Patten v. State

• Decision Date: 10 January 1985
• Docket Number: No. 61,945,61,945
• Citation: 467 So.2d 975,10 Fla. L. Weekly 244
• Parties: 10 Fla. L. Weekly 244, 10 Fla. L. Weekly 51 Robert PATTEN, Appellant/Cross-Appellee, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee/Cross-Appellant.
• Court: Florida Supreme Court

Page 975

467 So.2d 975

10 Fla. L. Weekly 244, 10 Fla. L. Weekly 51

Robert PATTEN, Appellant/Cross-Appellee, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee/Cross-Appellant.

No. 61,945.

Supreme Court of Florida.

Jan. 10, 1985.

Rehearing Denied April 18, 1985.

William L. Richey, of Richie & Munroe, Coral Gables; and Peter M. Siegel and Randall C. Berg, Jr., Miami, for appellant/cross-appellee.

Jim Smith, Atty. Gen., and Calianne P. Lantz, Asst. Atty. Gen., Miami, for appellee/cross-appellant.

OVERTON, Justice.

This is a direct appeal from Robert Patten's conviction of first-degree murder and the imposition of the death sentence. Appellant was also convicted of armed robbery and grand theft, and was found to have violated his probation for the offense of auto theft. He was sentenced to 110 years for the robbery conviction, five years for grand theft, and five years for auto theft, all sentences to be served consecutively. We have jurisdiction, article V, section 3(b)(1), Florida Constitution, and we affirm all of appellant's convictions and sentences with the exception of the death sentence. We find that we must vacate the death sentence and remand for a new sentencing proceeding before a jury because the trial judge erroneously instructed the jury that it should try to reach a majority verdict after the jury had advised the court it was deadlocked concerning its sentencing recommendation for the first-degree murder conviction.

The facts reflect that on September 2, 1981, the victim, a Miami police officer, attempted to stop appellant for traveling the wrong way on a one-way street. Appellant abandoned his car, which was later determined to have been stolen, and fled the scene on foot. He ran down an alley with the officer in pursuit. Witnesses heard gunshots and one witness testified that appellant had hidden in the alley and waited for the officer to approach before shooting him. The officer was found dead with two bullet wounds. One bullet had penetrated his heart, killing him instantly, and another had entered the officer's foot in a manner indicating that the officer had been shot after he was dead and lying prostrate.

Immediately after the shooting, appellant stole a car at gunpoint and fled the area. He was arrested later that day and charged with first-degree murder, armed robbery, grand theft, and violation of probation. Two days later, after obtaining a search warrant, the police recovered the murder weapon from beneath a heating grate in appellant's grandmother's home.

Prior to trial, the court and the prosecutor were apprised of the facts that appellant had been adjudicated not guilty of receiving stolen property by reason of insanity in 1978 and had been involuntarily committed to the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services for treatment under the provisions of section 394.467, Florida Statutes (1977). On September 25, 1981, the trial court, on its own motion prior to appellant's arraignment, ordered an evaluation of the appellant "covering all issues including insanity and competency and incompetency to stand trial." Prior to receiving the reports of the four experts appointed to examine appellant, and prior to the hearing on appellant's competency to stand trial, counsel for the appellant withdrew a pending motion for release on bail and orally advised the trial court that the defense would be filing a notice of intent to rely on the insanity defense and would request a hearing to determine if appellant was mentally competent to stand trial. Counsel for appellant subsequently filed a notice of intent to rely on the insanity defense and a motion requesting a competency hearing.

The court-ordered competency hearing was held on October 9, 1981. Three of the appointed doctors testified before the court and the fourth doctor's written report was submitted to the court by stipulation. During the course of these proceedings, the 1978 trial court order finding appellant not guilty by reason of insanity and the orders conditionally releasing him were admitted into evidence. The trial court found, in accordance with the unanimous opinion of the experts, that the appellant was competent to stand trial pursuant to the criteria set forth in Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.211. The trial court proceeded to arraign the appellant and, when he stood mute, entered a plea of not guilty on his behalf.

In a pre-trial motion, counsel for the appellant moved for a ruling on the insanity test to be applied at trial. Appellant asserted that the trial court should discard the M'Naghten rule and adopt the A.L.I. Model Penal Code test. While acknowledging that the appellant had been examined by a number of psychiatrists, all of whom indicated that the accused was legally sane under the M'Naghten rule, defense counsel argued that the M'Naghten rule constituted both a denial of substantive and procedural due process and cruel and unusual punishment. The trial court denied the motion, finding that it had no authority to change the criteria for the test for insanity that had been specifically adopted by the Supreme Court of Florida.

Counsel for the appellant also filed a pre-trial motion to have the electronic media excluded from the courtroom during the trial on the ground that their presence would affect the ability of the appellant to consult with his counsel. The trial court denied the motion after conducting a hearing attended by the state, the defense, and the media.

In the trial phase of the proceedings, the defense did not contest that appellant had killed the police officer; the theory of the defense was that appellant, in firing the shots, had acted "in a moment of panic" and that this tragic offense was not premeditated murder. Further, no evidence was submitted regarding appellant's prior adjudication of not guilty by reason of insanity. The jury found the appellant guilty of all offenses charged.

During the sentencing phase of the trial, the state initially presented evidence in aggravation that appellant had been convicted of robbery in 1975. The defense then presented the testimony of two psychologists to establish the statutory mitigating circumstances that the murder was committed while appellant was "under the influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance," section 921.141(6)(b), Florida Statutes (1981), and that the "capacity of defendant to appreciate the criminality of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of law was substantially impaired," section 921.141(6)(f). Both psychologists testified that these factors clearly applied to appellant. In addition to these conclusions, one psychologist described at length appellant's background and upbringing, including the fact that his mother had substantial mental problems, which resulted in her commitment; that he was an unwanted child; that he had suffered severe physical abuse, including being spit upon and thrown against the wall; that his father died when he was two years old; that, when appellant was six years old, it was discovered that he suffered from a degenerative bone disease which required him to spend a year in a body cast, during which time he continued to suffer physical abuse at the hands of his mother; that his leg was broken two days after the removal of his body cast and he was forced back into the body cast for more than eight months; that after returning to school his conduct required expulsion; that at age ten he was diagnosed as emotionally disturbed and another diagnosis recommended hospitalization; that his mother used choking as a disciplinary device; and that he began using drugs at an early age and suffered a barbiturate overdose at the age of fourteen. The history of the 1976 stolen property offense, his commitment as a result of being incompetent to stand trial, his acquittal on the charges by reason of insanity, and the resulting treatment were also presented to the jury. In rebuttal, the state presented the testimony of two psychiatrists who had examined appellant for competency to stand trial and insanity at the time of the offense. Both psychiatrists testified that appellant was able to conform his conduct to the requirements of law and both reflected an opinion that he was trying to fake mental illness.

During sentencing deliberations, the jury advised the trial judge that they were deadlocked six-to-six with regard to a recommended sentence. The judge instructed the jury:

If you can agree on a majority to either life or death, without trying to pressure you, by talking it over one more time and agreeing one way or another, and I'm not suggesting any result, but if after trying one more time you can't agree and it's still six/six, I will instruct you to go ahead and sign that verdict form that includes life imprisonment without parole for 25 years.

The jury, after continued deliberations, returned with a seven-to-five recommendation for death.

The trial judge imposed the death sentence and found that the following statutory aggravating factors applied: (1) appellant had previously been convicted of a felony involving the use or threat of violence; (2) the murder was committed to avoid a lawful arrest; and (3) the murder was committed in a cold, calculated, and premeditated manner without any pretense of moral or legal justification. In finding that there were no mitigating circumstances, the trial court expressly rejected the evidence presented by the appellant to prove that he had suffered from an extreme emotional or mental disturbance at the time of the homicide and that appellant's capacity to appreciate the criminality of his conduct was substantially impaired. The trial court recognized that the testimony of the experts for the state and for the defendant was "in direct contradiction" and expressly found that it should accept the testimony of the state's witnesses. The trial judge concluded that there were no statutory or nonstatutory mitigating factors applicable to this case.

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