Patterson v. State, 1084S381
| Decision Date | 25 July 1986 |
| Docket Number | No. 1084S381,1084S381 |
| Parties | Rowena Jeanne PATTERSON, Appellant (Defendant Below), v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee (Plaintiff Below). |
| Court | Indiana Supreme Court |
Geoffrey A. Rivers, Muncie, for appellant.
Linley E. Pearson, Atty. Gen., Amy Schaeffer Good, Deputy Atty. Gen., Indianapolis, for appellee
Rowena Patterson was convicted on May 18, 1984, of second degree murder, Burns Sec. 10-3404 (Repealed October 1, 1977), for the August 1963 death of her step-daughter, Rita. She was sentenced to life imprisonment.
Several issues have been raised in this direct appeal, one of which requires our reversal of the conviction. Because of our disposition of the case, we address only the following issues:
1. Whether the court's disqualification of two adult defense witnesses is reversible error;
2. Whether Patterson was denied due process because twenty years elapsed between the alleged offense and her arrest;
3. Whether the charging information was fatally deficient because it did not state the cause of Rita's death; and,
4. Whether the court's declaration of mistrial over Patterson's objections was erroneous, thereby barring a second trial.
The testimony at trial revealed that Rita was pronounced dead at St. John's Hospital in Anderson on August 30, 1963. Appellant told authorities that Rita and her sister, Patty, had been fighting over a doll at the top of the stairway in their house when Rita either fell down the stairs or was pushed by Patty. An inquest followed; the coroner ruled that Rita's death was an accident. Patterson was not prosecuted.
Twenty years later, Patty pursued her step-mother's prosecution, claiming that Patterson had beaten Rita to death. When Rita died, she was six years old, and Patty was seven. Patty testified at trial that on the morning Rita died, she and Rita had wet the bed, which prompted Patterson to declare they would each receive a "whipping." Patty said appellant told her to sit at the bottom of the stairs and watch Rita's punishment in anticipation of her own beating which would follow. Patty said Patterson began beating and kicking Rita. She whipped her with a metal pole. Patty testified the beating was a continuous series of blows during which Rita screamed constantly. Finally, Patty testified, Patterson picked Rita up and slammed her into a bathtub; Rita fell silent.
Patty said appellant then laid Rita on a bed and washed and dressed her. The next memory Patty claims to have is of the ambulance driver covering Rita with a sheet and saying, "This child's been beaten to death."
Both the physician who performed the original autopsy, Dr. Kim, and the doctor who examined Rita after exhumation agreed that Rita's injuries were not likely to have been caused by a fall down the stairs. Each testified that Rita's injuries were probably caused by a beating of forceful blows. She had bruises and contusions over her back and legs and multiple head injuries. Her liver and pancreas were ruptured. Dr. Kim testified that when he performed the autopsy he formed the opinion that Rita had sustained a broken or fractured spine. He also stated that in 1963 he had disagreed with the coroner who had declared the death accidental.
Testimony from Patty and others revealed that beatings were regularly inflicted in the Patterson household. In 1960, when Rita was three years old, she suffered severe burns in the shower, and the State promoted the inference that Patterson deliberately burned the child. Patterson claimed she was about to wash Rita, became distracted, and discovered Rita standing under the scalding water.
Patty explained that fear, confusion, and love for her father kept her silent about Rita's death for many years. As a teenager, when she finally confronted the family with appellant's acts, she claims she was told falsely that appellant had been tried and acquitted of the homicide.
Another Patterson sister, Debra, testified that she was seven when Rita died. She said Patty was lying. Debra said she, Rita, and Patty were upstairs and Rita and Patty were fighting over a doll. Appellant was downstairs talking with Josephine Greenwalt, the mother of Rita and Patty, on the telephone. Debra went into her room, heard thumping noises going down the stairs, and discovered Rita at the bottom of the stairway and Patty at the top. Debra also corroborated her mother's story about the burns Rita received in 1960.
Greenwalt testified for the defense that she was talking with Patterson on the telephone the morning Rita died, and that she also spoke briefly with the girls. She said appellant finally said she had to hang up to check on the girls, who were fighting at the top of the stairs.
Another relative testified that when Patty was twelve years old she told the witness that she felt "awful bad" because she had pushed Rita down the stairs and that appellant had nothing to do with it.
Appellant's husband, Virgil, testified that he had beaten Rita rather severely the night before she died. He said appellant never whipped or beat the children; rather, she restricted her punishments to spankings.
According to Virgil, Patty had on occasion accused him of killing Rita. Once, she had tried to run Virgil down with a car. She and Patterson had fought often as Patty grew older, and Patty had physically attacked Patterson in an argument over food stamps. Testimony was heard that Patty's reputation for truthfulness was very poor. In short, this was a trial in which the jury was truly called upon to weigh the credibility of the witnesses.
Two other children, Robert and Richard, were in the house when Rita died. In 1963, Robert was six years old, and Richard was almost five. The State objected to their competency as witnesses, citing Ind.Code Sec. 34-1-14-5, which states in relevant part that children under ten years of age are not competent witnesses unless it appears they understand the nature and obligation of an oath. The court accepted competency as the appropriate issue and held a hearing on the matter; the trial court ruled that both witnesses should be excluded on the basis of their youth at the time of the incident.
The court erred in excluding these witnesses. Any person over the age of ten is presumed competent to testify. Ware v. State (1978), 268 Ind. 563, 376 N.E.2d 1150. Although Richard and Robert were children under the age of ten when Rita died (as were Debra and Patty) their age at the time does not affect their present undisputed ability to understand an oath, or to perceive and narrate events, the true tests of competence. Grecco v. State (1960), 240 Ind. 584, 166 N.E.2d 180. They claim to have actual and authentic memories of the event, and they were not of such infancy that this is an impossibility. Their credibility was for the jury to determine. Ware, supra, 376 N.E.2d 1150.
A defendant has a constitutional right to present a defense regardless of its credibility as seen by the trial court. U.S. v. Cerro (1985), 775 F.2d 908 (7th Circuit). Patterson sought to present the testimony of two witnesses who claimed to have information about Rita's death. We believe it was grave error to exclude these witnesses on the basis of an inapplicable statutory provision. The question becomes the effect of that error on the verdict.
Of course, not all constitutional error is reversible error. It is always perilous to speculate about the effect which improperly excluded evidence would have had. Id. However, if the reviewing court can be satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that the error did not contribute to the conviction, reversal is not required. Chapman v. California (1967), 386 U.S. 18, 87 S.Ct. 824, 17 L.Ed.2d 705.
We are not convinced the error here was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. There is a vast difference between evidence that would prevail over a claim of insufficiency and evidence that is so convincing that a jury could not properly find against it. Coates v. State (1985), Ind.App., 487 N.E.2d 167. Here we cannot conclude that the evidence of Patterson's guilt was so overwhelming that the unavailability of two defense witnesses did not influence and contribute to the guilty verdict.
Richard and Robert, if believed, would have corroborated the version, denied by Patty, that she and Rita fought at the top of the stairway. They would have substantiated the claim that another adult in the household, appellant's mother, had beaten Rita. Most importantly, Richard claimed to have seen Patty push Rita down the stairs.
Patty was seriously impeached for bad motive, bias, and untruthfulness. Her testimony was completely contradicted by Debra. Although both medical experts testified Rita probably died from a beating, her death was ruled an accident in 1963. We cannot say beyond a reasonable doubt that the introduction of Richard's and Robert's exculpatory testimony would not have tipped the balance against the State. Therefore, Patterson's conviction must be reversed.
Patterson claims she was denied speedy trial and due process of law because she was arrested and tried twenty years after Rita's death. The Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial does not apply here, as the delay did not occur after arrest or indictment. U.S. v. Marion (1971), 404 U.S. 307, 92 S.Ct. 455, 30 L.Ed.2d 468.
Generally, statutes of limitations operate as the primary guarantee that stale criminal charges will not be pursued. In Indiana, a prosecution for murder may be commenced at any time. Ind.Code Sec. 35-41-4-2(a). Nonetheless, even where a charge is brought within the statute of limitations, the particulars of the case may reveal that undue delay and resultant prejudice constitute a violation of due process. However, the mere passage of time is not presumed to be prejudicial, and it is the defendant's burden to prove that undue prejudice arises from the delay. Scott v. State (19...
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