Patton v. Worthington Assocs., Inc.

• Decision Date: 31 May 2012
• Citation: 2012 PA Super 74,43 A.3d 479
• Parties: Earl PATTON and Sharon Patton, Husband and Wife, Appellee v. WORTHINGTON ASSOCIATES, INC., Appellant.
• Court: Pennsylvania Superior Court

43 A.3d 479

2012 PA Super 74

Earl PATTON and Sharon Patton, Husband and Wife, Appellee

v.WORTHINGTON ASSOCIATES, INC., Appellant.

Superior Court of Pennsylvania.

Argued Aug. 9, 2011.

Filed March 27, 2012.

Reargument Denied May 31, 2012.

John J. Hare, Philadelphia, for appellant.

Carin A. O'Donnell, Newtown, for appellees.

BEFORE: FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E., BENDER and MUNDY, JJ.

OPINION BY MUNDY, J.:

Appellant, Worthington Associates, Inc. (Worthington), appeals from the December 30, 2010 judgment entered in favor of Appellees, Earl Patton (Patton) and Sharon Patton (Ms. Patton), in the amount of $1,528,006.54. After careful review, we affirm.

The relevant facts and procedural history, as set forth by the trial court, are as follows.

[T]his personal injury action stems from serious injuries sustained by [Patton] while working on a construction site at a church in Levittown, Bucks County. In 2001, the Christ Methodist Church (hereinafter “the Church”) hired Worthington to serve as general contractor for the Fellowship Hall project. Worthington then hired Patton Construction, Inc. (hereinafter “Patton Construction”), which is wholly owned by Patton, to serve as a carpentry contractor on the project.

On October 26, 2001, Patton was to perform spackling of the soffits located along the ceilings of the Church's fellowship hall (hereinafter “the hall”). To perform the spackling, Patton rented and used a scissor lift. Located on the concrete floors of the hall were large holes, roughly two feet in diameter. Previously, Patton had covered the holes with plywood but they were uncovered the day of the injury. Patton had been in the hall multiple times. However, he had not been in the hall for three days prior to the date of the fall and when he arrived at work on this date[,] he discovered that elevator equipment had been placed on the hall floor. While maneuvering the lift to complete the spackling, a wheel on the lift fell into one of the holes in the hall floor causing the lift to fall over. Patton fell fourteen feet and was pinned by the lift resulting in serious injuries including fractured vertebrae. On October 14, 2003, [ ] Patton, [ ] and [Ms.] Patton [ ], husband and wife, filed a lawsuit against Worthington alleging that Worthington was negligent in failing to provide a safe work place and for failing to cover the holes in the concrete.

Trial Court Opinion, 4/29/10, at 2–3 (citations to notes of testimony omitted).

On November 17, 2006, Worthington filed a motion for summary judgment averring it was “the Statutory Employer of Mr. Patton under the Pennsylvania Workmen's Compensation Act, 77 P.S. Section 52[, and] McDonald v. Levinson Steel Company, 302 Pa. 287, 153 A. 424 (1930)[,]” and therefore immune from tort liability. See Worthington's Summary Judgment Motion, 11/17/06, at ¶ 14. On January 30, 2007, the trial court denied Worthington's motion.

On November 30, 2009, a three-day jury trial commenced. “During the trial, Worthington stipulated that it owed a duty to Patton to provide a safe workplace and breached that duty when it failed to do something that a reasonable careful person would do, or did something that a reasonable careful person would not do.” Trial Court Opinion, 4/29/10, at 3. “Worthington also stipulated that Patton's medical expenses were $57,234.71 and that his past lost wages were $21,059.02.” Id.

On December 2, 2009, the jury reached a verdict, and found as follows; (1) Worthingtonwas negligent; (2) Worthington's negligence was a factual cause in bringing harm to Patton; (3) Patton was contributorily negligent; (4) Patton's contributory negligence was a factual cause in bringing about his harm; (5) 80% of the causal negligence was attributable to Worthington, and 20% of the causal negligence was attributable to Patton; (6) Patton was awarded damages in the amount of $1,000,000.00; (7) Ms. Patton was awarded damages in the amount of $500,000.00 for loss of consortium; and finally the jury specifically found that (8) Patton was an independent contractor, not an employee, of Worthington. See Jury Verdict Sheet, 12/2/09. On December 2, 2009, the trial court molded the jury verdict, awarding $800,000.00 to Patton and $400,000.00 to Ms. Patton, for a total award of $1,200,000.00.

Thereafter, on December 11, 2009, Worthington filed post-trial motions requesting, inter alia, a grant of judgment notwithstanding the verdict (JNOV) on the basis that Worthington was Patton's statutory employer, a new trial on liability, a new trial on damages, or that the trial court grant remittitur and substantially lower the damages awarded. By opinion and order dated May 5, 2010, the trial court denied Worthington's post-trial motions.

On November 24, 2010, the trial court entered an order directing judgment in Patton's favor in the amount of $1,528,006.54.¹ The same day Appellees praeciped for judgment, and on December 30, 2010, the judgment was entered. On January 3, 2011, Worthington filed a timely notice of appeal.²

On appeal, Worthington raises the following issues for our review.

1. Whether judgment n.o.v. is warranted because the trial court erred by interpreting Lascio v. Belcher Roofing Corp., 704 A.2d 642 (Pa.Super.1997), as requiring a “prelude” or “screening question” to the statutory employer test set forth by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in McDonald v. Levinson Steel Co. , 153 A. 424 (Pa.1930)?

2. Whether a new trial is required because the jury instruction in support of this screening question, presented through Interrogatory Number 8, was confusing and insufficient to properly guide the jury as it considered whether the plaintiff, [ ] Patton, was an independent contractor or employee of a general contractor, Worthington [ ]?

3. Whether judgment n.o.v. or a new trial is required because the hole into which [ ] Patton drove his scissor lift was open and obvious as a matter of law, and [ ] Patton admittedly was aware of the hole and the danger it presented?

4. Whether a substantial remittitur or a new trial is required because the jury's verdict was plainly excessive and because it substantially deviated from the trial evidence?

Worthington's Brief at 5.

Worthington first argues the “right to statutory immunity is clear given that it meets all five elements required for such immunity set forth by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in McDonald v. Levinson Steel Co. , 153 A. 424 (Pa.1930).” Id. at 12. In support of this contention, Worthington argues, “[w]here these elements are satisfied, statutory immunity arises as a matter of law[.]” Id. Therefore, Worthington avers that “the trial court clearly erred when it submitted the issue of whether Worthington was [ ] Patton's employer to the jury as a so-called ‘screening question’ to the McDonald factors.” We disagree.

A review of the relevant statutes and case law in this Commonwealth leads to the conclusion that the trial court's decision to present the question of Patton's employment status to the jury was not only proper, but required to determine the applicability of the five element “McDonald test” set forth in McDonald, supra. As the trial court aptly notes,

[w]hile Worthington seeks to focus solely on the McDonald test, it ignores the major issue in this case. The threshold issue was whether or not Patton was an independent contractor.

Trial Court Opinion and Order, 4/29/10, at 5. The issue of whether or not Patton is an independent contractor focuses on Worthington's ability to meet the first prong of the McDonald test, specifically, whether Worthington qualifies as an “employer”.

The statutory employer immunity defense arises pursuant to 77 P.S. § 52 of the Workers' Compensation Act (the Act), formerly section 203, which provides as follows.

§ 52. Employers' liability to employe of employe or contractor permitted to enter upon premises

An employer who permits the entry upon premises occupied by him or under his control of a laborer or an assistant hired by an employe or contractor, for the performance upon such premises of a part of the employer's regular business entrusted to such employe or contractor, shall be liable to such laborer or assistant in the same manner and to the same extent as to his own employe.

77 P.S. § 52 (emphasis added).

The legislature has defined the key terms in this statute as follows. Under section 21 of the Act, an employer “is declared to be synonymous with master, and to include natural persons, partnerships, joint-stock companies, corporations for profit, corporations not for profit, municipal corporations, the Commonwealth, and all governmental agencies created by it.” 77 P.S. § 21 (“Employer” defined). Further, “employe” pursuant to the statute “is declared to be synonymous with servant[.]” 77 P.S. § 22 (“Employe” defined). Finally, crucial in conjunction with the statutory employer immunity defense is the term “contractor”. Under the Act, a “contractor” is defined as follows.

§ 25. “Contractor” defined

The term “contractor,” as used in article two, section two hundred and three, and article three, section three hundred and two (b), shall not include a contractor engaged in an independent business, other than that of supplying laborers or assistants, in which he serves persons other than the employer in whose service the injury occurs, but shall include a subcontractor to whom a principal contractor has sublet any part of the work which such principal contractor has undertaken.

77 P.S. § 25 (emphasis added).

“In ascertaining the character of the relationship, the basic inquiry is whether the alleged servant is subject to the alleged master's control or right to control[.]” Knepper v. Curfman, 158 Pa.Super. 287, 44 A.2d 852, 853–854 (1945). “A master is one who stands to another in such a relation that he not only controls the results of the work of that other, but also may direct the manner in which such work shall be done.” Joseph v. United Workers Ass'n, 343 Pa. 636, 23 A.2d 470, 472 (1942). “A...