Patton v. State
| Decision Date | 22 June 2004 |
| Docket Number | No. 49S02-0309-PC-402.,49S02-0309-PC-402. |
| Citation | 810 N.E.2d 690 |
| Parties | Keith PATTON, Appellant (Defendant below), v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee (Plaintiff below). |
| Court | Indiana Supreme Court |
Daniel M. Grove, Special Assistant to the Public Defender of Indiana, Indianapolis, IN, Attorneys for Appellant.
Steve Carter, Attorney General of Indiana, Ellen H. Meilaender, Deputy Attorney General, Indianapolis, IN, Attorneys for Appellee.
ON PETITION TO TRANSFER FROM THE INDIANA COURT OF APPEALS, NO.49A02-0211-PC-975
Keith Patton pled guilty to attempted murder without knowing that specific intent to kill was an element of that offense. A defendant who pleads guilty need not be aware of each of the elements of the offense so long as the defendant receives real notice of the true nature of the charge or that the absence of such notice is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. However, there is no evidence that Patton received such notice with respect to the attempted murder charge or that he acted with specific intent to kill. We hold that under these circumstances, his guilty plea was invalid. Patton's sentence of 192 years for his other convictions remains in effect.
On October 22, 1983, 17-year-old Keith Patton, armed with a sawed-off shotgun, and Leroy Johnson, both intoxicated, came upon a parked automobile in which a young man was in the driver's seat and a young woman beside him. Patton fired a shot into the driver's side window that seriously injured the passenger, Dietra Maxey. Patton subsequently fired a second shot, also through the driver's side window. This shot killed the driver, Michael Pack. Patton and Johnson then sexually assaulted Maxey.
On June 1, 1984, Patton pled guilty to the offenses of murder (of Pack), attempted murder (of Maxey), rape, criminal confinement, three counts of criminal deviate conduct, and dealing in a sawed-off shotgun. At the sentencing hearing on July 31, 1984, Patton admitted killing Pack but he denied that he had had any intent to kill Pack. The trial court sentenced Patton to death for the murder of Pack, to 30 years for rape, and to an additional 132 years for the other crimes.1
Patton appealed his convictions for murder and rape only to this court. (He did not appeal his convictions for attempted murder and the other offenses.) We held that it had been improper for the trial court to accept Patton's guilty plea to murder when he had denied that he had had any intent to kill Pack. We reversed the murder conviction, vacated the death sentence, and remanded the case with instructions to retry the murder count and re-sentence Patton on the rape count. Patton v. State, 517 N.E.2d 374 (Ind.1987). After remand, the murder and rape charges were tried to a jury. Patton was convicted of both murder and rape and received a sentence of 90 years imposed consecutive to the sentences imposed for attempted murder and the other offenses, bringing the total sentence to 222 years. These convictions and sentences were affirmed on appeal. Patton v. State, 588 N.E.2d 494 (Ind.1992).2
In 1996, Patton filed a petition for post conviction relief from the murder, attempted murder, and other convictions. The petition was denied. Patton filed this appeal, making the following claims:
Patton v. State, 789 N.E.2d 968, 976 (Ind.Ct.App.2003).
The Court of Appeals accepted the first of these four claims, finding that Patton's guilty plea to attempted murder was not knowing, voluntary, and intelligent because he was not sufficiently aware that specific intent to kill the victim was an element of the offense. Id. at 976. The State has petitioned to transfer, seeking review of this determination. We will discuss this issue infra. The Court of Appeals rejected Patton's three remaining claims. Id. at 973-74, 976. Patton has also petitioned to transfer, seeking review of these determinations. We grant transfer and summarily affirm the opinion of the Court of Appeals on these three issues. See Ind. Appellate Rule 58(A)(2).
In order to accept a guilty plea consistent with applicable law, the trial court must determine that a defendant is aware of the nature of the charge to which he or she is pleading guilty. Henderson v. Morgan, 426 U.S. 637, 96 S.Ct. 2253, 49 L.Ed.2d 108 (1976); Ind.Code § 35-35-1-2(a)(1). There has been confusion over the extent to which, in order for a defendant to be aware of the nature of the charge, the defendant must be advised of and understand each element of the charge at the time defendant pleads guilty.
Our analysis starts with Henderson v. Morgan. In that case, a petitioner for habeas corpus relief sought to have his conviction for second-degree murder vacated on grounds that his guilty plea was involuntary because, inter alia, he had not been aware that intent to cause death was an essential element of the offense. The district court granted habeas relief, finding that the petitioner had not been advised by counsel or the state court that an intent to cause death was a central element of second-degree murder. The Supreme Court also granted relief, holding that because the petitioner had not received "adequate notice of the offense to which he pleaded guilty, his plea was involuntary and the judgment of conviction was entered without due process of law." Id. at 647, 96 S.Ct. 2253.
The Supreme Court went on to say three things of consequence to the issue of whether a defendant must be advised of and understand each element of the charge at the time the defendant pleads guilty.
First, the Court said, Id. at 647, n. 18, 96 S.Ct. 2253.
Second, the Court seemed to hold that, where the record of the guilty plea proceeding does not contain a complete enumeration of the elements of the offense to which an accused person pleads guilty, either an explanation [in the record] of the charge by the trial judge, or at least a representation by defense counsel that the nature of the offense has been explained to the accused would be sufficient to satisfy the requirement that the defendant receive notice of the true nature, or substance, of a charge. Id. at 646-647, 96 S.Ct. 2253. Moreover, even without such an express representation, it may be appropriate to presume that in most cases defense counsel routinely explain the nature of the offense in sufficient detail to give the accused notice of what he is being asked to admit. This case is unique because the trial judge found as a fact that the element of intent was not explained to respondent. Id. at 647, 96 S.Ct. 2253. Third, the Court made clear that any error in providing the requisite notice is subject to harmless error analysis. Id. at 647, 96 S.Ct. 2253. Because any error in this regard would be of constitutional dimension, however, it would have to be harmless beyond a reasonable doubt to avoid reversal. Id.; see Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 87 S.Ct. 824, 17 L.Ed.2d 705 (1967)
.
After Henderson v. Morgan, our court has had three occasions to address the issue of whether a defendant must be advised of and understand each element of the charge at the time the defendant pleads guilty.
The first of these three is our opinion in DeVillez v. State. Among the claims raised by the petitioner seeking post-conviction relief in that case was that the trial court at the guilty plea proceeding had failed to advise her of the elements of the charge of first degree murder to which she had pled guilty. 275 Ind. 263, 267, 416 N.E.2d 846, 849 (Ind.1981). Justice DeBruler wrote for a unanimous court that, at the guilty plea hearing, the petitioner had made a factual statement and tendered a written admission in which she had "flatly, unmistakably and completely admit[ted] facts which permit[ted] of only one appraisal, namely that it [was] an admission of each element" of the charged offense. Id. The opinion went on to say that [s]uch a voluntary admission by the accused of each element of an offense is sufficient as a basis for the plea judge's determination that the accused is aware of the true nature of the charge against her and comports with due process." Id. (citing Henderson v. Morgan, 426 U.S. 637, 96 S.Ct. 2253, 49 L.Ed.2d 108 (1976)).
The DeVillez court agreed with the petitioner that the guilty plea statute required that there be a rational basis for the judge's determination that the accused understands the nature of the charge. But the court DeVillez, 275 Ind. at 267, 416 N.E.2d at 849.
The second is Coker v. State. Among the claims raised by the petitioner seeking post-conviction relief in that case was that her guilty plea to the offenses of criminal confinement and robbery was not entered knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily because the trial court did not advise her of the elements of those offenses. 499 N.E.2d 1135, 1137 (Ind.1986). Chief Justice Givan wrote that while the statute governing guilty pleas "requires that a defendant entering a plea of guilty...
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