Patterson v. Courtenay Mfg. Co.

• Decision Date: 02 April 1941
• Docket Number: 15239.
• Citation: 14 S.E.2d 16,196 S.C. 515
• Parties: PATTERSON et al. v. COURTENAY MFG. CO. et al.
• Court: South Carolina Supreme Court

14 S.E.2d 16

196 S.C. 515

PATTERSON et al. v. COURTENAY MFG. CO. et al.

No. 15239.

Supreme Court of South Carolina

April 2, 1941

Stephen Nettles, of Greenville, for appellant.

H C. Miller and S. E. Haley, both of Anderson, for respondents.

Harry Hughs, of Walhalla, for defendant Courtenay Mfg. Co.

BONHAM Chief Justice.

Wade Patterson and William Gibbs, well diggers by trade, were engaged in deepening a well on a farm, the property of Courtenay Manufacturing Company. In this work they were using dynamite to blast rock at the bottom of the well. There was an explosion which practically destroyed the sight of both of them. They made claim to the Workmen's Compensation Commission, which claim was heard first by Commissioner Duncan, who took testimony and made an award in favor of both of them. He found that the blindness of the men was due to an accident arising out of and in the course of their employment by Courtenay Manufacturing Company, and that each of them was entitled to recover from the employer and from the carrier. Upon application therefor by the carrier, the action of the single Commissioner was reviewed by the full Commission which in due time filed its opinion which affirmed the findings of fact and conclusions of law of Commissioner Duncan.

From the award the carrier appealed to the court of common pleas the Courtenay Manufacturing Company did not appeal. The appeal was heard by Hon. G. B. Greene, presiding at the Court for Oconee County, who filed an order sustaining the award.

The appeal comes to this Court on the following exceptions:

"1. That the claimants were independent contractors and not employees at the time of their injuries.

"2. That the claimants' injuries did not arise out of and in the course of their employment.

"3. That the carrier did not undertake, either under the terms of its policy of insurance with the mill or under the applicable statutory law, to insure these claimants against the injuries they sustained.

"4. That the employment of claimants was casual and not in the course of the business of the mill.

"5. That under the terms of the policy of insurance and the applicable statutory law claimants were excluded from the benefits thereof as farm laborers.

"6. That as between the mill and the carrier, any liability here is that of the mill, because

"(a) Claimants were working for the mill as independent contractors at the time of their injuries, and the mill could not thereafter alter their status, to the injury of the carrier, by putting their names on the payroll and paying them wages.

"(b) The insuring clauses of the policy do not cover the type of work being done by claimants, nor do they come within any of the classifications mentioned in the schedule of operations."

We do not find it necessary to pass upon each of these exceptions. Those that are not specifically considered by us are to be considered affirmed.

We find ourselves unable to concur with the view of Judge Greene that the claimants were not casual employees and were engaged in the course of business of the employer. He said this: "The appellant in its second question makes the point that the commission should have held that claimants were excluded from the benefits of the Workmen's Compensation Act for the reason that as employees they were both casual and not engaged in work in the course of business of the employer. Under the statute, for an employee to be excluded, his employment must be ' both casual and not in the course of the trade, business, profession or occupation of his employer.' The evidence shows that the employment of claimants was casual in the sense that they were engaged for a specific piece of work and not generally employed. It does not appear, however, that the claimants were 'not engaged in the course of the business of the employer.' ***." (Italics added.)

Then the order goes on to say:

"*** but on the contrary it appears from the evidence that claimants were engaged in improving a well which was the water supply for a house occupied by the Dyars, three members of the family being operatives in the mill. The Courtenay Manufacturing Company, in common with the textile industry generally in the South owns and furnishes to its employees residences in close proximity to its plant. This, of course, is for the convenience of its employees, but more particularly for the more efficient operation of the mill. Any operation necessary to the building or maintenance of these dwellings would seem logically to be in the course of the business of the manufacturer. If repairing the plumbing in one dwelling occupied by employees would be in the course of the business of the manufacturer, no logical reason appears why the repair of a well as the water supply for another dwelling occupied by other employees would not also be in the course of business of the manufacturer.

"It is urged by appellant that since Mr. Dyar was a tenant farmer and drew the water supply for farming purposes from the well, that the repair work on the well was a farming operation and outside of the course of business of the employer. Such a question might arise had the use of the well been exclusively for farming purposes. But a water supply, and in this case the well, was essential to render the dwelling fit as a habitation for the three members of the Dyar family working as operatives in the mill.

"The repair of the water supply of whatever kind for a dwelling furnished employees of the mill in accordance with an established practice of long standing being in the course of the business of the employer, and the claimants being engaged in such repair work at the time of the injury, it follows that the finding of the commission that the claimants were not casual employees not (?) engaged in the usual course of business of the employer must be sustained." We have given thus fully the holding of the Circuit order because we think therein lies the crux of the error on this point. If it be admitted that the claimants were not casual laborers, that would not entitle them to an award unless it also appears that their injuries were received while they were engaged in work in the course of the business of the mill. Or, stated conversely, if it be admitted that the work of claimants was not casual, it is necessary, in order that claimants be given an award under the provisions of the Workmen's Compensation Act, Section 2(b) of Act No. 610 of the Acts of 1936, 39 St. at Large p. 1232, that the employment is not casual and is in the course of the trade, business, profession or occupation of his employer.

Appellant's contention is that the evidence plainly shows that the claimants when injured were not in the course of the trade, business, profession or occupation of the employer. In its declaration of the character of its business, included in the policy, the employer states that it is a corporation engaged in cotton spinning and weaving at Newry, S. C. The Circuit Decree places its holding that the claimants were in the employ of the Courtenay Manufacturing Company within the provisions of the Workmen's Compensation Act flatly upon the ground that the Mill owns farm lands composed in the aggregate of some 1,200 to 1,400 acres; that one of these farms is rented to Mr. Dyar for a share of the crops, that the well where the accident occurred is on this farm and that three of the daughters of Mr. Dyar are employed in the cotton mill. The assumption of the Circuit order is that the mill is under obligation to furnish houses and water to its employees, and that therefore because of the fact that Mr. Dyar's daughters live with him in this house and work in the mill the men at work in the well were employed in the course of the trade, business, profession, or occupation of the cotton mill, which is the spinning and weaving of cotton cloth.

There is not a scintilla of evidence that the house was furnished to Mr. Dyar because the daughters who lived with him were employed in the mill. It is not correct to say that a cotton mill is under obligations to furnish dwelling houses to its employees. Those who furnish them charge a rental which is deducted from the wage envelope of the employee. The dwelling houses so furnished by this mill are congregated in the mill village and water and sewerage facilities are supplied by regular systems. There is no evidence that all employees live in mill houses, and there is not a particle of evidence that Mr. Dyar pays rent for the house, or that his daughters pay him or the mill for occupying it. The evidence shows that Mr. Dyar works the farm on shares with the mill and the reasonable inference is that he occupies the house under that contract.

In the case of Ward v. Ocean Forest Club, 188 S.C. 233, 198 S.E. 385, the question here being considered was not involved nor was it decided. The only issue was whether the employment was or was not casual. The case has no bearing here.

The case of Boseman v. Pacific Mills, 193 S.C. 479, 8 S.E.2d 878, was one in which the claimant was engaged in painting a water tank of the Pacific Mills when he was injured. The Industrial Commission found as a fact and as a matter of law that the work the claimant was doing when injured was within the provisions of the Compensation Act because the work was in the interest of the Mills in keeping the tanks which contained the water supply of the Mills in safe condition. On appeal Circuit Judge Dennis sustained this contention, holding that the case was controlled by the case of Marchbanks v. Duke Power Company, 190 S.C. 336, 2 S.E.2d 825, 831. In the Boseman case [193 S.C. 479, 8 S.E.2d 880] it was held: "*** The tank was an integral part of the mill business. There was also testimony to the effect that the mill desired...