Patterson v. Bark Eudora

• Citation: 190 U.S. 169,23 S.Ct. 821,47 L.Ed. 1002
• Decision Date: 01 June 1903
• Docket Number: No. 278,278
• Parties: B. M. PATTERSON, Edward Jansen, Sven Freeman, et al., Appts. , v. BARK EUDORA, whereof Alfred E. Dickson is Master
• Court: United States Supreme Court

190 U.S. 169

23 S.Ct. 821

47 L.Ed. 1002

B. M. PATTERSON, Edward Jansen, Sven Freeman, et al., Appts.,

v BARK EUDORA, whereof Alfred E. Dickson is Master.

No. 278.

Argued May 1, 1903.

Decided June 1, 1903.

On December 21, 1898 (30 Stat. at L. 755, 763, chap. 28, U. S. Comp. Stat. 1901, pp. 3071, 3080), Congress passed an act entitled 'N Act to Amend the Laws Relating to American Seamen, for the Protection of Such Seamen, and to Promote Commerce.' The material portion thereof is found in § 24, which amends § 10 of chapter 121 of the Laws of 1884, so as to read:

'Sec. 10. (a) That it shall be, and is hereby, made unlawful in any case to pay any seaman wages in advance of the time when he has actually earned the same, or to pay such advance wages to any other person. Any person paying such advance wages shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor, and, upon conviction, shall be punished by a fine not less than four times the amount of the wages so advanced, and may also be imprisoned for a period not exceeding six months, at the discretion of the court. The payment of such advance wages shall in no case, excepting as herein provided, absolve the vessel or the master or owner thereof from full payment of wages after the same shall have been actually earned, and shall be no defense to a libel, suit, or action for the recovery of such wages. If any person shall demand or receive, either directly or indirectly, from any seaman or other person seeking employment as seaman, or from any person on his behalf, any remuneration whatever for providing him with employment, he shall, for every such offense, be liable to a penalty of not more than one hundred dollars.'

'(f) That this section shall apply as well to foreign vessels as to vessels of the United States; and any master, owner, consignee, or agent of any foreign vessel who has violated its provisions shall be liable to the same penalty that the master, owner, or agent of a vessel of the United States would be for a similar violation; provided that treaties in force between the United States and foreign nations do not conflict.'

The appellants were seamen on board the British bark Eudora, and filed this libel for wages in the district court of the United States for the eastern district of Pennsylvania. By an agreed statement of facts it appears that on January 22, 1900, they shipped on board such bark to serve as seamen for and during a voyage from Portland, Maine, to Rio and other points, not to exceed twelve months, the final port of discharge to be in the United States or Canada, with pay at the rate of one shilling for forty-five days and twenty dollars per month thereafter. At the time of shipment twenty dollars was paid on account of each of them, and with their consent, to the shipping agent through whom they were employed. On the completion of the voyage, they, having performed their duties as seamen, demanded wages for the full term of service, ignoring the payment made, at their instance, to the shipping agent. The advanced payment and contract of shipment were not contrary to, or prohibited by, the laws of Great Britain. It was contended, however, that they were prohibited by the act of Congress, above quoted, and that such act was applicable. The district court entered a decree dismissing the libel. 110 Fed. 430. On appeal to the circuit court of appeals for the third circuit, that court certified the following questions to this court:

'First. Is the act of Congress of December 21, 1898, properly applicable to the contract in this case?

'Second. Under the agreed statement of facts above set forth, upon a libel filed by said seamen, after the completion of the voyage, against the British vessel, to recover wages which were not due to them under the terms of their contract or under the law of Great Britain, were the libellants entitled to a decree against the vessel?'

Mr. Joseph Hill Brinton for appellants.

Assistant Attorney General Beck for the United States.

Messrs. Horace L. Cheyney and John F. Lewis for appellee.

Statement by Mr. Justice Brewer:

Mr. Justice Brewer delivered the opinion of the court:

Applying the ordinary rules of construction, it does not seem to us doubtful that the act of Congress, if within its power, is applicable in this case. The act makes it unlawful to pay any seaman wages in advance, makes such payment a misdemeanor, and in terms provides that such payment shall not absolve the vessel or its master or owner for full payment of wages after the same shall have been actually earned. And further, it declares that the section making these provisions shall apply as well to foreign vessels as to vessels of the United States, provided that treaties in force between the United States and foreign nations do not conflict. It is true that the title of the act of 1898 is 'An Act to Amend the Laws Relating to American Seamen,' but it has been held that the title is no part of a statute, and cannot be used to set at naught its obvious meaning. The extent to which it can be used is thus stated by Chief Justice Marshall in United States v. Fisher, 2 Cranch, 358, 386, 2 L. ed. 304, 313:

'Neither party contends that the title of an act can control plain words in the body of the statute; and neither denies that, taken with other parts, it may assist in removing ambiguities. Where the intent is plain, nothing is left to con- struction. Where the mind labors to discover the design of the legislature, it seizes everything from which aid can be derived; and, in such case, the title claims a degree of notice and will have its due share of consideration.'

See also Yazoo & M. Valley R. Co. v. Thomas, 132 U. S. 174, 188, 33 L. ed. 302, 307, 10 Sup. Ct. Rep. 68; United States v. Oregon & C. R. Co. 164 U. S. 526, 541, 41 L. ed. 541, 545, 17 Sup. Ct. Rep. 165; Price v. Forrest, 173 U. S. 410, 427, 43 L. ed. 749, 755, 19 Sup. Ct. Rep. 434; Endlich, Interpretation of Statutes, §§ 58, 59. When, as here, the statute declares, in plain words, its intent in reference to a prepayment of seamen's wages, and follows that declaration with a further statement that the rule thus announced shall apply to foreign vessels as well as to vessels of the United States, it would do violence to language to say that it was not applicable to a foreign vessel.

But the main contention is that the statute is beyond the power of Congress to enact, especially as applicable to foreign vessels. It is urged that it invades the liberty of contract which is guaranteed by the 14th Amendment to the Federal Constitution, and reference is made to Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U. S. 578, 589, 41 L. ed. 832, 835, 17 Sup. Ct. Rep. 427, 431, in which we said:

'The liberty mentioned in that amendment means not only the right of the citizen to be free from the mere physical restraint of his person, as by incarceration, but the term is deemed to embrace the right of the citizen to be free in the enjoyment of all his faculties; to be free to use them in all lawful ways; to live and work where he will; to earn his livelihood by any lawful calling; to pursue any livelihood or avocation, and for that purpose, to enter into all contracts which may be proper, necessary, and essential to his carrying out to a successful conclusion the purposes above mentioned.'

Further, that even if the contract be one subject to restraint under the police power, that power is vested in the states, and not in the general government, and any restraint, if exercised at all, can only be exercised by the state in which the contract is entered into; that the only jurisdiction possessed by Congress in respect to such matters is by virtue of its power to regulate commerce, interstate and foreign; that the regulation of commerce does not carry with it the power of controlling contracts of employment by those engaged in such service, any more than it includes the power to regulate contracts for service on interstate railroads, or for the manufacture of goods which may be intended for interstate or foreign commerce; and, finally, that the validity of a contract is to be determined by the law of the place of performance, and not by that of the place of the contract; that the contract in this case was one entered into in the United States, to be performed on board a British vessel, which is undoubtedly British territory, and therefore its validity is to be determined by British law, and that, as conceded in the question, sustains its validity.

We are unable to yield our assent to this contention. That there is, generally speaking, a liberty of contract which is protected by the 14th Amendment, may be conceded; yet such liberty does not extend to all contracts. As said in Frisbie v. United States, 157 U. S. 160, 165, 39 L. ed. 657, 659, 15 Sup. Ct. Rep. 586, 588:

'While it may be conceded that, generally speaking, among the inalienable rights of the citizen is that of the liberty of contract, yet such liberty is not absolute and universal. ...