Patterson v. Taylor

• Citation: 51 Fla. 275,40 So. 493
• Parties: PATTERSON v. TAYLOR.
• Decision Date: 06 February 1906
• Court: United States State Supreme Court of Florida

40 So. 493

51 Fla. 275

PATTERSON v. TAYLOR.

Florida Supreme Court

February 6, 1906

In Banc. Error to Circuit Court, Duval County; R. M. Call Judge.

Petition by Andrew Patterson for writ of habeas corpus to Isham Taylor, jailer. From an order denying the writ, plaintiff brings error. Affirmed.

Syllabus by the Court

SYLLABUS

Although the municipality of Jacksonville is not by its charter of incorporation (chapter 3775, p. 160, Laws of Florida) approved May 31, 1887, expressly authorized to provide by ordinance for the separation of the races on the street cars in such city, yet it has such authority in the general welfare clause of its said charter, enabling it 'to pass all ordinances necessary for the health, convenience, and safety of the citizens, and to carry out the full intent and meaning of this act, and to accomplish the object of this incorporation.' But even without such general welfare clause, or other express authorization, the design of such an ordinance being to safeguard the peace and good order of society within such city, its enactment and enforcement is within the incidental police powers of the city directly resulting from its incorporation into a municipality.

An ordinance of a city designed to separate the two races upon the street cars in such city, that requires the companies operating such cars to effect such separation in one or the other of two clearly defined modes: (1) By providing separate cars for the two races; or (2) by division of the car when the same car is assigned to the two races--leaving it discretionary with such carrier as to which one of the two prescribed modes of separation it will adopt, is not an unauthorized delegation of authority or discretion to such carriers.

Where the Legislature has defined the delegated powers, and prescribed with precision the penalties that may be imposed a municipal ordinance within the powers granted, prescribing a penalty within the designated limit, cannot be set aside as unreasonable.

A passenger on a street car has no right to any particular seat in such car, nor to a seat in any particular end of such car and a regulation of a street car company, acting under the provisions of a city ordinance designed to effect a separation of the races on such cars, by which the seats in the rear end of its cars are assigned to the use of passengers of the colored race and the seats in the front end of such cars to passengers of the white race, or vice versa, is not an unreasonable regulation, nor an unlawful discrimination between the races.

COUNSEL

Wetmore & Purceil, for plaintiff in error.

Barrs & Odom, for defendant in error.

Writ of error pending in United States Supreme Court.

On October 23, 1905, the city council of the city of Jacksonville adopted the following ordinance:

'An ordinance regulating, requiring and providing for the furnishing of separate accommodations for and the separation of white and colored passengers on street cars.

'Be it ordained by the mayor and city council of the city of Jacksonville:

'Section 1. That all companies, persons, firms and associations operating street cars in the city of Jacksonville are hereby required to furnish separate accommodations for white and colored passengers, and all white and colored passengers occupying street cars in the city of Jacksonville are hereby required to occupy the respective cars, or divisions of cars, provided for them, so that the white passengers shall occupy only the cars, or divisions of cars, provided for white passengers, and the colored passengers shall occupy only the cars or divisions of cars, provided for the accommodation of colored passengers. All companies, firms, persons and associations operating street cars in the city of Jacksonville shall furnish such separate accommodations, at their option, by the operation together of two or more cars, providing separate cars for white passengers and separate cars for colored passengers, or by furnishing separate accommodations for white and colored passengers in the same car. The cars, or parts of cars, furnished for white and for colored passengers, respectively, shall have placed conspicuously at each end of the car, or part of car, signs in plain letters, not less than two inches high, indicating by the words 'white' or 'colored,' as the case may be, that such car or part of car is provided for the use of white passengers or colored passengers, as the case may be; and when open cars to be entered from the side of the car are provided for the accommodation of both white and colored passengers, additional such signs shall be provided and placed conspicuously on the side of the cars so as to indicate thereby the portion of the car to be used by white and colored passengers, respectively. Any officer, agent or employé of any company, person or firm, who shall, as superintendent or other officer of such company, or as conductor, motorman or other employé of such company, operate any car not so provided with signs on the streets of the city of Jacksonville for the transportation of passengers, shall upon conviction thereof be fined not more than five hundred dollars, or by imprisonment not more than ninety days, for each such offense; and any white person willfully occupying as a passenger any car or part of car not so set apart and provided for white passengers, and any colored person willfully occupying as a passenger any car or part of car not so set apart and provided for colored passengers, shall be deemed guilty of disorderly conduct and shall be punished by fine not exceeding five hundred dollars or by imprisonment not exceeding ninety days.

'Sec. 2. It is hereby made the duty of conductors, motormen and others engaged in the operation of street cars within the limits of the city of Jacksonville to call the attention of passengers to such signs and to the fact that separate provision is made for white and colored passengers, and to request white and colored passengers who are about to enter or who have entered cars, or divisions of cars, not intended for their accommodation, to occupy only the cars or divisions of cars provided for their accommodation; AND IF ANY SUCH PASSENGER REFUSES OR FAils to leave the car, or part of car, not provided for his or her accommodation, such conductor, motorman or other person operating such car shall notify the police department, or a member thereof, as soon as it is possible.

'Sec. 3. Any police officer of the city of Jacksonville seeing any white or colored passenger occupying a car or part of car not provided for his or her accommodation as indicated by such signs, shall arrest any such person and take him or her from such car and carry him or her to the police station as in case of any other person guilty of disorderly conduct.

'Sec. 4. Special cars, in addition to the regular schedule cars, may at any time be run for the exclusive accommodation of either white or colored passengers for special occasions or special business.

'Sec. 5. Any person willfully molesting, removing, mutilating or destroying any sign put or placed on any car in compliance with the terms of this ordinance, and while such car is being operated for the transportation of passengers, shall be guilty of disorderly conduct and upon conviction shall be punished by fine not exceeding five hundred dollars or by imprisonment not exceeding ninety days.

'Passed October 17, 1905.

'Approved October 23, 1905.

'Geo M. Nolan, Mayor.'

The plaintiff in error was convicted before the municipal court of said city of a violation of this ordinance, and the penalty imposed was a fine of $10 or in default of its payment confinement at hard labor for 14 days.

On December 5, 1905, the plaintiff in error filed his petition in the circuit court for Duval county for the writ of habeas corpus, alleging therein that he was unlawfully detained and imprisoned on the said conviction for violating said ordinance. That said ordinance is unconstitutional and void:

(1) Because the city council of the city of Jacksonville had no authority or power under the charter to enact said ordinance.

(2) Said ordinance is vague and uncertain, in that section 1 of said ordinance leaves it discretionary with street car companies, corporations or other persons operating street car lines in said city to designate the manner in which said separation shall be made, thus depriving the city of the right to require or enforce a uniform operation of...