Patterson v. State
| Citation | 846 N.E.2d 723 |
| Decision Date | 03 May 2006 |
| Docket Number | No. 18A02-0507-CR-651.,18A02-0507-CR-651. |
| Parties | Brandon PATTERSON, Appellant-Defendant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff. |
| Court | Court of Appeals of Indiana |
Geoffrey A. Rivers, Muncie, for Appellant.
Steve Carter, Attorney General of Indiana, Deanna L. Brunner, Deputy Attorney General, Indianapolis, for Appellee.
Brandon Patterson appeals his fifty-year sentence for robbery resulting in serious bodily injury, a Class A felony. Specifically, he contends that the trial court abused its discretion in finding certain aggravating circumstances, in weighing certain mitigating circumstances, and in failing to find other mitigating circumstances. Patterson also argues that his sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature of his offense and his character. We conclude that the trial court properly found and weighed the aggravators and mitigators and that Patterson's sentence is not inappropriate; therefore, we affirm his sentence.
On March 7, 2004, Patterson, along with Damien Sanders and fourteen-year-old A.A., went to a party near Ball State University in Muncie, Indiana. At the party, the trio met Karl Harford, who offered to drive them home. Patterson, Sanders, and A.A. agreed to rob Harford. Patterson, while in possession of Sanders' .25 caliber handgun, robbed Harford of $2.00. Sanders then took the gun and killed Harford with a single shot to the head. The defendants dragged Harford's body down the street and left it in the back seat of the car. Harford's body was discovered later that night, and the next day, Patterson called the police, turned himself in, and made a full confession.
The State charged Patterson with: Count I, Murder, a felony;1 Count II, Robbery Resulting in Serious Bodily Injury, a Class A felony;2 and Count III, Conspiracy to Commit Robbery Resulting in Serious Bodily Injury, a Class A felony.3 The State later amended the information to include two counts of theft arising from conduct unrelated to the robbery and murder of Harford. Patterson entered into a plea agreement under which he pled guilty to robbery resulting in serious bodily injury, a Class A felony, and the State dropped the four other charges. The written plea agreement included the following clause:
The parties agree that the defendant shall receive the following sentence:
Sentencing left to the discretion of the Court, however, the parties agree that there shall be a range of sentence between a minimum of forty-five (45) years to a maximum of fifty (50) years.
In sentencing Patterson, the trial court identified the following aggravating circumstances:
1. Defendant has some history of criminal activity; the length of time between Defendant's arrest in Henry County (12/7/03) and this offense (3/7/04).
2. The crime resulted in consequences beyond serious bodily injury, i.e., death.
3. The crime was committed in the presence of an individual under the age of 18 ([A.A.]).
Id. at 133. The court also identified the following mitigating circumstances:
1. Defendant accepted responsibility for his actions and pleaded guilty to the instant offense; however, this factor carries little weight, as Defendant gained a great advantage from the plea agreement (dismissal of the murder charge and three other charges).
2. Defendant states to be remorseful.
3. Defendant's youthful age; age 18 when the offense occurred, and now age 19.
4. Long-term incarceration of the Defendant could result in undue hardship upon the Defendant's dependents; however, the Court gives this factor minimal weight, because he was not considering his responsibilities the night this crime occurred.
Id. at 134. The court concluded: Id. As such, the court sentenced Patterson to an executed sentence of fifty years, the maximum sentence for a Class A felony. It is from this sentence that Patterson now appeals.
Patterson argues that the trial court abused its discretion in finding and weighing the aggravating and mitigating circumstances and that his sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature of his offense and his character.4 Initially, we note that the statutory sentencing range for a Class A felony is twenty to fifty years, the presumptive sentence being a fixed prison term of thirty years with not more than twenty years added for aggravating circumstances or not more than ten years subtracted for mitigating circumstances. Ind.Code § 35-50-2-4.5 By agreeing to a sentencing range of forty-five to fifty years, then, Patterson necessarily conceded that the aggravating circumstances outweighed the mitigating circumstances. See Tr. p. 19. As between forty-five and fifty years, however, Patterson entrusted the balancing of the aggravators and mitigators to the discretion of the trial court. Therefore, we must analyze the specific aggravators and mitigators found and weighed by the trial court, and we address this issue first.
Patterson argues that the trial court improperly found and weighed the aggravating and mitigating circumstances. Sentencing lies within the discretion of the trial court. Haddock v. State, 800 N.E.2d 242, 245 (Ind.Ct.App.2003). If a trial court uses aggravating or mitigating circumstances to enhance or reduce the presumptive sentence, it must: (1) identify all significant mitigating and aggravating circumstances; (2) state the specific reason why each circumstance is determined to be mitigating or aggravating; and (3) articulate its evaluation and balancing of the circumstances. Id. The trial court is not required to find the presence of mitigating circumstances. Id. When a defendant offers evidence of mitigators, the trial court has the discretion to determine whether the factors are indeed mitigating, and the trial court is not required to explain why it does not find the proffered factors to be mitigating. Id. The trial court's assessment of the proper weight of mitigating and aggravating circumstances is entitled to great deference on appeal and will be set aside only upon a showing of a manifest abuse of discretion. Id.
First, Patterson asserts that all of the aggravating circumstances the trial court found are improper. The first aggravator cited by the trial court in its sentencing order was Patterson's criminal history. The presentence investigation report reveals that Patterson was arrested for battery as a juvenile and had an active warrant and a charge pending for possession of cocaine at the time of his arrest in this cause. "A record of arrest, without more, does not establish the historical fact that a defendant committed a criminal offense and may not be properly considered as evidence of criminal history." Cotto v. State, 829 N.E.2d 520, 526 (Ind.2005). However, a review of the transcript of the sentencing hearing indicates that the trial court's primary concern was the risk that Patterson would continue to commit crime. See Tr. p. 53-55.
"A record of arrest, particularly a lengthy one, may reveal that a defendant has not been deterred even after having been subject to the police authority of the State." Cotto, 829 N.E.2d at 526. "Such information may be relevant to the trial court's assessment of the defendant's character in terms of the risk that he will commit another crime." Id. Here, Patterson's record of arrest is not particularly lengthy, but two other factors, noted by the trial court, make that record a significant aggravator. First, there were only three months between Patterson's felony charge for possession of cocaine and his charges in this cause. Second, Patterson was with Damien Sanders, his sister's boyfriend and an experienced criminal, during the conduct that gave rise to both the possession charge and the current charge. That Patterson continued to associate himself with Sanders and continued to engage in illegal activity after the felony cocaine charge supports the trial court's finding that there is a substantial risk that Patterson will commit another crime.
The second aggravator identified by the trial court was that, "The crime resulted in consequences beyond serious bodily injury, i.e., death." Appellant's Br. p. 21; Appellant's App. p. 133. Patterson refers us to Conwell v. State, where this Court held:
[W]hen a defendant pleads guilty to an included offense, the element(s) distinguishing it from the greater offense ... may not be used as an aggravating circumstance to enhance the sentence. The trial court is entitled to refuse to accept the plea to the included offense, but it may not attempt to sentence as if the defendant had pled to the greater offense by using the distinguishing element(s) as an aggravating factor.
542 N.E.2d 1024, 1025 (Ind.Ct.App.1989); see also Nybo v. State, 799 N.E.2d 1146, 1152 (Ind.Ct.App.2003) (). Nevertheless, in Lang v. State, where the defendant was charged with robbery as a Class A felony because the offense resulted in serious bodily injury to the victim, our Supreme Court held: "The serious nature of the injuries to the victim in this case was one of the specific facts which the court could consider as an aggravating circumstance." 461 N.E.2d 1110, 1113 (Ind.1984). Therefore, while the trial court was prohibited from imposing the maximum sentence for robbery resulting in serious bodily injury in an effort to "compensate" for the State's decision to dismiss the murder charge, see Conwell, 542 N.E.2d at...
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