Patty v. Middleton

• Decision Date: 18 December 1891
• Citation: 17 S.W. 909
• Parties: PATTY v. MIDDLETON <I>et al.</I>
• Court: Texas Supreme Court

Page 909

17 S.W. 909

PATTY v. MIDDLETON et al.

Supreme Court of Texas.

December 18, 1891.

Appeal from district court, Hill county; J. M. HALL, Judge.

Action by W. D. Middleton and others against J. R. Patty. Judgment for plaintiffs, and defendant appeals. Reversed.

Upshaw & Jordan, for appellant. McKinnon & Carlton, for appellees.

STAYTON, C. J.

This action was brought by appellees to recover an undivided half of two lots in the town of Hillsboro, and it resulted in a judgment in their favor. The parties have made an agreed case, which is as follows: "It is hereby agreed between appellant and appellees, for the purpose of giving precedence to the above cause under second clause of rule 59 of this court, that the conclusions of fact and law found by the trial court below, in connection with the appended statement, clearly present the issues of law to be tried by this court, to-wit: `(1) Whether or not, in view of said facts, appellant is an innocent purchaser of the property in controversy. (2) If an innocent purchaser of the property, — that is, if bought without knowledge of the existence of appellees and their right to the property, either actual or constructive, — then, can the defense of innocent purchase be maintained in this suit against the rights of appellees?' The conclusions of fact and law found by the court are as follows: `W. D. Middleton et al. vs. J. R. Patty. In the district court, etc. Conclusions of law and fact found by the court in the above-styled cause: (1) That plaintiff and defendant admit R. D. Jones to be the common source through whom they deraign title. (2) That N. S. Middleton acquired the property described in the petition from R. D. Jones as shown by his deed, read in evidence, in 1867, during the existence of the marital relations between himself and his wife, who was the mother of the plaintiffs, and therefore said property was the community property of said N. S. Middleton and his said wife. (3) That N. S. Middleton's said wife died in 1867, leaving the plaintiffs herein as her only children surviving her, and the property sued for, and some personal property, as the community estate of herself and N. S. Middleton, and leaving no community debt against said estate. (4) That N. S. Middleton, after the death of his said wife, sold the lots sued for to R. D. Jones, and the defendant holds through deeds from all the heirs of R. D. Jones and the interest of his former partner, B. K. Brockinton, which deeds are sufficient to vest title in defendant, if not defeated by the claim of plaintiffs. (5) That John W. Middleton and R. D. Jones had notice of the fact that N. S. Middleton acquired this property during the life-time of his wife, and notice of her death, and that plaintiffs were her children and survived her. (6) That neither J. R. Patty nor B. K. Brockinton had any actual notice that the said lots in question were bought by N. S. Middleton during his marriage with his said wife, or that the same was sold after the death of his said wife, or that plaintiffs were the children of said N. S. Middleton and his said wife, Law: (1) The court, under the facts, concludes that the plaintiffs are entitled to recover a one-half interest in said lots as their community interest in same inherited from their mother. (2) That the deed from N. S. Middleton to John W. Middleton only passed the interest of N. S. Middleton, which was one-half, and was not sufficient to pass the interest of plaintiffs to the other half of said lots. (3) The doctrine of innocent purchaser does not apply in this case, because the plaintiffs claim title by inheritance, and the same is not governed by the laws of registration. (4) It is believed that the doctrine laid down in Edwards v. Brown and Hill v. Moore, and other cases holding similar views as therein expressed, are not applicable or authority in this case, for the reason that the facts in each of said cases showed that there was no legal title vested in the community estate at the time of the death of the wife. (5) That the statute fixes the community estate and vests absolutely one-half interest in the survivor and the other half in the children of the decedent, subject only to the payment of community debts, and, if there are no such debts, then the one-half interest passes to the children by virtue of the statute, and the survivor has no legal right to dispose of the same, and, the law vesting said interest in the children, is notice to all purchasers, and they are held in law to take notice of the death of the wife and the rights of the children, and no purchaser will be heard to say that he had no notice of the legal title of the children.' And in further elucidation of the finding of facts by the court the record shows the following: That N. S. Middleton bought said lots, and they were conveyed to him in person, during the life of his wife, in 1867, by deed in the usual form, which deed was recorded in record of deeds in Hill county, Texas; and in the same year she died, leaving surviving as her children the appellees; and during that year, after her death, he sold said lots, and removed to Anderson county, Texas, a distance of over one hundred miles from the city of Hillsboro, Hill county, where said lots are situated. That nothing else is of record showing that appellees had any interest in the same." Appellant bought said lots in 1887, and at the time of the purchase by him he knew nothing of N. S. Middleton, or that said Middleton had ever been married, or ever had any children. It was also proven that appellant paid a full, fair, and valuable consideration for said lots, without knowledge of any other claimant to the same, and did not know of such claim as appellees' till the institution of this suit in the year 1890."

John W. Middleton was the person to whom N. S. Middleton conveyed, and the former conveyed to Ratcliff, who conveyed to R. D. Jones.

The statement of facts shows that when appellant purchased he was not in possession of any fact that would put him upon inquiry as to any right appellees might have, and the question arises in this case whether a person deraigning title through a father after the death of the mother can be protected as an innocent purchaser of community property. The court below did not hold on the theory that the law affects every such purchaser with notice that the property was purchased during the life-time of the wife, and with the further fact that the wife was dead at the time the conveyance through which he claims was made, and that children survived her. The court below held that on the death of a wife a legal title vested in her children to one-half of the community property, notwithstanding the deed by which it was acquired in terms conveyed the property to the husband. We do not understand it to be contended, if the legal title to property conveyed either to the husband or wife during marriage under such circumstances as to make it community property vests in the person to whom it is in terms conveyed that a conveyance by this parent, made after the death of the other, will not furnish the basis for a purchase in good faith, entitled to protection against the heirs of the deceased parent; but do understand it to be contended that the legal title to all community property vests in husband and wife alike, without reference to the fact that the deed through which the property is acquired on its face purports to convey only to one parent, and that on the death of the other a like title will vest in the children or other descendants of such deceased parent. If it be conceded that such title vests in each parent when the conveyance is to one, it must be conceded that it vests in the children or other descendants on the death of either parent to the extent of the interest of such deceased parent; but if the title which vests in one of the parents to community property, conveyed in terms to the other, be only an equitable title or interest in the one to whom the conveyance is not in terms made, then it must...