Patterson v. Miller, No. CV-15-00321-PHX-NVW
Decision Date | 03 April 2020 |
Docket Number | No. CV-15-00321-PHX-NVW |
Citation | 451 F.Supp.3d 1125 |
Parties | Lorraine PATTERSON, Plaintiff, v. Carla MILLER; Patty Nelson-McCall; Lindsey Romero; Joanne Mathlin; Karen Youngman; John and Jane Does 1-50, Defendants. |
Court | U.S. District Court — District of Arizona |
Lorraine Patterson, Mesa, AZ, pro se.
Cynthia Dawn Starkey, James B. Bowen, Office of the Attorney General, Phoenix, AZ, for Defendants.
Before the Court is Defendants Carla Miller ("Miller"), Patty Nelson-McCall ("Nelson-McCall"), Lindsey Romero ("Romero"), Joanne Mathlin ("Mathlin"), and Karen Youngman's ("Youngman") (collectively, "State Defendants") Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 172). For the reasons stated below, the motion shall be granted.
A motion for summary judgment tests whether the opposing party has sufficient admissible evidence to merit a trial. Summary judgment should be granted if the evidence shows there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A material fact is one that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law, and a factual dispute is genuine "if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc. , 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986).1
The moving party has the burden of showing the absence of genuine disputes of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett , 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). Once the movant shows an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party's case, the burden shifts to the nonmovant, which must then "set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." Anderson , 477 U.S. at 256, 106 S.Ct. 2505. The nonmoving party cannot rest on the pleadings and must do more than simply show there is "some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts." Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp. , 475 U.S. 574, 586, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986). Indeed, conclusory and speculative testimony, whether contained in affidavits or moving papers, is insufficient to raise genuine issues of fact. Thornhill Publ'g Co. v. GTE Corp. , 594 F.2d 730, 738 (9th Cir. 1979) ; see also Hernandez v. Spacelabs Med., Inc. , 343 F.3d 1107, 1112 (9th Cir. 2003) ( ).
In fulfilling these burdens, the parties must present admissible evidence. See Orr v. Bank of Am., NT & SA , 285 F.3d 764, 773 (9th Cir. 2002) (). A party contending a fact is or cannot be genuinely disputed must support the contention by "citing to particular parts of materials in the record" or "showing that the materials cited do not establish the absence or presence of a genuine dispute, or that an adverse party cannot produce admissible evidence to support the fact." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1) ; see also LRCiv 56.1(a)-(b). A party may object that the material cited to support or dispute a fact is inadmissible. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(2). "If a party fails to properly support an assertion of fact or fails to properly address another party's assertion of fact as required by Rule 56(c), the court may ... consider the fact undisputed for purposes of the motion." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)(2).
In deciding a motion for summary judgment, a court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, not weigh the evidence or assess its credibility, and draw all justifiable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party. Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc. , 530 U.S. 133, 150, 120 S.Ct. 2097, 147 L.Ed.2d 105 (2000) ; Anderson , 477 U.S. at 255, 106 S.Ct. 2505. However, it is not a court's task "to scour the record in search of a genuine issue of triable fact." Keenan v. Allan , 91 F.3d 1275, 1279 (9th Cir. 1996). "The court need consider only the cited materials, but it may consider other materials in the record." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(3). When the record, taken as a whole, could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party, there is no genuine issue for trial. Matsushita , 475 U.S. at 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348.
On March 5, 2013, the Arizona Child Protective Services (CPS)2 Hotline (the "Hotline") received a report which detailed allegations concerning Plaintiff Lorraine Patterson ("Lorraine") and her daughter, Michelle Patterson ("Michelle"), who at the time was 16 years old. (Doc. 172-1, Exhibit ("Ex.") 6; Doc. 172-2, Ex. 8.) Those allegations, which are contained in the "Reported Maltreatment" section of an intake summary dated March 7, 2013, are listed below:
(Doc. 172-1, Ex. 6.) But that was not all, as that same intake summary included a statement from a school counselor, which states, in part:
Today, Michelle reported she no longer wants to live with her mom, she is agitated and fed up with life at home, it's chaotic, mom screams all the time, there are negativity in the home, no specifics. The two adult sisters are seeking to take custody of her because they went through this type of home with their mom. Michelle said she has to be out of her house immediately.
(Id. ) The intake summary additionally included allegations from an unidentified "second source," which are substantially similar to those previously detailed. (Id. ) An investigation soon after commenced. (Id. ; Doc. 185, Ex. 21.)
Two days later, Linda Morris ("Morris"), Michelle's adult sister, filed—and the Hotline received—a dependency petition (the "March Dependency Petition") in the Superior Court of the State of Arizona in and for Maricopa County, Juvenile Division (the "Juvenile Court"). (Doc. 172-1, Exs. 2, 4.) The petition alleged, in part:
(Doc. 172-1, Ex. 2 (emphasis omitted).) Morris argued Michelle "should be made a temporary ward of the Court, committed to the continued care, custody and control of the Arizona Department of Economic Security3 ...." (Id. ) These allegations were substantially reproduced in an intake summary dated March 14, 2013. (Doc. 172-1, Ex. 4.)
A week later, Romero and Nelson-McCall entered the fray, submitting a "Report to the Juvenile Court for Preliminary Protective Hearing and/or Initial Dependency Hearing" ("the March 2013 Report").4 Under the "Reason for CPS Involvement" section and the subsection thereof titled "Why temporary custody was necessary," Romero summarized5 the allegations in the March Dependency Petition. (Doc. 185, Ex. 10 () .) Under the "Parent/guardian/custodian's verbal or written response to the allegations" subsection, she indicated she interviewed Lorraine regarding the allegations and that Lorraine said she had signed a "temporary custody document" and agreed to "sign over permanent guardianship" to Morris. (Id. ) Romero, in the subsection titled "Describe the need, if any, for continued temporary custody," wrote "[c]ontinued temporary custody is needed due to mom refusing Michelle to come home, she is willing to let Michelle stay with her adult daughter permanently." (Id. )
The Juvenile Court held a "Preliminary Protective Hearing" regarding the March Dependency Petition on March 15, 2013.6 Lorraine, her counsel, and Michelle were present, among others. (Doc. 172-4, Ex. 19.) The Juvenile Court noted that Linda filed a temporary guardianship petition, Lorraine consented to the...
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