Patrick v. State
| Decision Date | 23 September 2021 |
| Docket Number | No. 355, 2020,355, 2020 |
| Citation | 261 A.3d 1282 |
| Parties | Corey PATRICK, Defendant Below, Appellant, v. STATE of Delaware, Plaintiff Below, Appellee. |
| Court | Supreme Court of Delaware |
Nicole M. Walker, Esquire, Office of Public Defender, Wilmington, Delaware; for Defendant Below, Appellant Corey Patrick.
John Williams, Esquire, Delaware Department of Justice, Wilmington, Delaware; for Plaintiff Below, Appellee State of Delaware.
Before SEITZ, Chief Justice; VALIHURA, VAUGHN, TRAYNOR, and MONTGOMERY-REEVES, Justices, constituting this Court en Banc.
A Superior Court jury convicted Corey Patrick for multiple drug and weapons offenses. On appeal, Patrick challenges the trial court's decision to permit law enforcement witnesses to testify about the lengthy drug investigation leading to his arrest. Patrick also contests his two convictions for possession of a deadly weapon by a person prohibited. First, Patrick argues that there was insufficient evidence to sustain a conviction for the simultaneous possession of a firearm and a controlled substance because the State failed to satisfy the "possession" element. And second, Patrick claims that his conviction under Count Four of the Indictment for possession of a deadly weapon by a person prohibited (weapon and drugs together) should be vacated as duplicative of his other conviction under Count Two of the Indictment for possession of a deadly weapon by a person prohibited (weapon and prior felony conviction).
We affirm Patrick's convictions except for his conviction under Count Four of the October 7, 2019 Indictment (weapon and drugs together). The Count Four conviction duplicated his conviction under Count Two (weapon and prior felony conviction) and violated the constitutional prohibition against Double Jeopardy. Thus, we reverse and remand to the Superior Court to vacate his conviction and sentence under Count Four of the October 7, 2019 Indictment.
In August 2019, as part of a drug investigation, Delaware State Police detectives observed Corey Patrick and others leave the Christiana Mall in a GMC Terrain to pick up two of Patrick's children near White Oak Road in Dover. The family drove to the Walmart in Camden, Delaware. Police arrested Patrick on a warrant as he left the store. Detective Brian Holl patted Patrick down for weapons and found close to $1,000 in cash and two phones—an iPhone and a TLC track phone.
Police searched the GMC Terrain and found several bags of heroin bundled together with rubber bands in a compartment on the driver's side door. The bags were stamped "Angry Duck" in red ink. Police also found a book bag in the backseat with seven pink ten-milligram oxycodone pills, heroin packaging, and a little over $3,600 in cash.
After arresting Patrick, police executed a warrant to search his apartment. In a partial walk-in closet in the master bedroom police recovered a Glock 388 semi-automatic handgun from a men's shoe box on the top shelf of the closet. The shoe box also contained mail addressed to Patrick. Another shoe box in the closet contained white paper and green cellophane wrap, known to the detective to be heroin packaging materials. A safe on the floor of the closet contained over $5,300 in cash. Police searched the men's clothing hanging in the closet and found in the jacket pocket thirty-three bags of heroin wrapped in blue wax paper bags and twelve unopened Suboxone
strips. The police also recovered bags of heroin in a pair of male jeans lying on a bed and a single bag in a fanny pack near the front door of the apartment.
A Kent County grand jury indicted Patrick on twelve counts of various drug and weapons offenses, including one count of possession of a deadly weapon during the commission of a felony under 11 Del. C. § 1447a, two counts of possession of a deadly weapon by a person prohibited under 11 Del. C. § 1448(a)(1), and another count of the same charge under § 1448(a)(9). At trial, law enforcement witnesses testified about the nearly four-month drug investigation of Patrick by multiple officers from the Governor's Task Force and the Dover Drugs, Vice, and Organized Crime unit. The evidence included the fact that officers regularly watched Patrick enter and exit his apartment daily and monitored his location through use of a GPS device affixed to his vehicle.
Defense counsel objected to the admission of the surveillance evidence and argued that the evidence was unfairly prejudicial because it could lead the jury to infer that Patrick was involved in criminal conduct by virtue of being under investigation by the Task Force and Organized Crime unit. The Superior Court overruled the objections. At the close of the State's case, defense counsel moved for judgment of acquittal on the counts for possession of a deadly weapon during the commission of a felony and for possession of a deadly weapon by a person prohibited. Patrick argued that the State had failed to show that the gun was physically available or accessible to Patrick while he committed the alleged felonies and that Patrick constructively possessed the gun.
The Superior Court granted the motion for possession of a deadly weapon during the commission of a felony charge but denied the motion for all three of the possession of a deadly weapon by a person prohibited charges.1 The jury found Patrick guilty of the possession of the deadly weapon by a person prohibited charges and the remaining drug offenses. The Superior Court sentenced Patrick to 13 years of incarceration followed by decreasing levels of supervision.
Patrick raises three arguments on appeal. First, the Superior Court abused its discretion by allowing law enforcement officers to testify about the lengthy drug investigation leading to Patrick's arrest. Second, the Superior Court incorrectly denied Patrick's motion for judgment of acquittal on the possession of a deadly weapon by a person prohibited charge under 11 Del. C. § 1448(a)(9). And third, his conviction under Count Four of the Indictment (weapon and drugs together) duplicated his conviction under Count Two of the Indictment (weapon and prior felony conviction) and violates the Double Jeopardy clause of the United States Constitution.
Addressing Patrick's evidentiary objection first, we review the Superior Court's decision whether to admit evidence under an abuse of discretion standard.2 Relevant evidence is generally admissible.3 But relevant evidence may also be excluded "if its probative value is substantially outweighed by a danger of ... unfair prejudice."4 A police officer may testify about background facts to give the jury context and to ensure there are no holes in the State's case that might lead the jury to infer improper conduct by police.5 If, however, the usefulness of that testimony to the jury is substantially outweighed by the unfair prejudice to the defendant, the trial court should limit the State's reliance on background evidence.6 This is especially important when the background evidence depends upon extensive hearsay statements or reports.7 In that case, the State should limit its use of inadmissible evidence and employ other means to achieve the same goal—to give the jury background information necessary to set the stage for the accused criminal conduct.
The investigating officers testified at trial that they worked on the Governor's Task Force and the Dover Drugs, Vice, and Organized Crime units; the investigation of Patrick lasted nearly four months; they watched Patrick exit and enter the apartment daily; and they monitored Patrick's activity through a GPS device affixed to Patrick's car. Patrick argues these background statements aroused prejudice that Patrick was likely to have committed the crime.
Patrick also argues that the background evidence is only probative because it shows where Patrick lived and how the officers were able to locate Patrick and arrest him. As Patrick claims, these facts could have been shown by other means. For example, the officers could testify they observed Patrick enter and exit the apartment without saying they did so as members of the Governor's Task Force during a four-month long investigation. According to Patrick, the Superior Court did not properly weigh the danger of the jury inferring Patrick was involved in criminal activity against the weak probative value of the evidence.
We disagree. First, the record shows that the court considered the danger of unfair prejudice versus the probative value of the evidence as required by D.R.E. 403. The trial judge observed colloquially that evidence implicating the defendant in criminal conduct is always prejudicial. But he also held that any unfair prejudice could be addressed through cross-examination.8 Also, the court eventually restricted the State's background testimony.9
Second, the probative value of the evidence is not as weak as Patrick claims. For more than one charge the State had to prove that Patrick possessed the drugs and weapon found in the apartment and the car.10 The State showed the connection by presenting evidence that Patrick lived at the apartment and that he often drove the car. Testimony about the GPS device showed how law enforcement connected Patrick to the apartment and the car.11 While there were other ways to demonstrate Patrick's connection to the apartment and the car, the court in this case did not abuse its discretion by allowing the officers to testify about their roles and the investigation leading up to his arrest.
Patrick also argues that Count Four of the Indictment charged him twice for possession of a single deadly weapon by a person prohibited in violation of the Double Jeopardy clause of the United States Constitution. Because Patrick did not raise this issue with the trial court, we review this claim for plain error.12 To qualify as plain error, the error " ‘must be so clearly prejudicial to substantial rights as to jeopardize the fairness and integrity of the trial process,’ and...
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