Patrick v. Blair
Decision Date | 23 December 1893 |
Citation | 24 S.W. 767,119 Mo. 105 |
Parties | Patrick et al., Appellants, v. Blair et al |
Court | Missouri Supreme Court |
Appeal from St. Louis City Circuit Court. -- Hon. D. D. Fisher Judge.
Affirmed.
Pence & Carpenter for appellants.
(1) The estate conveyed by McManus to Blair, the trustee, vested in Camille W. Patrick, subject to the chattel interest in the trustee. Chew v. Keller, 100 Mo. 362; 4 Kent Com. star pp. 202-206; 1 Jarman on Wills [Bigelow's Ed.], star p. 805, 837; 2 Redfield on Wills, p. 225, sec. 18; Doe v Nowell, 1 Maule & S. 327; Bromfield v. Crowder, 1 B. & P., New Rep. 313; In re Bartholomew, 1 Mac. & G. 353; Croxall v. Shererd, 5 Wallace, 268; Doe v. Considine, 6 Wall. 458; Williamson v Fields, 2 Sanford's Ch. 533; Blanchard v. Blanchard, 1 Allen, 227; More v. Lyons, 25 Wend. 119; Gray v. Garman, 2 Hare, 268; Bland v. Williams, 3 Myl. & K. 411; Land & Loan Co. v. Bonner, 75 Ill. 315; Lunt v. Lunt, 108 Ill. 307; Manderson v. Lukens, 23 Pa. St. 31; Hawley v. James, 5 Paige, 466; Jones v. Waters, 17 Mo. 587; Doe v. Lea, 3 Term. Rep. 41; Stanley v. Stanley, 16 Ves. 491; Doe v. Nicholls, 1 Barn. & Cress. 336. (2) Although the title in Camille W. Patrick was vested it was defeasible by the happening of certain events thereafter. The estate in her is what is known as a defeasible, determinable or base fee. Doe v. Considine, 6 Wallace, 474; Church v. Grant, 3 Gray, 142; 1 Jarman on Wills [Bigelow's Ed.], star pp. 865, 866; 4 Kent Com., star pp. 125, 126, 128, 129; 1 Preston on Estates, 93; Bowditch v. Ayrault, 33 N. E. Rep., May 29, 1893, page 1067 (N. Y. Court of Appeals). (3) The estate being so vested in fee to Camille W. Patrick, and the event never happening upon which it was to be divested, it became indefeasible upon the death of Camille W. Patrick and descended to her heirs at law. (4) An estate being once vested, it can not be divested and sent in another direction, unless the intent be clear to so divest it. 2 Williams on Executors [6 Am. Ed.], bottom p. 1273; Doe v. Considine, 6 Wallace 476; Chew's Appeal, 45 Pa. St. 232; Harrison v. Foreman, 5 Ves. 207; Smither v. Willock, 9 Ves. 234; Malim v. Keighley, 2 Ves. 333; Doe v. Perryn, 3 Term. Rep. 484; Land & Loan Co. v. Bonner, 75 Ill. 327. (5) Whenever the instrument creating the trust contains covenants of warranty, then the grantor is estopped from setting up a resulting trust. If a conveyance is made for a valuable consideration there can be no resulting trust to the grantor. A trust deed cannot be turned into a resulting trust for a grantor by proof that it was without consideration. When a use is declared no other use can be shown to result. 1 Perry on Trusts, secs. 151, 159, 160, 161, 162; Stephenson v. Crapnell, 114 Ill. 19; Kingsburg v. Burnside, 58 Ill. 310; Jackson v. Cleveland, 15 Mich. 94; Graves v. Graves, 29 N.H. 129. Bobb v. Bobb, 89 Mo. 419; Philbrick v. Delano, 29 Maine, 410; Von der Volgen v. Yates, 9 N.Y. 219; Doe v. Considine, 6 Wallace, 471.
E. McGinnis and S. T. Price for respondents.
(1) A will is to be construed, not from particular words, phrases or clauses, but from the whole instrument and every part thereof taken as a whole, and if it contains any doubtful or ambiguous expressions the situation of the testator, the objects of his bounty and all the circumstances surrounding the parties may be considered. Smith v. Bell, 13 Pet. 74; Nichols v. Boswell, 103 Mo. 151; Howland v. Howland, 9 N. Y. Supplement, 233; Rogers' Estate, 29 P. 962; Wager v. Wager, 96 N.Y. 164. The same rule of construction applies also to deeds creating like estates and trusts. Bruensman v. Carroll, 52 Mo. 313; Rutherford v. Tracy, 48 Mo. 325; Cornelius v. Smith, 55 Mo. 528. (2) In construing doubtful or ambiguous phrases in wills and such deeds, courts favor that construction which will prevent property from going to strangers in blood to the testator or grantor. Smith v. Upton, 13 S.W. 721; Davis v. Harding, 80 Ky. 672.
OPINION
On the sixteenth day of May, 1888, Thomas Ward McManus executed and delivered to Gist Blair as trustee, with covenants of warranty, certain real estate (which is described) in consideration of $ 5 "and other considerations moving him thereto." The habendum clause of the deed is as follows:
Then follows a declaration of the powers and duties of the trustee in respect to the management of the property. These fully invested him with authority to collect incomes and profits of the trust property and to invest the same, and in case he should consider it for the best interest of the estate, he was authorized, after obtaining a proper order of the court to sell the real estate or to invest the money and personal property in real estate.
The deed then concluded as follows: "When the said Camille W. Patrick shall arrive at the age of eighteen years, the said Gist Blair, party of the second part, or his successor or successors in this trust, shall convey, assign, transfer and set over unto her by proper deeds, conveyances and instruments, to her sole and separate use free from the debts, claim, interference, control, curtesy or marital rights whatsoever of her then husband or future husband she may have, one-half of the property and estate hereby conveyed, together with one-half of all rents, issues, profits and increase thereof, then in the hands of said trustee or his successor; and the remaining one-half of said estate, together with the remaining one-half of the rents, issues, profits and increase of said estate, the said trustee shall hold to the sole and separate use, as aforesaid, of the said Camille W. Patrick until she shall have arrived at the age of twenty-five years, and shall then convey, transfer, assign and set over all the estate then in his hands to the said Camille W. Patrick, party of the third part, to her sole and separate use, as aforesaid.
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