Patterson v. Hitchcock

• Decision Date: 01 December 1877
• Citation: 3 Colo. 533
• Parties: PATTERSON v. HITCHCOCK.
• Court: Colorado Supreme Court

3 Colo. 533

PATTERSON v. HITCHCOCK.

Supreme Court of Colorado

December, 1877

Appeal from District Court of Boulder County.

THE facts are stated in the opinion. The defendant in the court below had judgment.

Mr. W A. HARDENBROOK, for appellant, and Mr. HUGH BUTLER, of counsel.

Messrs BELFORD & REED, and Mr. W. R. GORSLINE, for appellee.

ELBERT J.

On the 16th day of August, 1875, the appellee made application at the United States land office for a patent for the 'American lode.'

Thereafter and within the time limited by law, the appellant filed an adverse claim, as owner of the 'Bull of the Woods' lode.

This was an action of ejectment brought by the appellant against the appellee to recover the possession of the ground embraced within the side lines of the two lodes at their intersection.

At the trial in the court below, a question of estoppel was presented, arising out of representations made by appellant pending negotiations for the purchase of the American mine by the appellee.

Touching the estoppel which the appellee sought to establish, the court instructed the jury as follows:

'If you believe, from the proof in the case, that the defendant by his agent, Smith, applied to the plaintiff, Patterson, for the purpose of ascertaining whether the plaintiff claimed any interest in, or knew of any lode claimed by him that would conflict with the title of the American mine, and the plaintiff knew that the defendant contemplated purchasing the American mine, it was his duty then to assert his claim, if he had any, to any property the defendant was about to purchase; and if the plaintiff had full knowledge of the matters inquired about and failed then to assert his claim, and the defendant, or his agent, was influenced to purchase the American mine by what the plaintiff said at that time, he is estopped from asserting such claim against the defendant at this time. That is, he is concluded by his declaration or conduct, which has influenced the conduct of another to his prejudice. The rule being that when one by his words or conduct willfully causes another to believe the existence of a certain state of things, whereby he is induced to act on that belief, so as to alter his own previous position, such person is concluded from asserting against the other a different state of things as existing at the same time. There must be a representation or concealment of material facts. The representation must be made with knowledge of the facts. The party to whom made must be ignorant of the truth of the matter. It must be made with the intention that the party to whom made should act upon it. The other party must have been induced to act upon it.'

The giving of this instruction is assigned for error.

In cases involving the title to real estate, the doctrine of estoppel by conduct rests upon the broad principle of equity, that one who encourages by representations, or even stands by and sanctions the acquisition of land by another, will be estopped to defeat the purchase by afterward asserting title in himself.

The intent of the doctrine is to restrain fraud, and compel good faith and fair dealing, and in this view it is to be rigidly enforced.

The effect of the doctrine is to withdraw title to realty from the operation of the statute of frauds, to leave it resting in parol, to preclude its assertion by evidence less conclusive, less certain, and more liable to the taint of human imperfections, than the written evidence required by the statute; and, in this view, its enforcement should be carefully guarded, and unhesitatingly refused, except where all the elements of an estoppel are present.

The instruction complained of, so far as it gives the essential elements of an estoppel, follows the languate of Mr.

Bigelow. Bigelow on Estop., p. 437. 1. There must have been a representation or concealment of material facts. 2. The representation must have been made with knowledge of the facts. 3. The party to whom it was made must have been ignorant of the truth of the matter. 4. It must have been made with the intention that the other party should act upon it. 5. The other party must have been induced to act upon it.

The second and fourth propositions must be accepted as qualified by the authorities. The second is true unless the party making the representations was bound to know the facts, or ignorance of them was the result of gross nigligence. Bigelow on Estop., 476, and cases there cited.

The fourth is true with the qualification that gross and culpable negligence upon the part of the party sought to be estopped, the effect of which is to work a fraud on the party setting up the estoppel, supplies the place of intent. Henshaw v. Bissell, 18 Wall. 271; 3 Washb. on Real Prop. 80.

The omission, however, of these qualifications were in the appellant's favor, and he cannot be heard to complain of the instruction on this ground. If the evidence supplied, or tended to supply, these five essential elements of an estoppel, the court was warranted in submitting the question to the jury, and the instruction given with the above modifications, correctly stated the law.

Let us inquire if the evidence warranted the submission.

First, was there a representation or concealment of material facts?

In the conversation had between Smith and Patterson, just prior to the purchase of the American mine by Hitchcock, and pending the negotiation therefor, Smith testified, that he, acting as the agent of Hitchcock, inquired of Patterson, if he knew of any other claims that conflicted with the American. Patterson replied that he did not, except, possibly, the Inter-Ocean lode. This was a false representation, if the claim which Patterson now sets up had then any existence. 'At the same time' Smith testifies, 'I remarked to him that his 'Bull of the Woods' claim crossed that (the American), but I understood that to be a subsequent location. I cannot give his reply to that, but I known he assented to it. He did not claim to me that there was any conflict between the American mine and the Bull of the Woods.' Upon Smith's assertion that the Bull of the Woods claim was 'a subsequent location,' Patterson's failure to claim otherwise, if he did so claim, was a concealment of a material fact. Smith, however, testifies to an actual assent replied (though he does not remember the words of the reply), and this amounted to a representation as to a material fact.

Second. Was the representation made with knowledge of the facts?

There is no claim, nor is there any foundation for saying that Patterson had not full knowledge of the questions to which he spoke. The facts inquired of rested peculiarly within his own knowledge. The presumption is, that every one is acquainted with his own rights, if he have reasonable opportunity to know them.

Third. Was the party, to whom the representations were made, ignorant of the truth of the matter?

Upon this question there is more difficulty. The certificate of location of each lode was of record, and to these records both agent and principal had access equally with Patterson. The appellant insists that the case comes within the rule, that 'where the condition of title is known to both parties, or both have the same means of ascertaining the truth, there can be no estoppel.' Undoubtedly this is the rule where the record discloses the title, as is the case generally, with patented lands. Brant v. Virginia Coal & Iron Co., 3 Otto, 337. But the record of the certificate of location of a mining claim required by law does not necessarily disclose the title-nor did it in this case. The law prescribes that the certificate shall contain: 1st, the name of the lode; 2d, the name of the locator; 3d, the date of location; 4th, the number of feet claimed on each side of the center of the discovery shaft; 5th, the general course of the lode, as near as may be. This, however, gives the purchaser no information respecting conflicting claims. For this he is dependent on examination and inquiry. If a conflicting claim be ascertained, the record still does not necessarily disclose the better title. Location and record still relate back to the date of discovery for the inception of title. Location and record may both be prior to those of a cross lode, and still the latter be the older and better title, by reason of an earlier discovery, perfected within the statutory time, of which the record gives no information.

In the case at bar, the date of the certificate of location of the American mine was June 16, 1874; of the record, June 29, 1874. The date of the certificate of location of the Bull of the Woods lode was July 11, 1874; of the record July 13, 1874. In the body of this certificate the location is stated as April 17th, 1874.

This record did not disclose any condition of title upon which Smith, as the agent of the purchaser, Hitchcock, could rely. It was for him still to inquire as to the date of discovery of the respective lodes, and as to whether the requirements of the statute respecting discovery, discovery shafts, location and records had been complied with.

Having reference to the record, therefore, this was not a case where the condition of title was known to both parties, or where both had the same means of ascertaining the truth respecting it. To ascertain priority of right, as before stated, Smith was dependent on examination and inquiry. Under the circumstances, he properly applied to the appellant for information touching his cross lode, the Bull of the Woods.

If the priority of right, which the appellant claims, has any foundation now, it must have had existence then, and that too within the knowledge and intent of the appellant; and knowing that Smith was negotiating for the purchase of the ...