Patterson v. State, 18985
| Decision Date | 13 November 1969 |
| Docket Number | No. 18985,18985 |
| Citation | 253 S.C. 382,171 S.E.2d 235 |
| Parties | Teddy PATTERSON, Appellant, v. STATE of South Carolina, et al., Respondents. |
| Court | South Carolina Supreme Court |
Hoover C. Blanton, Charles B. Bowers, Columbia, for appellant.
Atty. Gen. Daniel R. McLeod, Emmet H. Clair and Robert H. Hood, Asst. Attys. Gen., Columbia, for respondents.
The appellant was found guilty of murder with recommendation to mercy by a jury at the September 1964 term of the Court of General Sessions of Abbeville County, and is now serving a sentence of life imprisonment therefor. From the conviction no appeal was taken. On August 30, 1965, he filed a petiton in the court below for a writ of habeas corpus seeking a new trial. Pursuant to this petition several hearings were held at which extensive testimony was taken. On order was filed on May 19, 1967 which denied the relief sought, resulting in this appeal.
The first question presented for our determination as phrased by the State is as follows: 'Was appellant represented by competent and effective counsel at his trial in compliance with the constitutional right to counsel and due process of law?' The same question is phrased by appellant as follows: 'Was appellant denied his constitutional right to counsel?'
On this issue the appellant argues first that he made statements to law enforcement officers and signed a confession before he was allowed to talk to his attorney. Even though these were not admitted in evidence against him, he contends that the very fact that such took place put him in a psychological state that impeded his ability to converse with his own attorney in aid of his defense. He further submits that his attorney stated in open court in his presence at the June term that he felt he could not adequately represent the appellant, and that such shattered the attorney-client relationship and impeded preparation of a defense and the presentation of the case when it was tried three months later.
The basic objection which the appellant makes relative to his counsel does not relate to the attorney's performance. At the habeas corpus hearing below the appellant said, 'I consider Mr. Clay competent, he is a very fine attorney, but in my case, there being friction between Mr. Clay and myself, I felt that I couldn't relate my thoughts to him whereby he could counsel me properly.'
A brief history of the killing and of the incidents leading up to the trial is necessary for a determination of the question posed. On Friday, February 28, 1964 at about eight o'clock in the evening Mrs. Mary Frances Lowe, a divorcee, was riding around with a friend, James Davis. She was driving the car. The appellant, who had dated Mrs. Lowe not more than tow times previously, followed the couple for some time and until they stopped at an eating place. The deceased was sitting on the passenger side of the front seat and Mrs. Lowe was under the steering wheel. The appellant got out of his automobile with a .22 automatic rifle and shot Davis three or four times, causing his death. The appellant then took Mrs. Lowe in his own car and held her at the home of his mother until early the following (Saturday) morning. After holding officers and others at bay with the use of the rifle he was taken into custody.
The family of the appellant contacted Attorney Gerald Clay on Saturday morning. Mr. Clay was not allowed to see the appellant on Saturday or Sunday. On Monday the police said that the appellant would be available whenever desired, but on Tuesday, March 3, he was placed in the Stat penitentiary in Columbia, apparently for security reasons. On March 11 the attorney and the appellant conferred for the first time. The appellant was described as being in an emotional state and was difficult to communicate with.
The trial was set for the June 1964 term of court before Judge Griffith. At that term of court Attorney Clay petitioned to be relieved as counsel because his fee had not been paid. The judge granted the petition but immediately designated the same attorney as court-appointed counsel. Counsel then stated in open court in the presence of the appellant that he did not feel that he could adequately represent the appellant. A continuance until the September term was granted. Attorney Clay states that he took this position in order to get a continuance and in order to make up a record to set the stage for a new trial if the appellant was sentenced to the electric chair, and states that he told the appellant why he made the statement. It was a tactical maneuver.
Appellant admits that he did not at any time indicate to his attorney or to Judge Griffith at the June term or to the trial judge at the September term any dissatisfaction with the attorney chosen by his family, and in the last analysis appointed by the court. The transcript of the Coroner's Inquest, the trial proceedings and the habeas corpus hearing are all a part of the record before us and the conclusion is inescapable that Attorney Clay represented the appellant with the utmost professional ability, acquired a good result for his client under the circumstances, and indeed his newly appointed counsel appearing in this habeas corpus proceeding does not argue to the contrary. His sole contention on this issue is that his constitutional right to counsel and effective representation has not been protected. Though he argues that prejudice has been shown, there is absolutely nothing in the record that points out wherein counsel failed to do anything he should have done or wherein his...
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State v. Hendrix
...as a matter of law that the appellant killed the deceased because he believed he was in eminent danger. As stated in Patterson v. State, 253 S.C. 382, 171 S.E.2d 235 (1969) cert. denied, 397 U.S. 1069, 90 S.Ct. 1511, 25 L.Ed.2d One of the things a defendant has to affirmatively prove in a p......