Patterson v. W. Va. Reg'l Jail & Corr. Facility Auth.
| Decision Date | 03 July 2012 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 3:11-cv-00943 |
| Parties | JOSEPH IRA PATTERSON, Plaintiff, v. WEST VIRGINIA REGIONAL JAIL AND CORRECTIONAL FACILITY AUTHORITY; WESTERN REGIONAL JAIL; WESTERN REGIONAL JAIL ADMINISTRATOR MICHAEL CLARK, SERGEANT FLEMINGS, and CORPORAL FAREWELL, et al., SUED IN THEIR INDIVIDUAL AND OFFICIAL AUTHORITIES AND CAPACITIES, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of West Virginia |
Pending before the Court is the initial screening of Plaintiff's complaint filed pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (ECF No. 1-1) and Defendants' Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 2). This matter is assigned to the Honorable Robert C. Chambers, United States District Judge, and by Standing Order has been referred to the undersigned United States Magistrate Judge for the submission of proposed findings of fact and recommendations for disposition pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B).
Plaintiff, Joseph Ira Patterson ("Patterson"), filed this complaint on October 18, 2011 in the Circuit Court of Cabell County, West Virginia. Defendants removed the case to federal court on November 23, 2011 and concurrently filed a Motion to Dismiss. Patterson filed a response to the Motion to Dismiss on January 17, 2012(ECF No. 7), and the time for filing a reply has expired. Accordingly, this matter is fully briefed and ready for resolution.
In the complaint, Patterson alleges that he was the victim of racial and religious discrimination during his incarceration at the Western Regional Jail in Barboursville, West Virginia in violation of his constitutional and civil rights, including his right to be free from discrimination in places of public accommodation under 42 U.S.C. § 2000a.1 Patterson seeks an award of money damages against each defendant in the amount of $100,000 plus court costs and attorneys fees. (ECF No. 1-1 at 2-3). For the reasons that follow, the undersigned FINDS that the complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted and, thus, RECOMMENDS that the presiding District Judge dismiss the complaint, with prejudice, and remove it from the docket of the Court.
On February 5, 2010, Patterson was arrested and charged with kidnapping, assault, and robbery. He was taken to the Western Regional Jail ("WRJ") and wassubsequently indicted by a Cabell County Grand Jury on three counts of kidnapping; attempted first degree robbery; two counts of first degree robbery; four counts of first degree sexual assault, and conspiracy. At the time of his arrest, Patterson was on supervised release arising from a federal drug trafficking conviction.
According to Patterson, since his arrest and incarceration, representatives of the WRJ have subjected him to unfair and discriminatory treatment due to his race (African American) and his religion (Muslim). In particular, Patterson alleges the following:
In response, the defendants contend that they are entitled to a dismissal for the following reasons:
Pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, the Court must screen each case in which a prisoner seeks redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. The Court must dismiss the case, or any part of it, if the complaint is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or "seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief." 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. A case is "frivolous" when it lacks "an arguable basis either in law or fact." Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325, 109 S.Ct. 1827, 104 L.Ed.2d 338 (1989). A case lacks an arguable basis in law when it relies upon an indisputably meritless legal theory, Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 112 S.Ct. 1728, 118 L.Ed.2d 340 (1992); Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 744, 87 S.Ct. 1396, 18 L.Ed.2d 493 (1967), and lacks an arguable basis in fact when the supporting allegations describe "fantastic or delusional scenarios." Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 328. Similarly, a complaint fails to state a compensable claim when viewing the factual allegations in the complaint as true and in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, the complaint fails to contain "enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Bell Atlantic Corp v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007).
In the present case, the defendants have moved to dismiss the complaintpursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). "To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to 'state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'" Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 677, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) (citing Bell Atlantic Corp, 550 U.S. at 570). The Supreme Court explained the "plausibility" standard in Iqbal, stating:
A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged. The plausibility standard is not akin to a "probability requirement," but asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully. Where a complaint pleads facts that are "merely consistent with" a defendant's liability, it "stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility of 'entitlement to relief.'
Ashcroft, 556 U.S. at 677 (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp, 550 U.S. at 544) (internal citations omitted).
Determining whether a complaint states a facially plausible claim for relief is a "context-specific task that requires the court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense." Ashcroft, 556 U.S. at 679, citing Iqbal v. Hasty, 490 F.3d 143, 157-158 (2nd Cir. 2007). While the Court is required to accept as true the factual allegations asserted in the complaint, it is not required to accept the legitimacy of legal conclusions that are "couched as . . . factual allegation[s]." Ashcroft, 556 U.S. at 677, (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp, 550 U.S. at 554). "Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice" to establish a facially plausible complaint. This Court is required to liberally construe pro se complaints, such as the one filed in this civil action. Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94, 127 S.Ct. 2197, 167 L.Ed.2d 1081 (2007). However, evenunder this less stringent standard, the complaint must contain sufficient factual allegations to support a valid legal cause of action. The court may not rewrite the pleading to include claims that were never presented, Parker v. Champion, 148 F.3d 1219, 1222 (10th Cir. 1998), develop the plaintiff's legal theories for him, Small v. Endicott, 998 F.2d 411, 417-18 (7th Cir. 1993), or "conjure up questions never squarely presented" to the court. Beaudett v. City of Hampton, 775 F.2d 1274, 1278 (4th Cir. 1985).
Patterson alleges wrongdoing that entitles him to relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Title 42 U.S.C. § 1983 provides as follows:
Every person who under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress, except that in any action brought against a judicial officer for an act or omission taken in such officer's judicial capacity, injunctive relief shall not be granted unless a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable.
In order to state a cause of action under § 1983, Patterson must present facts showing that: (1) a person (the defendant) deprived him of a federally protected civil right, privilege or immunity and (2) that the defendant did so under color of state law. Perrin v. Nicholson, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 105121, at *4 (D.S.C. 2010); American Mfr. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Sullivan, 526 U.S. 40, 50-52, 119 S.Ct. 977, 143 L.Ed.2d 130 (1999). If either of these elements is missing, the complaint fails to state a claim for relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Moreover, a complaint that states plausible facts and accepted legal theories under § 1983 may nonetheless be subject to dismissal on initial screening or on a motion to dismiss if the defendant is immune from liability.
As stated, under § 1983 Patterson must demonstrate that a person acting under color of state law deprived him of a right guaranteed by the Constitution or federal laws. Rendall-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830, 838, 102 S.Ct. 2764, 73 L.Ed.2d 418 (1982). Given that neither the WRJ nor the WVRJA are persons subject to suit under § 1983, Patterson's complaint should be dismissed against...
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