Patten v. Olson
Decision Date | 13 April 1978 |
Docket Number | No. 9419,9419 |
Citation | 265 N.W.2d 688 |
Parties | Kenneth PATTEN and Marian M. Patten, Plaintiffs and Appellants, v. Phyllis A. OLSON, Personal Representative of the Estate of Vernon Olson, Deceased, Defendant and Appellee. Civ. |
Court | North Dakota Supreme Court |
Robert J. Lamont, of McGee, Hankla, Backes & Wheeler, Minot, for plaintiffs and appellants.
John E. Rowell, of Nilles, Hansen, Selbo, Magill & Davies, Fargo, for defendant and appellee.
This appeal involves interpretation of North Dakota's Death By Wrongful Act statute, Chapter 32-21.
Pamela Ellen Garland died of injuries incurred in an automobile accident. She was married to Darryl Garland, from whom she had separated. She was living with her parents, the Pattens, the plaintiffs and appellants in the case before us. Her husband's attorney had drawn a complaint for a divorce and asked her to agree to a proposed divorce settlement, but she had refused to do so. The divorce complaint had never been filed in court.
After her death, the adjusters for the insurance company which insured the driver of the other automobile, Vernon Olson, entered into settlement negotiations with the estranged husband and ultimately settled with him for $11,000, after he had satisfied the insurance company that he was the surviving husband of the decedent. The settlement was finally made after the Pattens, the parents of the decedent, had informed the insurance company that they claimed the right to recover under the wrongful-death statute for the death of their daughter, and that any settlement with the husband would be made at the insurance company's risk. The action now before us followed, when the parents sued Olson's estate for damages for the wrongful death of their daughter.
The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendant-appellee (administrator of Olson's estate) on the ground that the settlement by the husband was a final and complete settlement of all claims for damages under the wrongful-death statute, and that the parents had no right of recovery.
Relevant provisions of the wrongful-death statute are:
The question before us is whether the district court erred in granting summary judgment, dismissing the action for wrongful death brought by the deceased wife's surviving parents. The court determined that the compromise settlement of the claim of her surviving husband, from whom she was separated, was valid and binding. We affirm.
Both sides agree that the plain language of the statutes quoted above puts a surviving husband or wife in a preferred position to bring or compromise an action for wrongful death of a spouse, that the surviving spouse has the right to compromise the claim or the right to bring the action, and that such compromise is binding upon all other persons authorized to bring the action or to share in the recovery. Therefore, by the plain language of the statute, the husband, so long as there is no divorce, has the right to bring the action or to compromise the claim.
However, the parents assert that this plain language is subject to an implied exception, the exception being that a person holding a preferred position under the statute may disqualify himself to bring the action, and thereby cause the right to bring the action to pass to a person or persons in a less-preferred position. In support of this argument, the parents cite certain language from our recent case of Broderson v. Boehm, 253 N.W.2d 864 (N.D.1977). 1
While the language quoted from Broderson v. Boehm, supra, was not strictly necessary to the decision, the principle it states is undoubtedly correct. A more definitive example might be given. If, for instance, a husband and father were murdered by the wife and mother, leaving children formerly dependent upon the father destitute, there can be little doubt that the children would be allowed to sue the mother for the wrongful death of the father, even though the mother, by statute, is named as the person entitled in the first instance to sue or settle the claim. This would be true particularly in a State such as North Dakota where intrafamily tort suits are permitted. Our decision in Bartholomay v. St. Thomas Lumber Company, 148 N.W.2d 278 (N.D.1967), also illustrates this principle. A father whose contributory...
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