Patterson v. Rural Water Dist. 2

• Decision Date: 07 February 2020
• Docket Number: Case No. CIV-19-627-R
• Citation: 438 F.Supp.3d 1258
• Parties: Billy Ray PATTERSON, Plaintiff, v. RURAL WATER DISTRICT 2, Cotton County, David Rodriguez, Udell "Scooter" Quinn, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Western District of Oklahoma

438 F.Supp.3d 1258

Billy Ray PATTERSON, Plaintiff,

v.RURAL WATER DISTRICT 2, Cotton County, David Rodriguez, Udell "Scooter" Quinn, Defendants.

Case No. CIV-19-627-R

United States District Court, W.D. Oklahoma.

Signed February 7, 2020

Jana Beth Leonard, Shannon C. Haupt, Leonard & Associates PLLC, Oklahoma City, OK, for Plaintiff.

Gerard F. Pignato, Matthew C. Kane, Ryan Whaley Coldiron Jantzen Peters & Webber PLLC, Oklahoma City, OK, for Defendants.

ORDER

DAVID L. RUSSELL, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Before the Court is the Motion to Dismiss, Doc. No. 9, filed by Defendants Cotton County Rural Water District 2 ("CCRWD"), David Rodriguez, and Udell Quinn pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Plaintiff responded, Doc. No. 10, and Defendants replied, Doc. No. 11. Upon review of the parties' submissions, the Court grants Defendants' motion in part and denies the motion in part.

I. Background

Plaintiff filed this action against his former employer, the CCRWD, and two of his former supervisors, Mr. Rodriguez and Mr. Quinn. The Complaint alleges a variety of claims arising out of the termination of Plaintiff's employment with the CCRWD. In general, Plaintiff alleges that his termination, and the events leading up to it, demonstrate that Defendants discriminated against him on the basis of age and associational disability.¹ In particular, Plaintiff asserts the following seven claims: (1) age discrimination in violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act ("ADEA"); (2) associational disability discrimination in violation of the American with Disabilities Act ("ADA"), American with Disabilities Act Amendments Act ("ADAAA"), Rehabilitation Act, and the Oklahoma Anti-Discrimination Act ("OADA"); (3) retaliation for engaging in protected opposition to disability discrimination in violation of the ADA, ADAAA, Rehabilitation Act, and the OADA; (4) violation of Plaintiff's First Amendment right to free speech; (5) violation of Plaintiff's Fourteenth Amendment right to equal protection; (6) tortious interference with a contract; and (7) tortious interference with a prospective economic advantage. Claims one through three are asserted only against the CCRWD; claims four and five are asserted against the CCRWD, Rodriguez, and Quinn; and claims six and seven are asserted only against Rodriquez and Quinn.

Defendants CCRWD, Rodriguez, and Quinn move for dismissal of all seven claims. The CCRWD argues that it is entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity from all of Plaintiff's claims because it is an arm of the State of Oklahoma. The Individual Defendants also claim immunity from Plaintiff's federal claims and assert that Oklahoma law preempts Plaintiff's state law claims.

II. Standard of Review

Defendants ask this court to review their entire motion pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). However, Defendants' first argument for dismissal involves the CCRWD's assertion of sovereign immunity—challenging the Court's subject matter jurisdiction.² Therefore, Court considers Defendants' first assertion pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1). See Holt v. United States , 46 F.3d 1000, 1003 (10th Cir. 1995). A Rule 12(b)(1) motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction may take one of two forms: a facial attack or a factual attack. Id. at 1002–03. A "facial attack ... questions the sufficiency of the complaint." Id. A factual attack goes "beyond allegations contained in the complaint and challenge[s] the facts upon which subject matter jurisdiction depends." Id. Defendants' assertion of sovereign immunity is a factual challenge. In this context, the Court "may not presume the truthfulness of the complaint's factual allegations," and it "has wide discretion to allow affidavits, other documents, and a limited evidentiary hearing to resolve disputed jurisdictional facts." Herrera v. Las Cruces Pub. Sch. , 695 F. App'x 361, 367 (10th Cir. 2017) (citing Holt , 46 F.3d at 1003 ). Because the jurisdictional issues here are not intertwined with the merits of the case, a "reference to evidence outside the pleadings does not convert the motion to a Rule 56 motion." Holt , 46 F.3d at 1003.

Defendants' other arguments discussed herein are appropriately considered challenges made to the sufficiency of Plaintiff's Complaint under Rule 12(b)(6). In considering Defendants other arguments, the Court must accept all the well-pleaded allegations of the Complaint as true and must construe the allegations in the light most favorable to Plaintiff. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly , 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007) ; Alvarado v. KOB–TV, L.L.C. , 493 F.3d 1210, 1215 (10th Cir. 2007). In doing so, the Court must determine whether Plaintiff has stated a claim upon which relief may be granted. The motion is properly granted when the Complaint provides no "more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action ...." Twombly , 550 U.S. at 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955. Plaintiff's Complaint must contain enough "facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face" id. at 570 , 127 S.Ct. 1955, and the factual allegations "must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level." Id. at 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955 (citations omitted).

III. Sovereign Immunity

Defendants first argue that all of Plaintiff's claims against the CCRWD—claims one through five—should be dismissed because the CCRWD is entitled to sovereign immunity under the Eleventh Amendment as an arm of the State of Oklahoma. Doc. No. 9, p. 5–8; Doc. No. 13; Doc. No. 15. In response, Plaintiff contends that the CCRWD is a political subdivision and thus not entitled to immunity. Doc. No. 10, p. 6–9; Doc. No. 14. For the reasons stated below, the Court finds that the CCRWD is entitled to immunity as an arm of the State of Oklahoma.

Under the Eleventh Amendment, "an unconsenting State is immune from suits brought in federal court[ ] ...." Edelman v. Jordan , 415 U.S. 651, 662–63, 94 S.Ct. 1347, 39 L.Ed.2d 662 (1974). In terms of scope, Eleventh Amendment immunity extends to states and state entities but not to counties, municipalities, or other political subdivisions. See Mt. Healthy City Sch. Dist. v. Doyle , 429 U.S. 274, 280, 97 S.Ct. 568, 50 L.Ed.2d 471 (1977). To determine the category into which a given entity falls, the Court considers whether that entity is, or is not, an "arm of the state." Id. The answer to this question depends, in large part, upon the Court's analysis of the "nature of the entity created by state law." Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Doe , 519 U.S. 425, 429 & n. 5, 117 S.Ct. 900, 137 L.Ed.2d 55 (1997) ; Sturdevant v. Paulsen , 218 F.3d 1160, 1164 (10th Cir. 2000). If the entity is akin to an arm of the state, it is entitled to immunity. See Mt. Healthy , 429 U.S. at 280, 97 S.Ct. 568 ; Steadfast Ins. Co. v. Agric. Ins. Co. , 507 F.3d 1250, 1253 (10th Cir. 2007). If, however, the entity is more like a political subdivision, it is not entitled to immunity. Id.

In determining whether the CCRWD is an arm of the state, the Court must consider four primary factors:

First, we assess the character ascribed to the entity under state law. Simply stated, we conduct a formalistic survey of state law to ascertain whether the entity is identified as an agency of the state. Second, we consider the autonomy accorded the entity under state law.

This determination hinges upon the degree of control the state exercises over the entity. Third, we study the entity's finances. Here, we look to the amount of state funding the entity receives and consider whether the entity has the ability to issue bonds or levy taxes on its own behalf. Fourth, we ask whether the entity in question is concerned primarily with local or state affairs. In answering this question, we examine the agency's function, composition, and purpose.

Baca v. Colorado Dep't of State , 935 F.3d 887, 926 (10th Cir. 2019), cert. granted sub nom. Colo. Dep't of State v. Baca , ––– U.S. ––––, 140 S.Ct. 918, 205 L.Ed.2d 519 (2020) (citing Steadfast , 507 F.3d at 1253 ). Neither the Supreme Court nor the Tenth Circuit has decided who carries the burden of persuasion regarding Eleventh Amendment immunity. However, every federal appeals court to address the question has placed the burden on the moving party. See Thomas v. Guffy , No. CIV-07-823-W, 2008 WL 2884368, at *4 (W.D. Okla. July 25, 2008) (collecting cases). This Court has previously supposed that the Tenth Circuit would reach that same conclusion. Id. Accordingly, Defendants carry the burden of persuasion regarding the factors mentioned above and discussed below.

A. Factor one: Character ascribed by state law

First, the Court assesses the character ascribed to the CCRWD under Oklahoma law. Oklahoma's Rural Water, Sewer, Gas and Solid Waste Management Districts Act, 82 O.S. §§ 1324.1 – 35 provides that upon its creation a rural water district, like the CCRWD, "shall be a body politic and corporate and an agency and legally constituted authority of the State of Oklahoma for the public purposes set forth in this act." Id. § 1324.6. Interpreting this language, the Oklahoma Supreme Court has declared that a water district—like the CCRWD—created under 82 O.S. § 1324.6 is properly characterized as a "State agency" for jurisdictional purposes. Sinor Long Bay Marina, LLC v. Wagoner Cty. Rural Water Dist. No. 2 , 2014 OK 43, ¶ 3, 335 P.3d 262, 263 (explaining that rural water districts are state agencies, not "persons" under the Antitrust Act). The Eastern District of Oklahoma has found the same, see Barnes v. Wagoner Cty. Rural Water Dist. No. 4 , No. 15-CV-479-JHP, 2016 WL 1627622, *2 (E.D. Okla. Apr. 22, 2016) (characterizing a rural water district created under 82 O.S. § 1324.6 as "an agency of the State of Oklahoma" entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity); so too has the Oklahoma Attorney General, see 2001 OK AG 38, ¶5 (explaining the legal history of rural water districts under 82 O.S. § 1324.6...