Patterson v. Mintzes

• Decision Date: 07 September 1983
• Docket Number: No. 81-1364,81-1364
• Citation: 717 F.2d 284
• Parties: Chester PATTERSON, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Barry MINTZES, et al., Defendants-Appellees.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Sixth Circuit

Page 284

717 F.2d 284

Chester PATTERSON, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Barry MINTZES, et al., Defendants-Appellees.

No. 81-1364.

United States Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit.

Argued Dec. 1, 1982.

Decided Sept. 7, 1983.

Chester Patterson, pro se.

James Robinson, David M. Honigman (argued), Detroit, Mich., for plaintiff-appellant.

Frank J. Kelley, Atty. Gen. of Mich., Lansing, Mich., Robert A. Derengoski, Sol. Gen., J. Peter Lark, Asst. Atty. Gen. (argued), Corrections Div. Crim. Appeals Section, Lansing, Mich., for defendants-appellees.

Before KRUPANSKY and WELLFORD, Circuit Judges, and PHILLIPS, Senior Circuit Judge.

KRUPANSKY, Circuit Judge.

This pro se Sec. 1983 action was initiated by Chester Patterson (Patterson) against defendants Barry Mintzes (Mintzes), William Grant (Grant) and Mark Smith (Smith), respectively the Warden, Deputy Warden and Prison Counselor of the State Prison of Southern Michigan (SPSM), for declaratory and compensatory redress to recompense averred deprivations of plaintiff's First Amendment right of access to the courts and Eighth Amendment guarantee against cruel and unusual punishment. Patterson appealed from the April 30, 1981 judgment of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan granting the motion of defendants for summary judgment.

It is initially incumbent upon this Court to ascertain whether Patterson has waived the right to appeal from the judgment of the district court for failure to timely file written objections to the magistrate's report and recommendation. United States v. Walters, 638 F.2d 947 (6th Cir.1981). Patterson's cause of action was referred to a magistrate under 28 U.S.C. Sec. 636(b)(1)(B). 28 U.S.C. Sec. 636(c) dictates that Patterson had 10 days within which to file written objections, if any, to the magistrate's report and recommendations. The record concedes, however, that Patterson's written objections were tendered to the district court on the 12th day following Patterson's receipt of the magistrate's report. Nevertheless, the district court filed the written objections, without requiring Patterson to move for an extension of time within which to file and/or demonstrate excusable neglect, and pronounced in its judgment that such untimely written exceptions had been considered together with the magistrate's report and recommendation. ¹ From this judgment Patterson filed a timely notice of appeal.

In Walters, supra, this Court promulgated the following rule of waiver applicable when a party fails to file written objections as authorized by 28 U.S.C. Sec. 636(b)(1):

[T]he fundamental congressional policy underlying the Magistrate's Act--to improve access to the federal courts and aid the efficient administration of justice--is best served by our holding that a party shall file objections with the district court or else waive right to appeal. Additionally, through the exercise of our supervisory powers, we hold that a party shall be informed by the magistrate that objections must be filed within ten days or further appeal is waived.

The filing of objections provides the district court with the opportunity to consider the specific contentions of the parties and to correct any errors immediately. This comports with judicial efficiency and "will often save the parties the expense and difficulty of appeal."

638 F.2d at 949-50. This Court concludes that when written objections to a magistrate's report are tendered beyond the 10 day period of 28 U.S.C. Sec. 636(b)(1), but are nevertheless filed and considered by the district court, the criteria identified in Walters in justification of the waiver rule promulgated therein dissipate and the rule will not apply to bar appellate review.

It is initially observed that the 10 day period of Sec. 636(b)(1) may be extended by the district court. Section 636(b)(1) expressly dictates that the filing of written objections may be regulated by "rules of court";

Within ten days after being served with a copy, any party may serve and file written objections to such proposed findings and recommendations as provided by rules of court. (emphasis added).

"Rules of court" incorporate, at a minimum, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. In particular, Rule 6(b) provides for enlargement of time periods "[w]hen by these rules or by a notice given thereunder or by order of court an act is required or allowed to be done at or within a specified time ..." ² In the action sub judice, the magistrate ordered Patterson to file written objections within 10 days; this is an "order of court" within the meaning of Rule 6(b) and therefore subject to extension.

Further, recognition of a district court's authority to extend the time to file written objections ultimately advances and serves the underlying purpose of the Magistrate Act. The district court, rather than the magistrate, is charged with the ultimate responsibility of properly adjudicating the Article III controversy before it. United States v. Raddatz, 447 U.S. 667, 100 S.Ct. 2406, 2412, 65 L.Ed.2d 424 (1980). Accordingly, the district court may place upon the magistrate's recommendation such reliance as is warranted through the "exercise of sound judicial discretion." Id., 100 S.Ct. at 2413. A district court's power to extend the 10 day filing period correspondingly preserves the opportunity to render a more fully informed opinion and thereby effectively discharge its judicial responsibilities. An analysis of the interests underlying the Magistrate Act and the desirable procedures of achieving those interests compel the conclusion that Congress did not intend to divest the district courts of the ability to balance the interests of the parties and the interests of justice and extend the 10 day period of Sec. 636(b)(1) when necessary and appropriate ³ to accomplish the ultimate objects of the proceedings, to wit, ascertain the facts and the controlling principles of law. Last, it is observed that Congress did not promulgate the time prescription of Sec. 636(b)(1) to effectuate or advance an expeditious resolution of the proceedings. Time is not, in the traditional sense, "of the essence". Therefore no policy reasons exist in support of the proposition that a district court should not be authorized to extend the 10 day period to file objections. ⁴

The waiver rule of Walters is predicated upon advancement of "[t]he fundamental congressional policy underlying the Magistrate's Act--to improve access to the federal courts and aid the efficient administration of justice". Walters, supra, 638 F.2d at 949. These policies are advanced when a district court reviews the written objections to the magistrate's report and recommendation. In the case at bar the district court, consistent with congressional policies underlying the Magistrate Act, extended the 10 day period of Sec. 636(b)(1), by accepting Patterson's written objections for consideration. The express dictates of Walters--that "a party shall file objections"--have been satisfied, albeit with implicit leave of court rather than of right. Under these circumstances the waiver rule of Walters is inapplicable.

Confronting the merits of the instant appeal, it is observed that the complaint, and the attached "Client Grievance Forms", reflect the following operative facts relative to Patterson's First Amendment claim. Patterson was incarcerated at the Marquette Branch Prison, State of Michigan, and transferred from said facility on December 11, 1980, to SPSM. The sole purpose of the transfer was to provide Patterson the opportunity to appear on his own behalf at a scheduled judicial proceeding on January 13, 1981. Plaintiff's personal property, including transcripts and legal papers necessary for his court appearance, were transferred on the same bus in which he was transported to SPSM. These documents and records were placed in the property room at SPSM upon arrival.

Upon arrival at SPSM on December 11, 1980 Patterson was placed in 5-west segregation, cell 16-base. Continuous oral requests by Patterson for access to his transcripts, legal papers and writing amenities were denied. On the fourth day subsequent to his arrival, December 15, 1980, Patterson filed a "Client Grievance Form" seeking his legal documents and writing supplies. The request was denied by defendants. Patterson's transcript and legal papers were not delivered to him until January 27, 1981, two weeks subsequent to his judicial proceeding which had concluded on January 13, 1981.

It is beyond peradventure that the factual allegations heretofore enumerated, which stand unrebutted by credible testimony or documentary evidence, constitute a cognizable Sec. 1983 action predicated upon the First Amendment. It is well-settled that prisoners possess a constitutional right of access to the courts. Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 97 S.Ct. 1491, 52 L.Ed.2d 72 (1977). As has been recently summarized:

"[P]ersons in prison, like other individuals, have the right to petition the Government for redress of grievances which, of course, includes 'access of prisoners to the courts for the purpose of presenting their complaints.' " Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319, 321, 92 S.Ct. 1079, 1081, 31 L.Ed.2d 263, (1972), quoting, Johnson v. Avery, 393 U.S. 483, 485, 89 S.Ct. 747, 748, 21 L.Ed.2d 718 (1969).

Milhouse v. Carlson, 652 F.2d 371, 373 (3d Cir.1981). Prison officials are charged with the responsibility of assuring that inmate access to the courts is "adequate, effective and meaningful". Bounds, supra 97 S.Ct. at 1495. See also, Burns v. Ohio, 360 U.S. 252, 79 S.Ct. 1164, 3 L.Ed.2d 1209 (1959); Smith v. Bennett, 365 U.S. 708, 81 S.Ct. 895, 6 L.Ed.2d 39 (1961). A prisoner's First Amendment guarantees must be freely exercisable without hinderance. Milhouse, supra, 652 F.2d at 374, referencing Ferranti v. Moran, 618 F.2d 888, 891-92 (1st Cir.1980); Garland v. Polley, 594 F.2d 1220, 1222-23 (8th Cir.1979); Hudspeth v. Figgins, 584 F.2d 1345, 1347 (4th Cir.1978), ...