Pattangall v. Mooers

• Decision Date: 06 July 1915
• Citation: 94 A. 561,113 Me. 412
• Parties: PATTANGALL v. MOOERS.
• Court: Maine Supreme Court

94 A. 561

113 Me. 412

PATTANGALL

v. MOOERS.

Supreme Judicial Court of Maine.

July 6, 1915.

Exceptions from Superior Court, Kennebec County.

Action by William R. Pattangall against John A. Mooers. There was a verdict for plaintiff, and defendant excepted. Exceptions overruled.

Argued before SPEAR, CORNISH, KING, BIRD, and HANSON, JJ.

Pattengall & Plumstead, of Waterville, and Geo. W. Heselton, of Gardiner, for plaintiff. Fred F. Lawrence, of Skowhegan, for defendant.

KING, J. This is an action for slander for certain oral statements by the defendant, alleged to be false and defamatory, and to have been made maliciously concerning the plaintiff, with intent to injure him in his good name and reputation as an attorney at law, and likely to so injure him. The alleged slanderous statements were made on the 12th day of August, 1913, at Skowhegan, Me., first to one Fisher, and afterwards on the same day repeated to one Adams. At that time the plaintiff was one of three candidates, nominees of three political parties for the office of Representative to Congress from the Third Maine congressional district, the election to which office was to be held about a month later. The defendant and both Fisher and Adams were electors in that district. Mr. Fisher's version of what the defendant said to him concerning the plaintiff is this:

"Why, he went on to tell me about the bill that the labor unions was trying to get passed through the Legislature, so if they got injured in any corporation or firm, was the way I understood it, that they should have compensation, if they got hurt in any way, and they went to Mr. Pattangall and asked him what he would put the bill through for, and he said $500. And then the corporation goes to Mr. Pattangall and asked him what he would defeat it for, and he said $500. So he gets $1,000, and defeats the bill."

Mr. Adams' version of the defendant's statement to him is substantially the same as that of Fisher, except that he adds that the defendant said, "And that is your Mr. Pattangall." And the defendant testified:

"I told Mr. Fisher that, as I understood it, there was a bill, one of the worthiest bills, as I said to him, that was before the last Legislature. And I explained to him somewhat the nature of the bill, and I said to him that, as I heard it, Mr. Pattangall was engaged upon one side or the other, and that later he took a retainer from the opposite side, whatever it was I didn't know, and received money from both sides, and I told him that was just how I heard it."

His version of what he later said to Mr. Adams is:

"I repeated to him, as near as I could tell you now, the exact words, substantially the words that I told Mr. Fisher. Mr. Adams said to me, 'John, you wouldn't say that about Mr. Pattangall if it was not so?' or something to that effect. I said, 'I hope you don't think I am that kind of a man.' I think that is all there was said that I remember."

It appears from the foregoing testimony that there was no material controversy as to that part of the defendant's statement which is claimed to be defamatory of the plaintiff. He admits saying that the plaintiff, having accepted money for his services and influence in securing the passage through the Legislature of the Workmen's Compensation Act, also accepted a retainer from the opponents of the act. There appears to be some difference between the testimony of the plaintiff's witnesses and that of the defendant as to whether he made the defamatory statement concerning the plaintiff as a fact of his own knowledge, or as a rumor that he had heard. He claimed the latter. But on cross-examination Mr. Fisher was asked: "You understood that he told it to you as something he knew personally?" And he answered: "Yes, sir; he didn't explain anything about anybody to me." Mr. Adams' testimony on that point was to the same effect. And the defendant does not claim that at the time he made the statement complained of he gave the name of his informant of the rumor, if such it was. The plaintiff recovered a verdict of $279.25, and the case comes up on defendant's exceptions to the exclusion of certain testimony, to the refusal of certain instructions, and to the giving of certain other instructions.

No attempt was made to justify the defendant's statement concerning the plaintiff by proving its truth, and accordingly it must be regarded as false. If it was but the repetition of something he had heard about the plaintiff, he did not give the name of his informant; but the evidence was sufficient to justify the jury in finding that the defendant made the statement as a fact within his own knowledge, and not as a rumor. What was the statement? How was it to be interpreted as applied to the plaintiff? The evidence shows that the plaintiff had been a qualified attorney at law for about 20 years, commanding an extensive practice throughout the state. He had frequently been employed professionally to appear before committees of the Legislature to present and advocate, or to oppose, proposed legislation. He had served as Attorney General for the state, had been a member of the Legislature during four of its sessions, and had been mayor of the city of Waterville for three terms, ending in March, 1914.

Defamatory language is to be interpreted as it would naturally be understood by the hearers of it, taking into consideration accompanying explanations and the surrounding circumstances known to the hearers. It cannot be reasonably questioned that Fisher and Adams, to whom the defendant made the slanderous statement complained of, understood from it that the plaintiff had been employed and paid as an attorney for the labor unions to advocate the enactment of the Workmen's Compensation Act, and that he was guilty of most culpable dishonesty towards his employers, and had basely betrayed their trust and confidence in him by accepting a retainer from the opponents of the act and using his influence to defeat it. If slanderous words, whether written or oral, directly tend to the prejudice or injury of one in his profession, trade, or business, they are actionable. And, when the defamatory words spoken have such a relation to the profession or occupation of the plaintiff that they directly tend to injure him in respect to it, or to impair confidence in his character or ability, when, from the nature of the business great confidence must necessarily be reposed, they are actionable, although not applied directly by the speaker to the profession or occupation of the plaintiff. 25 Cyc. 328. The slanderous statement complained of directly tended to injure the plaintiff in respect to his profession and occupation. If believed it could have no other effect than to destroy all trust and confidence in him as an attorney. We entertain no doubt, therefore, that the defendant's false statement concerning the plaintiff was actionable per se, independent of the question of privilege.

But the defendant claimed and undertook to maintain at the trial that his statement to Fisher and Adams concerning the plaintiff was within the qualified privilege accorded to voters in discussing the qualifications and fitness of a candidate for an elective public office. Therein is involved the important and fundamental question raised by the exceptions.

It is the law everywhere that when a person becomes a candidate for a public office his qualifications and fitness for that office may be freely and fully discussed, commented on, and criticized by any member of the community having an interest in the matter. Such comment and criticism may be harsh, severe, and unnecessarily acrimonious, but so long as it is made in good faith, without express malice, it is privileged in law, and therefore not actionable. The law tolerates such comment and criticism of public men and candidates for public office upon the theory that it is for the public good to do so, to the end that the people may learn the troth as to the qualifications and fitness of candidates for office, and become informed of the manner those in office are discharging the duties of the office, thereby being better qualified to intelligently exercise the elective franchise.

But the authorities are not in accord on the question whether this privilege to make fair comment and criticism of public men and candidates for public office includes the right to make false defamatory statements concerning them.

One view or rule is to the effect that, while fair comment and criticism respecting the qualifications and fitness of candidates for office may be privileged, false defamatory statements of fact concerning them are not within the privilege. This limited rule may be more fully expressed as follows: One who becomes a candidate for election to an office in the gift of the people thereby puts in issue before them his abilities, qualifications, and fitness for that office. And any voter or other person having an interest in that election may fully and freely comment on and criticize his talents and qualifications, mentally and physically, for the office he seeks. The conduct and actions of such candidate may be canvassed, discussed, and boldly criticized. Even his faults and vices, in so far as they necessarily affect his fitness for the office, may be investigated and commented on. His private character, however, is only put in issue so far as his qualifications and fitness for the office may be affected by it. He does not by becoming a candidate for office surrender his private character to false accusation. The public have an interest to know the truth respecting the qualifications and fitness of a candidate for office. But it would not serve the public good to have falsehoods concerning him disseminated among the people. And therefore the law does not Justify, under the guise of qualified privilege, a false defamatory statement of specific acts of misconduct concerning a candidate for office. While the publication of the...