Patton v. Ragland, s. 83-304

• Decision Date: 16 April 1984
• Docket Number: Nos. 83-304,83-305,s. 83-304
• Citation: 282 Ark. 231,668 S.W.2d 3
• Parties: E.F. PATTON and L. Faye Pierce, Appellants, v. Charles RAGLAND, Commissioner, Division of Revenue, Department of Finance and Administration, Appellee. Dale CHARLES, Appellant, v. Scott GORDON, Commissioner of the Division of Youth Services, Arkansas Department of Human Services and Charles Ragland, Commissioner, Division of Revenue, Department of Finance and Administration, Appellees.
• Court: Arkansas Supreme Court

Page 3

668 S.W.2d 3

282 Ark. 231

E.F. PATTON and L. Faye Pierce, Appellants, v. Charles RAGLAND, Commissioner, Division of Revenue, Department of Finance and Administration, Appellee.

Dale CHARLES, Appellant, v. Scott GORDON, Commissioner of the Division of Youth

Services, Arkansas Department of Human Services and Charles

Ragland, Commissioner, Division of Revenue, Department of

Finance and Administration, Appellees.

Nos. 83-304, 83-305.

Supreme Court of Arkansas.

April 16, 1984.

Rehearing Denied May 21, 1984.

Grace, Napper, Allen & East, Little Rock, for appellants.

Timothy J. Leathers, Joseph V. Svoboda, Kelly S. Jennings, Jr., Wayne Zakrzewski, Ann Fuchs, Joe Morphew and Michael Munns by John H. Theis, Little Rock, for Charles Ragland.

Steve Clark, Atty. Gen. by Elizabeth E. Dowling, Asst. Atty. Gen., Little Rock, for Scott Gordon, Com'r of Div. of Youth Services.

DUDLEY, Justice.

Appellants Patton and Pierce were discharged from their jobs with the Division of Revenue of the Department of Finance and Administration. Pursuant to Act 693 of 1981, Ark.Stat.Ann. § 12-3901, et seq. (Supp.1983), they appealed to the Arkansas Merit System Council Board. The Board ordered appellants reinstated. Appellee Ragland, Commissioner of the Division of Revenue, appealed to circuit court. The circuit court dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. We affirmed, finding judicial review inappropriate because the act provides: "The decision by this Board regarding such appeals shall be final and binding on the appointing authority/agency." Department of Finance and Administration, et al. v. Merit System Council Board, et al., 280 Ark. 325, 658 S.W.2d 369 (1983). Upon remand the appellee commissioner refused to reinstate the appellants to their former positions. Appellants then petitioned the Circuit Court of Pulaski County for a writ of mandamus and asked that the appellee commissioner be directed to reinstate them in accordance with the orders of the Board. The circuit court, finding that the act was unconstitutionally vague and unlawfully delegated legislative authority to the Board, denied relief to the appellant. We affirm. Jurisdiction to determine the constitutionality of an act of the General Assembly is in this court. Rule 29(1)(c).

The act at issue, Ark.Stat.Ann. § 12-3905(2) (Supp.1983), provides:

It shall be the duty of the Board to hear appeals on its behalf for Merit and non-Merit System agencies in accordance with the Merit System Rules and Regulations regarding appeals .... The decisions by the Board regarding such appeals shall be final and binding on the appointing authority/agency.

No other provision of the act describes the word "appeals." As a result, the Board is given complete discretion to decide the subject matter to be appealed. In such a vacuum the Board possesses absolute, unregulated and undefined authority to act. For example, the Board might decide to hear appeals from minor personnel disputes such as dress codes or excused absences in inclement weather or the setting of thermostats or eating and drinking at an employee's desk. It might decide to hear appeals from disagreements over pay, job transfers, affirmative action programs or termination of a probationary employee. It might decide to limit appeals to termination of employment of regular employees. In addition the act does not define "Merit and non-Merit System agencies."

Thus, the Board might decide to hear an appeal from any subject matter controversy involving any state agency except the Arkansas State Highway Commission and the Arkansas State Highway and Transportation Department. See § 12-3907. In Cline v. Plaza Personnel, 252 Ark. 956, 481 S.W.2d 749 (1972), we stated: "Discretionary power may be delegated by the legislature to the licensing authority, but it is essential that reasonable guidelines be provided." We have held other acts unconstitutionally vague because key words were not defined. For example, in Davis v. Smith, 266 Ark. 112, 583 S.W.2d 37 (1979), the enactment dealing with custody rights allowed parental rights to be terminated if the parents could not provide a "proper home." In Walden v. Hart, 243 Ark. 650, 420 S.W.2d 868 (1967), the act granted the local police chief or the state motor vehicle commissioner the authority to decide, without resort to any definition, which vehicles would be deemed "emergency vehicles" under the statute. We said the "... Legislature gave to the named authorities an unbridled discretion and that is fatal" to the act. Despite its presumption of constitutionality, Ark.Stat.Ann. § 12-3905(2) is so vague that it necessarily delegates legislative authority to the Board and is unconstitutional.

The appellants contend that the General Assembly can, within limits, empower administrative agencies to adopt rules and regulations to carry out the legislative will and, they argue, that was done in this case. For example, the State Highway Commission can be authorized to promulgate reasonable rules and regulations to regulate traffic on state highways. Snow v. Riggs, 172 Ark. 835, 290 S.W. 591 (1927); the Board of Control of State Agricultural Institutions can be empowered to provide for rules and regulations dealing with the eradication of cattle ticks, Davis v. State, 126 Ark. 260, 190 S.W. 436 (1916); and the State Board of Health can validly promulgate rules, orders, and regulations dealing with the prevention of the spread of disease, State v. Martin and Lipe, 134 Ark. 420, 204 S.W. 622 (1918). However, the plain wording of § 12-3905(2) does not empower the Board to promulgate rules and regulations to carry out the purposes of the act.

The appellants next contend that § 12-3905(2) refers to the Board's rules and regulations and, by reference, incorporates them. They then argue that the missing definition of the word "appeal" can be found in the rules existing at the time of the enactment of the...