Patterson v. State
Citation | 314 N.E.2d 92 |
Decision Date | 24 July 1974 |
Docket Number | No. 3-873A107,3-873A107 |
Parties | James Earl PATTERSON, Defendant-Appellant, v. STATE of Indiana, Plaintiff-Appellee. |
Court | Court of Appeals of Indiana |
Thomas H. Clifford, Merrillville, for defendant-appellant.
Theodore L. Sendak, Atty. Gen., David A. Miller, Deputy Atty. Gen., Indianapolis, for plaintiff-appellee.
Defendant-appellant James Earl Patterson was charged by indictment with murder in the first degree. IC 1971, 35-13-4-1, Ind.Ann.Stat. § 10-3401 (Burns Supp. 1973). To such charge appellant pleaded not guilty. Following trial before a jury appellant was found guilty of the lesser included offense of involuntary manslaughter and sentenced to imprisonment for a period of not less than one nor more than ten years. Thereafter, appellant's motion to correct errors was overruled and this appeal was perfected.
An examination of the evidence most favorable to the State discloses that during the night immediately prior to the early morning hours of August 2, 1972, appellant's wife, Patricia Patterson, accompanied the deceased, George Hall, to a drive-in movie. Afterward, Hall left Mrs. Patterson at her residence and, at approximately 12:30 A.M. returned to his own apartment where he was joined by a friend, James Earl Jones, and Miss Jonnie Mae Robinson, a tenant who occupied a basement apartment in the same building. After the three had had something to eat, Jones went to Miss Robinson's apartment to take a nap while Miss Robinson remained with Hall.
Upon Mrs. Patterson's return to her residence after having been in the company of George Hall, a continuation of an argument that had begun earlier occurred between Mrs. Patterson and the appellant, her husband. At that time, Patterson learned that his wife had attended a drive-in movie with George Hall, and became angry. Patterson then obtained a knife from the kitchen, took his wife by the arm and proceeded to Hall's apartment. After Patterson and his wife were admitted to Hall's apartment, an argument erupted between Patterson and Hall in which the appellant accused Hall of taking his wife to a drive-in movie earlier in the evening. Patterson repeatedly stated in an angry tone, 'I'm going to kill you if you don't tell me something', and, further, 'why did you take my wife to the drive-in(?)' George Hall responded with 'cool it man, cool it', and 'maybe I can explain something.' During the argument, Patterson struck his wife chipping one of her teeth. Shortly thereafter, a physical struggle occurred between appellant and the deceased which culminated in the fatal stabbing of Hall.
Miss Robinson, who heard the voices of the combatants and witnessed part of the struggle, left to obtain help. As she exited, she observed both Patterson and Hall in the hallway of the apartment and noted that at the time Hall was kneeling on the floor.
James Jones had been resting in Miss Robinson's basement apartment when he heard the sound of commotion. Jones proceeded upstairs after being summoned by Miss Robinson and found George Hall lying face down on the floor of his apartment near the entrance. Hall appeared to be gasping for air. After an unsuccessful attempt by Jones to turn him over, Hall ceased gasping and no longer exhibited any movement.
Shortly thereafter, Detective Edward Chale of the Gary Police Department arrived at the scene. In order to gain entry to Hall's apartment, he found it necessary to move Hall's body which was blocking the doorway. During his subsequent investigation, Detective Chale determined that Hall was dead and, upon turning the body over, found a butcher knife which he concluded was the weapon used in the crime.
An autopsy revealed that the deceased, George Hall, died as the result of a wound which perforated the heart, the right bornchi and the right pulmonary artery causing a massive hemorrhage in the right chest and pericardial cavity.
It is to be noted initially that the sufficiency of the evidence to support appellant's conviction of the offense of involuntary manslaughter is not questioned. The foregoing factual circumstances, however, have been included in order to supply background to several of appellant's succeeding arguments.
The first issue is whether the trial court erred in overruling appellant's challenge to the venire from which the jury panel was drawn. Appellant, in his motion to correct errors, asserts that black citizens were systematically excluded from the venire and that he was thereby denied his right to a trial by a jury of his peers.
The Supreme Court of the United States has consistently held that jury selection systems are required to draw prospective jurors from a fair cross-section of the community. Thiel v. Southern Pacific Co. (1946), 328 U.S. 217, 66 S.Ct. 984, 90 L.Ed. 1181; Glasser v. United States (1942), 315 U.S. 60, 62 S.Ct. 457, 86 L.Ed. 680; Smith v. Texas (1940), 311 U.S. 128, 61 S.Ct. 164, 85 L.Ed. 84; Strauder v. West Virginia (1879), 100 U.S. 303, 25 L.Ed. 664. Reasonable qualifications, however, may be imposed notwithstanding the fact that they may detract from the cross-section present in the actual jury pools. See: United States v. Butera (1st Cir. 1970), 420 F.2d 564.
The burden of demonstrating purposeful discrimination is imposed initially upon the defendant. Sanders v. State (1972), Ind., 284 N.E.2d 751. See: Whitus v. Georgia (1967), 385 U.S. 545, 87 S.Ct. 643, 17 L.Ed.2d 599; Hernandez v. Texas (1954), 347 U.S. 475, 74 S.Ct. 667, 98 L.Ed. 866. Further, in United States v. Butera, supra, at 569 of 420 F.2d, it is stated:
(Emphasis supplied.)
The central question then, is whether appellant succeeded in establishing a 'significant disparity' between black citizens who were selected for jury service and the percentage of black citizens in the community. Sanders v. State, supra.
Counsel for appellant in challenging the jury selection process, noted that an excess of seventy jurors were present in court on the previous day and that approximately four out of the seventy were black citizens. Counsel thereafter stated his belief that the percentage of black citizens in the county amounted to approximately ten to twenty per cent. Appellant's argument that a significant disparity was thereby shown must fail, however, under reasoning similar to that which was succinctly stated in Sanders. Therein, our Supreme Court, at Ind., at 757 of 284 N.E.2d, stated that,
(Emphasis supplied in part.)
In the case at bar, no evidence was introduced to show that the group of jurors present in court represented the entirety of the jurors selected. Moreover, counsel's statements concerning his beliefs as to the racial composition of the county and his recollections as to the number of black citizens present cannot be regarded as 'reliable data' from which a determination could be made.
The next issue is whether the trial court erred in admitting into evidence over appellant's objections State's Exhibits Nos. 2, 3 and 7 which were photographs taken at the scene of the crime.
With regard to State's Exhibit No. 2, which is a view of the upper portion of the body of the deceased showing a wound on the right side of the chest, it is asserted that such exhibit does not tend to prove any issue in controversy; that it is shockingly morbid, ghastly and macabre; that its introduction during the testimony of the doctor who performed the autopsy was calculated to arouse passion and prejudice from the jury; and that the admission of the photograph into evidence constituted an abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court. Appellant further contends that State Exhibits Nos. 3 and 7 which are different views of the deceased lying face down in the hallway of his apartment were not relevant and did not enlighten the jury on any material issue in the case.
We first observe that the admission of a photograph into evidence is a matter within the sound discretion of the trial court. The trial court's action, moreover, will not be...
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Patterson v. State
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