Patterson v. Gage

• Decision Date: 27 January 1888
• Citation: 16 P. 560,11 Colo. 50
• Parties: PATTERSON v. GAGE et al.
• Court: Colorado Supreme Court

16 P. 560

11 Colo. 50

PATTERSON v. GAGE et al.

Supreme Court of Colorado

January 27, 1888

Commissioners' decision. Appeal from superior court, Arapahoe county.

September 20, 1882, Hamm began boarding at Gage's hotel, and seven days thereafter delivered to him a guaranty signed by Patterson, and in the following words: 'I will be responsible for the hotel bill of J. W. Hamm, and will see it paid within twenty days.' Hamm remained at said hotel 14 days; running a bill of $49 for board and lodging, also a bar bill of $23.25. Gage sued Patterson on this guaranty claiming $72.25. Patterson defended, contending that he was in no event liable for the bar bill, but only for the board and lodging, and not even for any part of that furnished subsequent to said guaranty. Judgment for Gage, and Patterson appeals.

Markham & Thomas, for appellant.

Allen & Ferguson, for appellee.

RISING C.

This action was brought by D. A. Gage & Co. against T. M Patterson to recover the sum of $72.25. The evidence shows that the plaintiffs were proprietors of the St. James Hotel in the city of Denver, in September, 1882; that on the twentieth day of September J. W. Hamm commenced running a bill at said hotel; that on the twenty-seventh day of September the defendant, at the request of said Hamm, gave to him a writing, which is as follows:

'DENVER, COLORADO, September 27, 1882.

' David Gage, Esq.--DEAR SIR: I will be responsible for the hotel bill of J. W. Hamm, Esq., and will see it paid within twenty days.

'T. M. PATTERSON.'

--That said writing was delivered to the plaintiffs; that Hamm remained at said hotel until after dinner on the fourth day of October; that a month or two after Hamm left, the plaintiffs presented to defendant for payment the following account:

"Mr. J. W. Hamm to St. James Hotel, Dr.

September 20th, To board to October 4th, A. D.,

$42 00

Extra meals, $5.00: extra lodging, $2.00,

7 00

To bar, 2.70, .50, 1.55, 4.50, 2.50, .75, .65, .60, 2.30, .75, 1.45, 3.10,

23 25

-------

$72 25"

[16 P. 561] --That, when the account was presented to the defendant, he offered to pay the board bill, but refused to pay the bar bill. Upon a trial to the court, judgment was rendered against the defendant for the sum of $65.25.

The question presented for our consideration is, what is the extent of the liability of the appellant upon his written undertaking to pay the hotel bill of J. W. Hamm? And in the consideration of this question we are to inquire whether the words 'hotel bill,' as used in said undertaking, shall be held to include the bar bill; and also whether, under the terms of said undertaking, appellant shall be held liable for the full amount of Hamm's hotel bill, or only for a portion of it. That a person keeping a house for the entertainment of travelers, with board and lodging, is an hotel keeper, and that, as such hotel keeper, he is under an obligation to furnish his guests with board and lodging, is well settled in this country. It is clear that such articles as an hotel keeper is under obligation to furnish his guest with, upon request, are proper items to be included in the general term 'hotel bill.' This is so, because the term 'hotel bill' would then be generally applicable. But if the term is extended so as to include items which the hotel keeper is not obligated to furnish, but which he does furnish, as a matter of convenience, to his guests, then it can have no general and common meaning, but the hotel bill of one hotel keeper might include board and lodging only, that of another might include board, lodging, and liquors, and still another might include board, lodging, liquors, cigars, and billiards; and this list of articles might be continued so that such bill could be made to include all articles that the guest might order that are kept for sale by the proprietor of the hotel. It is obvious that the term 'hotel bill,' as used in the undertaking of appellant, must be held to mean what the words mean as used in their general, common, and usual sense. 2 Pars. Cont. 500.

These words, used in their general and comprehensive sense, should be held to include, as proper charges in an hotel bill, only such items as would make the term properly applicable to all hotels; and this would confine the items of charges in such bill to such articles as an hotel keeper, by reason of his being an hotel keeper, is bound to furnish his guests upon request. An hotel keeper is not bound to furnish his guests with liquors, cigars, or billiards; and therefore the including of such articles in an hotel bill would not be expected or anticipated by one contracting to pay the hotel bill of another. To illustrate: If an attorney, living in Leadville, contract with a client to go to Denver upon business for the client, the attorney to be paid for his services at a stipulated price per day, and such further sums as the attorney should pay out for railroad fare and hotel bills, while engaged in such service, could the client be compelled to pay for the wines, liquors, and cigars furnished the attorney by the keepers of the hotels where the attorney stopped? We do not think the words of the contract could be so construed as to make the contract say that it was the intention of the client to bind himself to the payment for such articles, without doing violence to the rule that requires that the language of a contract will be understood in the ordinary, popular sense, unless it relates to some technical subject. Bish. Cont. § 590. The fact that it may be customary, upon the request of a guest, to charge such articles in his bill, instead of requiring him to pay for the same when and where obtained, does not constitute such items a part of his hotel bill proper, in the legal acceptation ...