Patton v. State

• Decision Date: 10 June 2003
• Docket Number: No. 49A02-0211-PC-975.,49A02-0211-PC-975.
• Citation: 789 N.E.2d 968
• Parties: Keith PATTON, Appellant-Petitioner, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee-Respondent.
• Court: Indiana Appellate Court

789 N.E.2d 968

Keith PATTON, Appellant-Petitioner, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee-Respondent.

No. 49A02-0211-PC-975.

Court of Appeals of Indiana.

June 10, 2003.

Daniel M. Grove, Special Assistant to the Public Defender of Indiana, Indianapolis, IN, Attorney for Appellant.

Steve Carter, Attorney General of Indiana, Ellen H. Meilaender, Deputy Attorney General, Indianapolis, IN, Attorneys for Appellee.

OPINION

BAILEY, Judge.

Case Summary

Appellant-petitioner Keith Patton appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand.

Issues

Patton raises six issues for review, which we consolidate and restate as follows:

I. Whether our supreme court's reversal of his murder conviction invalidated his guilty plea;

II. Whether several of his convictions violate double jeopardy III. Whether his guilty plea to attempted murder was knowing, voluntary, and intelligent; and

IV. Whether he may challenge trial counsel's statements during voir dire regarding his guilty plea.

Facts and Procedural History

Shortly after midnight on October 22, 1983, after consuming eighty ounces of beer between them, seventeen-year-olds Patton and Leroy Johnson approached a parked car in Washington Park in Indianapolis. Michael Pack and Dietra Maxey were sitting in the driver's and passenger's seats, and Maxey's four-year-old daughter was sleeping in the back seat. Patton shot out the driver's-side window with a sawed-off twelve-gauge shotgun, seriously injuring Maxey. When Pack attempted to start the car, Johnson shot the passenger's-side rear tire with his sawed-off twenty-gauge shotgun. Patton said, "Don't—give it up. Don't try it[,]" then fired his shotgun a second time, killing Pack. Trial Tr. at 928. Patton ordered Maxey out of the car and led her away from the scene, leaving her daughter behind. Both Patton and Johnson had sexual, oral, and anal intercourse with Maxey, and Patton inserted his shotgun into Maxey's vagina.¹

On October 28, 1983, the State charged Patton with murder² and with two counts of Class A felony rape,³ one of which was later dismissed. On November 28, 1983, the State filed an information for death sentence. On January 24, 1984, under a separate cause number,⁴ the State charged Patton with attempted murder,⁵ Class B felony criminal confinement,⁶ three counts of Class A felony criminal deviate conduct,⁷ and dealing in a sawed-off shotgun.⁸ These causes were later consolidated under cause number CR83-232D.

On June 1, 1984, Patton signed a document wherein he agreed to plead guilty as charged, acknowledged that the State would continue to seek the death penalty, and agreed to transfer the consolidated causes from Judge Patricia Gifford to Judge Thomas E. Alsip for guilty plea proceedings. That same day, Judge Gifford appointed Judge Alsip as a special judge to hear the cause. In July 1984, Judge Alsip accepted Patton's guilty plea and sentenced him to death on the murder conviction, thirty years on the rape conviction, and 132 years on the remaining convictions.⁹ Patton appealed only his murder and rape convictions. In December 1987, our supreme court determined that Patton had protested his innocence to the murder charge at the sentencing hearing and reversed and remanded "for trial on that charge and sentencing on the rape charge." Patton v. State, 517 N.E.2d 374, 376 (Ind.1987) ("Patton I").¹⁰

Upon remand, the cause was venued to Judge Gifford. Patton unsuccessfully challenged Judge Gifford's jurisdiction. See State ex rel. Patton v. Superior Court of Marion County, 547 N.E.2d 255 (Ind. 1989)

(denying Patton's writ for mandate and prohibition) ("Patton II"). In March 1990, a jury convicted Patton of murder and recommended against the death penalty. Judge Gifford sentenced Patton to sixty years for murder, to be served concurrently with his thirty-year rape sentence and consecutive to the 132-year sentence on his other convictions. Patton then appealed his murder conviction, which our supreme court affirmed. See Patton v. State, 588 N.E.2d 494 (Ind.1992) ("Patton III").

In 1996, Patton filed pro se a petition for post-conviction relief, which was subsequently amended by counsel. On December 19, 2001, the post-conviction court held a hearing on Patton's petition. On August 22, 2002, the post-conviction court denied Patton's petition. Patton now appeals.

Discussion and Decision

At the outset, we note the appropriate standard of review:

Post-conviction procedures do not afford the petitioner with a super-appeal. Instead, they create a narrow remedy for subsequent collateral challenges to convictions, challenges which must be based on grounds enumerated in the post-conviction rules. Petitioners bear the burden of establishing their grounds for relief by a preponderance of the evidence. If an issue was known and available but not raised on appeal, it is waived. If it was raised on appeal but decided adversely, it is res judicata.

When one appeals the negative judgment of a post-conviction court, the standard is even more rigorous. Petitioners must show that the evidence as a whole, "leads unerringly and unmistakably to a conclusion opposite to that reached by the trial court."

Williams v. State, 706 N.E.2d 149, 153-54 (Ind.1999) (citations omitted), cert. denied, 529 U.S. 1113, 120 S.Ct. 1970, 146 L.Ed.2d 800 (2000).

I. Invalidation of Guilty Plea

By signing the guilty plea document, Patton indicated that he understood "that the State [was] a party to this document only as it relates to the agreement in Defendant's Motion to Transfer [the cause to Judge Alsip] and the qualifications as set out in rhetorical paragraphs [5¹¹](A) and (B) of that document, attached hereto and marked as Exhibit A." Patton I Tr. at 151. Paragraph 5(B) of the motion to transfer provides,

In the event the defendant elects not to plead guilty as charged to all counts as per paragraph [5](A) above, or the plea of guilty is not completed for whatever reason, both the parties agree that this Motion to Transfer is null and void and that the trial by jury will proceed on June 4, 1984 [before Judge Gifford] as scheduled.

Id. at 146. Finally, paragraph 7 of the plea agreement provides, "The agreement embodies the entire agreement between the parties and no promises have been made or inducements given to the defendant by the State which are not part of this written agreement." Id. at 152.

Patton contends that the Patton I court's reversal of his murder conviction invalidated part of the guilty plea agreement. He further contends,

Because part was invalid, the entire plea was invalid and Patton was entitled to a jury trial on all counts. According to [his guilty plea counsel's] understanding of the terms of the plea, if the plea to any single count could not be accepted then the entire case would go back to Judge Gifford for a retrial of every count.

Appellant's Br. at 8.

Patton's claim is without merit.¹² It is well settled that

[a] plea agreement is a contract, an explicit agreement between the State and defendant which is binding upon both parties when accepted by the trial court. Because a plea agreement is a contract, the principles of contract law can provide guidance in the consideration of plea agreements. The primary goal of contract interpretation is to give effect to the parties' intent. When the terms of a contract are clear and unambiguous, they are conclusive of that intent, and the court will not construe the contract or look to extrinsic evidence. Rather, we will merely apply the contractual provisions.

Griffin v. State, 756 N.E.2d 572, 574 (Ind. Ct.App.2001) (citations and quotation marks omitted), trans. denied (2002).

We agree with the post-conviction court's conclusion that "[t]he guilty plea was `completed' as stated in the agreement. The agreement made no specific provision for what would happen if Patton's conviction on one or more counts was later overturned." Appellant's App. at 138. Given that the guilty plea document "embodies the entire agreement between the parties," we cannot conclude that the plea agreement was invalidated by the Patton I court's reversal of his murder conviction.

II. Double Jeopardy

Patton contends that his conviction for dealing in a sawed-off shotgun violates state and federal double jeopardy principles¹³ and that his plea of guilty was therefore unknowing, involuntary, and unintelligent. The State correctly observes that a guilty plea generally acts as a waiver of double jeopardy claims. See, e.g., Mapp v. State, 770 N.E.2d 332, 334-35 (Ind.2002) ("Plea bargaining is a tool used by both prosecutors and defendants to expedite the trial process. Defendants waive a whole panoply of rights by voluntarily pleading guilty. These include the right to a jury trial, the right against self-incrimination, the right of appeal, and the right to attack collaterally one's plea based on double jeopardy.") (footnote omitted).¹⁴ As for Patton's contention that his plea was not knowing, voluntary, or intelligent, we note that in the cases on which he relies, the convictions and sentences were vacated because the sentences violated express statutory authority. See Thompson v. State, 634 N.E.2d 775 (Ind.Ct.App.1994)

; Sinn v. State, 609 N.E.2d 434 (Ind.Ct.App.1993),

trans. denied. Such is not the case here. Patton has failed to establish that he is entitled to relief on this ground.

III. Attempted Murder

A person may not be convicted of attempted murder without proof that the person specifically intended to kill his victim. Spradlin v. State, 569 N.E.2d 948, 949-50 (Ind.1991). Patton was never advised prior to the entry and acceptance of his guilty plea that the State, in order to obtain a conviction for attempted murder, was required to prove that Patton specifically intended to kill Maxey when he shot into the vehicle. Patton argues that his plea of guilty to the attempted murder charge was therefore invalid.

Before a trial court...