Patrick v. Steamboat J.Q. Adams

• Decision Date: 31 October 1853
• Citation: 19 Mo. 73
• Parties: PATRICK et al., Respondents, v. THE STEAMBOAT J. Q. ADAMS, Appellant.
• Court: Missouri Supreme Court

19 Mo. 73

PATRICK et al., Respondents,

v.THE STEAMBOAT J. Q. ADAMS, Appellant.

Supreme Court of Missouri.

October Term, 1853.

1. A witness may be allowed to state the nature of the fracture in a boat caused by a collision, and his impressions derived therefrom as to the position of the two boats when the collision occurred.

2. A party who was an owner of the boat when attached, and when bond was given for her release, is not a competent witness for the boat, even though he may afterwards have sold his interest.

3. A witness testifying as to the general character of a pilot cannot state his knowledge of particular instances of recklessness.

Appeal from St. Louis Court of Common Pleas.

This was an action instituted under the act concerning boats and vessels, by James Patrick and others against the steamboat John Quincy Adams, for damages done to the steamboat Shelby, of which the plaintiffs were owners, by a collision alleged to have been caused by the negligence of the officers and crew of the J. Q. Adams. At the trial. there was much conflicting evidence upon the question of negligence. The plaintiffs read the deposition of William Smith, who testified that he had been a pilot for many years, and knew George Lampton, the pilot at the wheel of the defendant, at the time of the collision. Among other questions put to Smith was this; “Is said Lampton a safe, skilful and prudent pilot, or what is his character as a pilot?” His answer, as written in the deposition, was this: “His character, as to his knowledge of piloting, has always been good, but as regards his recklessness, in many instances to my knowledge, he has not used the care which he should have used. I have heard him make observations that, meeting boats at night, he would run at them to make them run.” To the giving of this answer in evidence, the defendant objected, and the court sustained the objection as to all except that portion in italics, and overruled it as to that portion, to which the defendant excepted.

In the deposition of Henry L. Patterson, read in evidence by the plaintiffs, he testified that he saw nothing relative to the collision before it took place. He was a passenger upon the Shelby, and in bed at the time of the collision, but then jumped up, went into the cabin, and after waiting till the escaping steam, and the noise and confusion of the crash had ceased, he went out and looked at the condition of the boats. He then stated the shape of the fracture made in the Shelby by the defendant's bow, and the impression thereby made upon his mind as to the position in which the boats came together. The defendant objected to that portion of the deposition, in which the witness spoke of his impressions as to the manner in which the boats came together, and his reasons therefor; but the objection was overruled and the evidence admitted, to which the defendant excepted.

The defendant offered to read the deposition of Michael E. Lucas, in which he states that, at the time of the collision, he had an interest in the defendant, but that he had since sold out, with the understanding that those who took it should run the risk of the result of the suit. The plaintiffs objected to the reading of this deposition, on the ground that, at the time of the commencement of the suit, Lucas was one of the owners of the defendant. This objection was sustained by the court. When the boat was seized by the sheriff, she was released upon a bond, to which however, Lucas was not a party.

There was a verdict and judgment for the plaintiffs.

Todd & Krum, for appellant.

I. The admission of the testimony of Smith that Lampton, the acting pilot of the defendant, at the time of the collision, was, to his knowledge, in many instances, reckless, and did not use the care which he should have done, was error.

II. The admission of so much of the deposition of Patterson as gives his impression of the manner in which the boats came together, was error.

III. The rejection of the testimony of Lucas, was error. The boat had been released upon a statutory bond which entirely discharged the boat from the claim, and made the parties to the bond alone liable. Lucas was not a party to this bond; nor was there any evidence that those who were parties, became such at his request, or that he was under any legal obligation to indemnify them. When he gave his deposition, he had no further interest in the boat, having sold out at the risk of the purchaser.

Glover & Richardson, for respondents.

I. The testimony of Patterson, objected to by the appellant, was competent and relevant. The position of the boats at the time of the collision was material. The witness stated his impression, and the facts upon which it was founded. Both went to the jury together. 4 H. & McH., 63. 9 Conn. Rep. 102. 6 Conn. Rep. 9. 2 Pick. 304. 3 Dana, 382. 18 Ohio, 375.

II. The evidence of Lucas was properly excluded, because he was an owner of the boat at the collision, and at...