Patterson v. Saunders, 4002

• Decision Date: 26 January 1953
• Docket Number: No. 4002,4002
• Parties: CHARLES C. PATTERSON v. LILLIE M. SAUNDERS AND OTHERS. Record
• Court: Virginia Supreme Court

Page 204

74 S.E.2d 204

194 Va. 607

CHARLES C. PATTERSON v. LILLIE M. SAUNDERS AND OTHERS.

Record No. 4002.

Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia

January 26, 1953.

Harold H. Dervishian, Joseph F. Spinella, for plaintiff in error.

E. Sclater Montague, Charles S. Smith, Jr., George M. Brady, for defendants in error.

JUDGE: HUDGINS

HUDGINS, C.J., delivered the opinion of the court.

Charles C. Patterson filed his motion for judgment against Lillie M. Saunders, J. B. Gray, O. M. King, and Canton Lumber Company, Inc., seeking to recover $50,000 damages for wrongfully cutting and removing timber from a sixty-acre tract of land, situated in Elizabeth City county, alleged to be owned by him. Defendants filed separate pleas of res judicata, in which it was alleged that the Circuit Court of Elizabeth City county, in a chancery suit brought by the same plaintiff against J. B. Gray and O. M. King, two of the defendants named in his motion for judgment, had held that plaintiff had no title to the same sixty acres of land described in his motion. The trial court sustained the pleas and dismissed the case. To that judgment this writ of error was granted.

The record of the former proceeding upon which each of the pleas of res judicata is based, consists of a bill in chancery, an answer and a decree. It was alleged in the bill of complaint filed by the same plaintiff on October 22, 1946, that he was the owner in fee of the sixty acres described in his motion for judgment, and cited the deed by which he acquired the property and other deeds in his chain of title, and charged that J. B. Gray and O. M. King 'have cut and are cutting 800,000 feet of heavy timber more or less on that portion of my land in the Wythe District of Elizabeth City county containing 60 acres * * *. ' The plaintiff's prayer in the bill was that J. B. Gray and O. M. King be enjoined 'from cutting timber and trees on my above said land * * * and * * * from trespassing on my said land in any manner whatsoever.'

The defendants in that proceeding filed a short answer denying each and every allegation set forth in the bill. The cause came on to be heard upon the issues thus joined, and after considering the evidence introduced by the parties, the chancellor entered the following decree:

'This day came the complainant pursuant to notice and filed his bill of complaint for a temporary injunction against the defendants, and this day came the defendants and filed their answer in writing, and the Court having heard the evidence, being of the opinion that the complainant has failed to establish his ownership of the property, and having failed to prove that either of the defendants have cut any timber from the complainant's land, and being of the opinion that the complainant is not entitled to any of the relief prayed for, doth adjudge, order and decree that the complainant's petition for a temporary injunction be and the same is hereby denied and this cause is dismissed and stricken from the docket of this Court at the cost of the complainant; to which ruling of the Court the complainant excepted.

'And the Court proceeding further doth authorize each of the parties to this proceeding to withdraw from the evidence the respective exhibits filed in evidence this day in this proceeding.

'An emergency existing, this decree shall be effective forthwith.'

Charles C. Patterson, hereinafter designated 'plaintiff,' contends that the judgment of the trial court sustaining the pleas of res judicata is erroneous for three reasons: (1) the court of equity in the former proceeding had no jurisdiction to try title to plaintiff's land; (2) even if it had jurisdiction, it did not pass upon the merits of the cause, and (3) there was no privity of parties in the two proceedings.

Originally, an action of ejectment was the exclusive remedy to try title and settle controverted boundaries of land, but this rule has been modified by statutes (Code of 1950, secs. 8-836 and 55-153) and modern decisions.

The general rule is that in the absence of some peculiar equity arising out of the conduct, situation or relation of the parties, a court of equity is without jurisdiction to settle disputes as to title and boundaries of land. But where the act done, or threatened to be done, would be destructive of the substance of the estate, or would result in irreparable injury, a court of equity will assume jurisdiction, restrain the perpetration of the wrong and prevent the injury. Equity having taken jurisdiction, it will then decide the whole controversy, though the issues are legal in their nature and are capable of being tried by a court of law. Miller v. Wills, 95 Va. 337, 28 S.E. 337; Cumbee v. Ritter, 123 Va. 448, 96 S.E. 747; Edwards v. Ritter Lumber Co., 163 Va. 851, 177 S.E. 841.

The bill of complaint filed by this plaintiff in the former proceeding does not appear to have been drawn by an expert. However, its allegations were amply sufficient to invoke equity jurisdiction. The bill contains the essential averments approved by this Court in Bledsoe v. Robinett, 105 Va. 723, 54 S.E. 861, where Judge Buchanan, discussing the necessary allegations of a bill in this class of cases, said: 'The pleadings of the complainant ought, therefore, to make out a clear case for the equitable relief sought, for courts of law ought not to be ousted of their jurisdiction in doubtful cases, especially where the title to or the boundaries of land is involved, as is the fact in this case.

* * *

'It is not sufficient for the complainant to allege that he is the owner of the land upon which the trespass is being committed, but he must set forth his title. Where he claims under a paper title he should generally exhibit his title papers, or copies thereof, or such of them at least as will make out a prima facie case of title.'

Judge Whittle, in Ely v. Johnson, 114 Va. 31, 75 S.E. 748, citing with approval the case of Bledsoe v. Robinett, supra, said: '* * * a plaintiff in a suit to restrain a trespass need not allege that his title is undisputed or has been adjudicated. He must, however, show a prima facie title.'

Plaintiff's bill was demurrer proof. It contained the essential averment that plaintiff owned the land, and referred to the deeds by which he claims to have acquired title. The answer denied this allegation. Each side was given full opportunity to introduce, and did introduce, evidence on this issue of fact. The court did more than merely deny the injunction. It disposed of the controversy on its merits and dismissed the case at the cost of plaintiff. In the order of dismissal the court said: 'Complainant has failed to establish his ownership of the property * * * and failed to prove that either of defendants have cut any timber from complainant's land.'

The doctrine of res judicata is that a point once adjudicated by a court of competent jurisdiction may be relied upon as conclusive upon the same matter as between the parties or their privies, in any subsequent suit, in the same court or any other court, at law or in chancery. Hedlund v. Miner, 395 Ill. 217, 170 A.L.R. 1306, 69 N.E.2d, 862.

'A judgment in a case involving two or more issues is treated as conclusive upon all of them, where all are decided in favor of the same litigant and the judgment rests upon them jointly, since the decision of one issue in such case is no less necessary or material than the decision of the other.' 30 Am. Jur., Judgments, sec. 185, p. 931.

'The general rule is that a judgment, in a former action, based upon an insufficiency of evidence is sufficient to support the application of the doctrine of res judicata.' 30 Am. Jur., Judgments, sec. 213, p. 948.

The plaintiff, in the chancery cause, excepted to the entry of the decree, but took no appeal therefrom. Whether the decree was or was not supported by the evidence is immaterial. A final decree, whether right or wrong, from which no appeal is taken, is binding upon the litigants. Nicholas v. Commonwealth, 186 Va. 315, 42 S.E.2d, 306.

In Cumbee v. Ritter, 123 Va. 448, 96 S.E. 747, Judge Prentis, speaking for the court, said: 'In a case like this, where both parties claim title and possession and both are exercising acts of ownership, and one fails to establish even a prima facie case, we are of opinion that in the interest of peace, law and order the equity court should take jurisdiction; and that in this case the trial court properly determined the question raised against the defendant's contention, which rests upon a claim of title, which is entirely unsustained, if not negatived, by the evidence introduced to support it. In view, however, of the fact that the record suggests the possibility that the defendants were overconfident in their view that the court of equity had no jurisdiction, and, therefore failed fully to present the evidence upon which they relied in support of their claim of title, we are not disposed to close the door of opportunity to them. ' The decree was affirmed without prejudice to the right of defendant thereafter to assert title to the property in a proper forum.

In the case at bar the equity suit was not dismissed without prejudice. The adjudication was positive. If the plaintiff had proved that he owned the land, doubtless the court would have performed its duty, issued the injunction and restrained the defendants from cutting and removing the timber, or, if he had proved that he had a bona fide claim of right to the land, it would have been the duty of the court to dismiss the case without prejudice to plaintiff's rights. W.O. & W.R.R. Co. v. Cazenove, 83 Va. 744, 3 S.E. 433; Moorman v. Lynchburg, 113 Va. 90, 73 S.E. 987; Woolfolk v. Graves, 113 Va. 182, 69 S.E. 1039.

While the court did not declare that title to the land was in the defendants, or their privies, it did declare that plaintiff was not the owner. That alleged fact was the main issue in the cause. A fact necessarily involved in an issue, on which...