Bryan, Agents for the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and Clarence M. Kelley, The Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, Postmaster General, United States Postal Service, Defendants.

No. 73-1091.

United States District Court, D. New Jersey.

May 1, 1979.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Frank Askin, Rutgers School of Law, Constitutional Litigation Clinic, Newark, N. J., for plaintiffs.

Carolyn Arch, Asst. U. S. Atty., Dept. of Justice, Newark, N. J., David White, U. S. Dept. of Justice, Washington, D. C., for defendants.

OPINION

WHIPPLE, District Judge.

I. Introduction

This action, filed July 24, 1973, is for damages and equitable relief on account of alleged illegal and unconstitutional investigative activity by the defendants. It is presently before the Court on cross-motions for summary judgment. These motions represent the continuing efforts of counsel to narrow the issues to be presented as the trial date rapidly approaches. As a result there are a considerable number of issues presented upon which this Court shall rule.

At the threshold a brief statement of the nature and purpose of summary judgment is in order. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56 prescribes the procedural device for disposing of actions in which there is no genuine issue as to any material fact. 6 Moore's Federal Practice ¶ 56.041, at pp. 56-63. If there is no such genuine issue a court should render summary judgment, if, however, there is a genuine issue as to a material fact, this must be resolved by a trier of fact at trial. See generally, Adickes v. S. H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 90 S.Ct. 1598, 26 L.Ed.2d 142 (1970); Taylor v. Rederi A/S Volo, 374 F.2d 545 (3d Cir. 1967). Moreover, questions of law may be resolved by summary judgment. Mellon Nat'l Bank and Trust Co. v. Nationwide Mutual Ins. Co., 32 F.R.D. 365, 366 (W.D.Pa.1962).

II. Facts

By now this Court and all the parties are intimately familiar with the facts of this case. For those not familiar reference is made to Paton v. LaPrade, 524 F.2d 862, 865-867 (3d Cir. 1975) and to my opinion filed November 29, 1978, Paton v. LaPrade, 469 F.Supp. 773 (D.N.J.1978). Thus I will recapitulate only the most notable facts.

As part of a high school assignment for a course called "Left to Right," Lori Paton, a student at West Morris Mendham High School in New Jersey, wrote a letter which she inadvertently addressed to the Socialist Workers' Party, an allegedly subversive organization upon which the Government maintained mail surveillance. After the F.B.I. intercepted the Paton letter, it tried to determine whether she was engaged in subversive activity. An agent was sent to the local police department, the credit bureau, and to her high school to make inquiries. The field agent determined that Paton had written the letter as part of a high school project and was not involved in subversive activity. He therefore advised his superior to close administratively the file the F.B.I. had prepared on her. On June 13, 1973, Paton's attorney wrote J. Wallace LaPrade, Special Agent in charge of the Newark office of the F.B.I., to inquire about the investigation of Paton. LaPrade responded by letter dated July 6, 1973, stating that "no investigation" had been conducted. Plaintiff claims this answer was an intentionally deceitful and misleading statement intended to discourage or hinder her in seeking legal redress.

A. LaPrade's Liability for Acts Alleged.

At the outset I note that the identical issue was argued before Judge Coolahan, October 11, 1977, who denied summary judgment as to LaPrade without prejudice. Nevertheless I have considered these arguments anew.

LaPrade contends that any theory of recovery against him must be based on "respondeat superior" as he was not personally involved in any of the alleged facts. The doctrine of respondeat superior is unavailable as a basis for imposing liability under § 1983;¹ there must be some showing of personal responsibility. Duchesne v. Sugarman, 566 F.2d 817, 830 (2d Cir. 1977); Hampton v. Holmesburg Prison Officials, 546 F.2d 1077, 1082 (3d Cir. 1976).

In Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 96 S.Ct. 598, 46 L.Ed.2d 561 (1976), an action by various citizens against Philadelphia City officials for alleged police misconduct of a pervasive pattern, the Supreme Court held there must be some causal connection between the acts which "subjects . . . or causes to be subjected" (42 U.S.C. § 1983) the deprivation of civil rights and the supervisory personnel who are named defendants. In Rizzo no such causal connection was found.

There are several methods to create the requisite causal connection between a supervisor and his subordinates. The greater the duty a supervisor has to control those employees who actually committed the violation, the less specific knowledge of the offending conduct the supervisor will be required to have. Santiago v. City of Philadelphia, 435 F.Supp. 136, 152 (E.D.Pa.1977). The existence of general policies and practices within an organization can create a constructive knowledge on the part of the supervisor of the alleged constitutional deprivations. Id.; Holland v. Conners, 491 F.2d 539, 541 (5th Cir. 1974). As the Court explained in Duchesne v. Sugarman, supra:

Unlike Rizzo, in the present case, a jury could find the individual appellees liable, not on the theory that these supervisory officials may be held responsible for the acts of agents which were negligent or contrary to instructions, but rather on the theory that it was the appellees own conduct which resulted in the constitutional violations. It is not necessary for § 1983 liability that the appellees directed any particular action with respect to these specific individuals, only that they affirmatively promoted a policy which sanctioned the type of action which caused the violations. In short this is not a case of indifference, that is, a failure to act in the face of misconduct by subordinates, but is rather a case of affirmative policy-making which may have caused the misconduct. (emphasis in original)

566 F.2d at 831. Causation can be established from the fact that the subordinate's action is an implementation of the policies or practices endorsed by the supervisor. Santiago, supra, 435 F.Supp. at 152.

On the record before me it is clear that there is a question of fact as to what role LaPrade played in the implementation and overseeing of policies and practices which led to Ms. Paton's alleged injury. As such, defendant's motion for summary judgment as to the first cause of action² is denied.

B. The Legal Propriety of Damages for Embarrassment and Notoriety.

Defendants argue that embarrassment and notoriety are not proper grounds for awarding damages. Moreover, if emotional distress attaches to plaintiff's claim there was no attendant physical suffering and as such no damages.

The Third Circuit addressed this issue in their 1975 opinion:

The difficulty of quantifying these injuries is no bar to the bringing of a lawsuit for damages. In a suit for an intentional violation of constitutional rights, it has been held in a § 1983 case that "nominal damages are proved by proof of deprivation of a right to which the plaintiff was entitled." Basista v. Weir, 340 F.2d 74, 87 (3d Cir. 1965). Compensatory damages may be awarded under certain circumstances although no out-of-pocket expenses are shown. Seaton v. Sky Realty Co., 491 F.2d 634 (7th Cir. 1974); Donovan v. Reinbold, 433 F.2d 738, 743 (9th Cir. 1970). Also punitive damages may be awarded in some situations for a malicious and wanton disregard for a plaintiff's constitutional rights even in the absence of actual damages. Fisher v. Volz, 496 F.2d 333, 346-48 (3d Cir. 1974); Basista v. Weir, 340 F.2d 74, 87 (3d Cir. 1965). On this abbreviated record, it is not appropriate to decide whether plaintiff Paton could possibly be entitled to damages, and such issues should not be addressed unless and until the district court is faced with a sufficient record on remand. In view of Paton's allegations of injury and the applicable law of damages in civil rights cases, we cannot sustain the district court's entry of summary judgment denying Paton's claim for damages.

524 F.2d at 871-872. Presently the record before me is not sufficient to rule out the possibility of damages. The type and amount of damages remains a question for the trier of fact.

Additionally defendants claim that any and all notoriety was caused by plaintiff herself, or her teachers and parents heralding the news of the investigation. While this contention is not so "ludicrous" as plaintiff deems, a person is nevertheless, responsible for the natural consequences of his actions. Cf. Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 187, 81 S.Ct. 473, 5 L.Ed.2d 492 (1961). Thus whether the defendants' investigation was the "legal" cause and the "proximate" cause of plaintiff's damage, if any, remains a question for the trier of fact.

C. Legal Sufficiency of the Conspiracy Claims Under 42 U.S.C. § 1985.

The seminal cause of Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88, 102-103, 91 S.Ct. 1790, 29 L.Ed.2d 338 (1971) prescribed the requisites of "coming within" 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3).³ The complaint must allege that the defendants did:

(1) "conspire or go in disguise on the highway or on the premises of another"

(2) "for the purpose of depriving, either directly or indirectly, any person or class of persons of the equal protection of the laws, or of equal privileges and immunities under the laws." It must then assert that one or more of the conspirators (3) did, or caused to be done, "any act in furtherance of the object of the conspiracy," whereby another was (4a) "injured in his person or property" or (4b) "deprived of having and exercising any right

...