Patterson v. City of Binghamton

• Decision Date: 30 November 1897
• Citation: 154 N.Y. 391,48 N.E. 739
• Parties: PATTERSON et al. v. CITY OF BINGHAMTON.
• Court: New York Court of Appeals Court of Appeals

154 N.Y. 391

48 N.E. 739

PATTERSON et al.

v.CITY OF BINGHAMTON.

Court of Appeals of New York.

Nov. 30, 1897.

Appeal from supreme court, appellate division, Third department.

Action by Edward J. Patterson and others against the city of Binghamton. From a judgment of the appellate division (39 N. Y. Supp. 408) affirming a judgment dismissing the complaint, plaintiff Patterson appeals. Affirmed.

O'Brien J., dissenting.

Roger P. Clark, for appellant.

Alex. Cumming and A. D. Wales, for respondent.

BARTLETT, J.

The duly-constituted authorities of the city of Binghamton, in the year 1891, continued Henry street from Washington to Water streets, this work being known as the Henry street extension. Among other lands condemned for this purpose was a portion of the premises of the plaintiffs. This action is brought to recover the award in the condemnation proceedings. The original answer in this case contained substantially an agreed state of facts, to which the plaintiffs demurred as not containing a defense. The issue of law on this demurrer resulted in a decision in plaintiffs' favor, with leave to defendant to answer over. Under the amended answer the case has been twice tried. At the first trial a judgment was directed in favor of plaintiffs. The general term reversed on the ground that the plaintiffs' remedy was confined to the proceedings pointed out by the charter of the city of Binghamton. 88 Hun, 272,34 N. Y. Supp. 416. At the second trial the court followed the decision of the general term, and dismissed the complaint, and this judgment was affirmed. From this affirmance the present appeal is taken. This case is presented under a stipulation that the findings contain all the facts. The question to be considered is whether this action at law will lie to recover the award under the peculiar circumstances of the case.

In April, 1891, a petition was presented to the common council of the city to open the new street, and resulted in a resolution the following month to make the improvement and to appoint a commissioner to report upon the land required and the probable expense. In June, 1891, this report was filed, indicating the land required, including that of plaintiffs, and estimating the total expense. By reason of some irregularity, a second commissioner was appointed for the purpose above indicated, who made a similar report on the 3d of August, 1891. Hearings were duly had before the common council, and resulted in a resolution on the 24th of August, 1891, describing the lands to be taken and the estimated cost, and directing the city engineer to make a survey of the proposed improvement with a map. This resolution was duly complied with. In September, 1891, the common council passed a resolution declaring its intention to make the improvement, and issued a notice that an application would be made to the county court for the appointment of three commissioners to ascertain and report the compensation to be paid to persons and associations whose property was to be taken. The court duly appointed the commissioners, who made a report fixing awards, and giving to the plaintiffs $6,270. This report was filed with the common council under the provisions of the charter, and, no appeal having been taken, the awards named therein became final on the 5th day of November, 1891. The building on the premises of the plaintiffs was valued at $100 for the purpose of removal, and, the plaintiffs having elected to remove the same, their award was reduced to $6,170. On the 30th of November, 1891, the common council directed the commissioners to proceed to assess the benefits and make out an assessment roll to pay the awards in pursuance of the charter. These assessments were duly made, and the money received by the city to pay the awards and expenses. The precise date when the tax was collected and the city received the money does not appear in this record.

Under the charter of the city of Binghamton, the municipality acquired an easement over the lands condemned, and not an absolute fee. This easement involved the greater portion of the plaintiffs' property, leaving narrow strips or parcels thereof on the north and south sides of the street. It seems to be conceded that the portion of the premises not taken was of comparatively little value, and the lot of plaintiffs was substantially condemned by the city. At the time these condemnation proceedings were instituted the Binghamton Trust Company held a mortgage thereon to secure the payment of $3,000 and interest. There were also a second mortgage on the premises to secure the payment of $800, a third mortgage for $500, and a considerable number of small judgments. On the 12th of September, 1891, the Binghamton Trust Company began a foreclosure of its mortgage, and all of these liens were at the time unsatisfied. The sale in foreclosure was made by the referee on the 6th day of February, 1892, and the premises were struck off to Francis W. Downs for the sum of $6,525. The judgment of foreclosure was duly satisfied, together with all the liens upon the premises, and there remained a surplus of $700, which was paid to plaintiffs in this action. It is found that the plaintiffs duly demanded payment of the award, which was refused, and on the 17th day of August, 1892, they brought this action to recover the same. It is further found that six days prior to the institution of this suit, and on the 11th day of August, 1892, the common council passed a resolution reciting that the right to the award made to the plaintiffs was disputed, and that a warrant be drawn for the amount of it in favor of the office of the clerk of the county of Broome and delivered to him, and that the corporation counsel prepare the proper statements and papers to accompany payment, as provided by the city charter. Under the charter the mayor of the city has a week in which to approve any resolution passed by the common council, and six days after the passage of this resolution, to wit, on the 17th day of August, 1892, the mayor duly approved it, and the next day, the 18th day of August, 1892, the award was duly paid to the county clerk as the clerk of the supreme court. It thus appears that while the city was taking the necessary legal steps to pay this award into court, by reason of the contest between the purchaser at the foreclosure sale and the plaintiffs, this action was commenced on the day the mayor approved the resolution of payment and the day before the money was actually paid into court. We here have the entire amount of the award in cash placed in the custody of the court to pay the plaintiffs or the purchaser at the sale, as their rights may be made to appear. From this point on the city of Binghamton was in the attitude of a stakeholder admitting liability by paying the fund into court. The claimants were not only abundantly secure with the fund in the possession of the court, but the city charter provided a speedy and sufficient remedy for a determination of the adverse claims; it being the duty of the clerk at the first term of the supreme court, special or general, held in the county, after receipt of the moneys, to make a report of the amount thus deposited, and the court is required at that term to order the investment of the money or the payment over on the ascertainment of the person entitled thereto. Charter, tit. 7, § 10. This is a proceeding in which the city has no interest whatever.This action was begun at a time when it cannot be justified, and seems upon its face to have been an effort to anticipate the final act of payment into court after the approval by the mayor of the resolution of the common council authorizing it to be done. The approval, as already pointed out, was August 17th, and the payment August 18th, Which was certainly most speedy action, when we consider that not only was the warrant to be drawn, but the corporation counsel had to submit therewith certain statements. We are not called upon to determine at this time under what circumstances a common-law action will lie to recover an award in the custody of a municipality, but we hold that, under the facts now disclosed, this action was improperly brought, and there was no error in dismissing the complaint. The judgment appealed from should be affirmed, with costs.

O'BRIEN, J. (dissenting).

This action was commenced on the 17th day of August, 1892, to recover the amount of an award of damages for the taking of the plaintiff's land for street purposes. On a trial before the court the plaintiff recovered. The judgment was reversed by the general term and a new trial granted. 88 Hun, 272,34 N. Y. Supp. 416. On the second trial the court, following the view of the general term, dismissed the complaint, and, the judgment having been affirmed by the appellate division (4 App. Div. 615,39 N. Y. Supp. 408), the plaintiff was appealed to this court.

The case has always been, and is now, embarrassed by many collateral and irrelevant considerations. The complaint states a very simple cause of action at law for the recovery of money only. It alleges that in the year 1891 the plaintiff was the owner in fee simple and in possession of a parcel of land in the city of Binghamton; that the authorities of that city in the month of May of that year duly instituted proceedings under its charter to lay out a street 50 feet wide through the land; that thereafter such proceedings were duly had and it was duly determined that the street should be laid out over a portion of the land, and that it was laid out prior to the 22d day of October, 1891; that commissioners were duly appointed in the proceedings for the purpose of ascertaining and awarding to the plaintiff damages as compensation for the land so taken, and that the commissioners made an award in writing to the plaintiff, as his damages for laying out the street, in the sum of $6,270; that no objections were ever filed by the city to this award; that it became...