Sanders v. State

• Decision Date: 14 July 1972
• Docket Number: No. 870S193,870S193
• Parties: William Frederick SANDERS, Appellant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee.
• Court: Indiana Supreme Court

Page 751

284 N.E.2d 751

259 Ind. 43

William Frederick SANDERS, Appellant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee.

No. 870S193.

Supreme Court of Indiana.

July 14, 1972.

Joseph A. Williams, Fort Wayne, for appellant.

Theodore L. Sendak, Atty. Gen., J. Frank Hanley, Deputy Atty. Gen., for appellee.

HUNTER, Justice.

This is an appeal by William Frederick Sanders from a judgment in the Allen Circuit Court convicting him of First Degree Murder. Trial was to a jury, and upon conviction appellant was sentenced to life imprisonment in the Indiana State Prison.

The issues presented for review on appeal may be grouped as follows:

1. The verdict is not sustained by sufficient evidence in that the State allegedly failed to prove premeditated malice.

2. The court erred in admitting into evidence certain written and oral statements made by appellant which were allegedly obtained in violation of his constitutional rights.

3. The court erred in overruling appellant's Motion to Strike the Jury Panel wherein it was alleged that Negro citizens were systematically excluded from jury service thus denying appellant his right to a trial by a jury of his peers.

The evidence most favorable to the State, as revealed by the record, is as follows: At approximately ten o'clock on the morning of November 11, 1968, appellant went to the apartment of Miss Barbara Wright in Fort Wayne, Indiana, for the purpose of paying her support money. An argument resulted when Miss Wright informed appellant of her intentions to marry another person. While appellant's back was turned, Miss Wright apparently secured a heavy stick or club and advanced toward him as if to strike him. Appellant turned before the blow was struck, and he succeeded in wresting the club away from her. Appellant then proceeded to strike Miss Wright with the club, and after the second blow she fell to the floor. The appellant next struck Miss Wright's two children, Michelle, age eighteen months, and Yolanda, age seven months, as they went to their mother's side. Appellant immediately left the apartment, but he returned a short time later. Using a jar of gasoline which was stored in a closet, he doused the bodies of the three victims and set the apartment on fire. Appellant then fled the apartment and did not return. The bodies of the victims were discovered by firemen who were called to the scene to extinguish the fire.

Appellant was charged only with the murder of the eighteen month old child, Michelle. An autopsy revealed that the cause of her death was due to a blow on the head with a blunt instrument which caused extensive hemorrhaging into the brain.

The above facts relating to the commission of the crime were gained solely from the appellant's confession. Counsel for appellant places great weight on the fact that Miss Wright appears to have initiated or provoked the attack. Counsel also insists that the jury must accept appellant's entire version of the incident since it is uncontradicted by any other evidence. Appellant contends that after striking Miss Wright he 'panicked' and proceeded to strike the two children. From this evidence, it is argued, a jury could not find premeditated malice and a conviction of First Degree Murder should not be sustained. We do not agree.

It is well established law that the jury may accept or reject all or any part of a defendant's confession or admission. See, Corbin v. State (1968), 250 Ind. 147, 234 N.E.2d 261, 237 N.E.2d 376; Swift v. State (1961), 242 Ind. 877, 176 N.E.2d 117; Jackson, etc. v. State (1958), 238 Ind. 365, 151 N.E.2d 141. Therefore, the jury was certainly not bound to accept the appellant's entire explanation of the incident.

In regard to the argument that premeditated malice was not sufficiently established, this Court recognized in May v. State (1953), 232 Ind. 523, 112 N.E.2d 439, that malice may be inferred from the intentional use of a deadly weapon. Premeditation may be proved by both direct and circumstantial evidence. Wahl v. State (1951), 229 Ind. 521, 98 N.E.2d 671; May v. State, supra. It is not necessary that an appreciable length of time expire before the premeditated intent to kill is formed. Pierce v. State (1970), 253 Ind. 650, 256 N.E.2d 557. In the instant case, the evidence discloses that appellant intentionally and deliberately struck Michelle Wright, an eighteen month old infant, with a club with sufficient force to fatally injure her. Appellant's contention that he was so upset and excited that he was incapable of acting with premeditated malice is a claim which the jury could properly believe or disbelieve. Apparently the jury chose to disbelieve this part of the confession, and in view of all of the facts and circumstances surrounding this event, we are of the opinion that the jury's decision was proper. This Court will neither weigh the evidence nor determine the credibility of witnesses. Where, as here, there is substantial evidence of probative value sufficient to establish every material element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt, the jury's verdict will not be disturbed on appeal. Valentine v. State (1971), Ind., 273 N.E.2d 543.

In regard to appellant's contention that his confession should not have been admitted into evidence, we must first examine the events leading up to his arrest and subsequent confession. On the afternoon of November 11, 1968, the date of the killing, two Fort Wayne Police Officers drove to the home of Barbara Wright's stepmother where they found the appellant. One officer went to the house and asked the appellant if he would come outside to the police car and speak with him. The appellant agreed, and upon arriving at the car, he was orally informed of his constitutional rights. Appellant was then asked if he would be willing to accompany the officers to the police station and submit to questioning. Appellant agreed to the request, and, while enroute to the station, he was again orally advised of his constitutional rights. Soon after his arrival at the station, appellant was taken to one of the interrogation rooms. At that time his constitutional rights were read to him from a 'rights and waiver' form. He was asked if he understood everything that had been explained to him, including the waiver. The appellant indicated that he understood, and he agreed to sign a waiver of his constitutional rights. The signed waiver was introduced at trial. Before the interrogation was commenced, appellant was again asked if he wanted an attorney present, and he replied that he did not. Appellant was interrogated three times that evening, the last session concluding at 12:50 A.M. on November 12. At that time he was placed under arrest on a preliminary charge of aggravated assault and battery.

On the morning of November 12, appellant appeared in City Court where he was informed by the court of the nature of the preliminary charge against him. He was further advised that the charge was merely a holding charge, and that sometime within the next seven days the State would either dismiss the charge or file formal charges in the Allen Circuit Court. The appellant was also fully apprised of his constitutional rights by the judge.

After the court hearing, appellant was interrogated for a period of two hours. He continued to deny that he had anything to do with the killings. However, during the afternoon of November 12, he admitted that he had argued with Barbara Wright at her apartment on the morning of November 11, and that she had attempted to strike him with a club. He claimed that he couldn't remember any of the other details except that a fire had started. Before this oral statement was reduced to writing, appellant was again advised of his right to remain silent, that anything he said would be used against him in court, and that he had a right to have an attorney present. He was then asked whether he wanted an attorney present, and he replied that he did not. He was not advised that the court would appoint an attorney for him if he could not afford one. Appellant signed the written statement, the contents of which reflected his earlier oral statement. Later that same afternoon, appellant signed another written statement which contained essentially the same explanation of the incident as did his earlier statement. Before this statement was taken, he was again advised of his rights except for his right to court-appointed counsel if he could not afford to retain an attorney.

It was not until November 13, that the appellant made a full confession of his guilt, filling in the details which he had omitted on the previous day. Before this statement was reduced to writing, he was again informed of his constitutional rights except for his right to court-appointed counsel. It should be observed that the rights which were given to him prior to taking all of these written statements were printed at the top of the forms used by the Fort Wayne Police Department for taking such statements. Although any reference to his right to court-appointed counsel was omitted from these forms, they did contain the question, 'Do you want an attorney present?' Each time the appellant gave a negative answer to this question.

It should further be noted that appellant was subjected to approximately thirteen hours of interrogation during his first forty-six hours in custody. At no time did appellant express a desire not to continue to answer questions. Nor does it appear that appellant was threatened or coerced in any manner. He was fed regularly, permitted to use the telephone, and was allowed to visit with his parents. The record is absolutely void of any evidence which tends to indicate that appellant was mistreated in any way.

Appellant's first objection to the admissibility of the confession is that he was not informed of his constitutional rights as required by Miranda v. Arizona (1966), 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694. However, the evidence discloses that he was given his Miranda...