Edwards v. W. M. Ritter Lumber Co

• Decision Date: 17 January 1935
• Citation: 177 S.E. 841
• Parties: EDWARDS et al. v. W. M. RITTER LUMBER CO. et al.
• Court: Virginia Supreme Court

177 S.E. 841

EDWARDS et al.

v.W. M. RITTER LUMBER CO. et al.

Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia.

Jan. 17, 1935.

Appeal from Circuit Court, Dickenson County.

Bill by the W. M. Ritter Lumber Company and another against Earsel Edwards and others. From a decree, defendants appeal.

Reversed without prejudice.

Argued before CAMPBELL, C. J., and HOLT, EPES, BROWNING, and CHINN, JJ.

G. Mark French and S. H. & Geo. C. Sutherland, all of Clintwood, for appellants.

Earle P. Rose, Walter Lee Rush, and A. A. Skeen, all of Clintwood, for appellees.

CAMPBELL Chief Justice.

The Clinchfield Coal Corporation, a Virginia corporation, and W. M. Ritter Lumber Company, a West Virginia corporation doing business in Virginia, filed their bill against Earsel Edwards, Elvina Colley, Iowa Edwards, B. H. Edwards, Fitzhugh Colley, Zena M. Colley, Estelle Willis, Earnest Willis, Chloe Ratliff, Troy Ratliff, and Richard Edwards, alleging that Clinchfield Coal Company, complainant, is seized and possessed, by proper and apt deeds, muniments, and grants of title of record, of two certain tracts of land situated in Dickenson county and generally described as follows: (1) That certain tract or parcel of land known as the Clinchfield Coal Corporation-Columbus Phipps 105-26-acre tract; (2) that certain tract known as the Clinchfield Coal Corporation-H. H. Branham 170-acre tract; that by proper deed the Clinchfield Coal Corporation conveyed to the W. M. Ritter Lumber Company the timber standing on said two tracts of land, together with the privilege of removing same within twenty-five years from the date of deed; that the Ritter Company began the construction of a road upon the Columbus Phipps tract of land preparatory to the construction of a tramroad in order to remove the timber from the lands purchased from the Clinch-field Coal Corporation; that on the ---- day of ----, 1933, the defendants entered upon the Phipps tract of land and with force and arms prevented farther construction of the road; that defendants have been guilty of repeated acts of trespass upon both the Phipps and Branham tracts of land by cutting and removing timber trees from the land; that the defendants are financially unable to respond in damages; that the Ritter Lumber Company would suffer irreparable injury; and there was a prayer for an injunction.

The defendants filed a demurrer and answer to the bill. The demurrer challenged the jurisdiction of a court of equity, on the ground that complainants had an adequate remedy at law. The demurrer was properly overruled. Upon its face the bill denotes a prima facie title in complainants, the destruction of the timber, the insolvency of defendants, and under the ruling of this court in Cumhee v. Ritter, 123 Va. 448, 96 S. E. 747, which reaffirms the doctrine of Miller v. Wills, 95 Va. 337, 28 S. E. 337, a court of equity has jurisdiction in cases of this nature.

The answer denied the allegation of the bill as to the ownership of the land in controversy and claimed ownership in the defendants by reason of their adverse possession of the property.

Over seven hundred pages of evidence were taken to substantiate the conflicting claims. Upon a final hearing, a decree awarding apermanent injunction against Earsel Edwards was entered. It is from that decree this appeal is allowed.

In support of its claim that it is the fee-simple owner of the lands by reason of its paper title thereto, the Clinchfield Coal Corporation introduced forty-three deeds. In view of the following stipulation of counsel, only seven of these deeds become material: "It is admitted by counsel for defendants for the purpose of saving time and expense that the complainants have good paper chain of title to all the land in dispute back to Dale Carter and that they also have a good paper chain of title back to Columbus Phipps to the tract of land designated on plaintiff‘s map as Columbus Phipps 105 acre tract and back to H. H. Branham for the tract designated on complainants' map as II. H. Branham tract of 171 acres. That no admission is made as to title prior to these links."

In this case, as in other cases where one claims possession by reason of the fee-simple ownership of land, it is incumbent upon the claimant to trace his title back to the commonwealth or to a common grantor. Complainants attempted to do this by introducing in evidence a grant from the commonwealth to Richard Smith, and successive deeds, until title was vested in Dale Carter, who in turn made a conveyance to the complainant.

In addition to the burden of tracing title to the land in controversy, it was incumbent upon complainants to show that the land in dispute is covered by the title papers. The main contention of the defendants is that complainants have wholly failed to adduce proof identifying the lands in issue. In other words, complainants have failed to show that the lands in dispute are covered by their title papers. In the written opinion of the chancellor, filed with the record, this is said: "The evidence of identity by the complainants, is in some respects, not altogether satisfactory, but taken in connection with the admission of defendants, is thought to be sufficient." (Italics added.)

At the conclusion of the argument of this case before this court, counsel for complainants were requested to file an additional brief "putting their finger" on the evidence in the voluminous record showing that the identity of the land had been sufficiently shown. Pursuant to that request, counsel filed a brief in which we read:

"Do the Richard Smith grants cover the...