Pauchogue Land Corp. v. Long Island State Park Comm'n

• Decision Date: 25 May 1926
• Citation: 243 N.Y. 15,152 N.E. 451
• Parties: PAUCHOGUE LAND CORPORATION v. LONG ISLAND STATE PARK COMMISSION et al.
• Court: New York Court of Appeals Court of Appeals

243 N.Y. 15

152 N.E. 451

PAUCHOGUE LAND CORPORATION

v.LONG ISLAND STATE PARK COMMISSION et al.

Court of Appeals of New York.

May 25, 1926.

Action by the Pauchogue Land Corporation against the Long Island State Park Commission and others. From an order of the Appellate Division (215 App. Div. 816, 213 N. Y. S. 501), denying defendant's motion for judgment on the pleadings, defendants appeal.

Orders modified, and, as so modified, affirmed.

The following questions are certified: (1) Does it appear from the face of the amended complaint herein that the Supreme Court has jurisdiction of the subject of the action? (2) Does the amended complaint herein state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action?

Appeal from Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Second department.

Walter H. Pollak, Carl S. Stern, and George D. Carrington, all of New York City, and G. Frank Dougherty, of Brooklyn, for appellants.

Charles H. Tuttle and Joseph S. Auerbach, both of New York City, William H. Robbins, of Bay Shore, and Martin A. Schenck, of New York City, for respondent.

POUND, J.

The following is a summary of the complaint: On December 4, 1924, the plaintiff owned in fee and possessed 1,500 acres (with the buildings thereon) in the town of Islip, Suffolk county, and known as the Taylor estate. The property was worth in excess of $800,000. On that day the defendants, claiming to act as the Long Island state park commission, undertook by ex parte action to seize forthwith both the title to and the possession of this land. The title they claimed to expropriate by their own ex parte act in filing in the secretary of state's office a so-called notice of appropriation directed to the plaintiff and asserting that the land ‘is appropriated by the people of the state of New York for public and state park purposes pursuant to chapter 112 of the Laws of 1924 and section 59 of the Conservation Law (Consol. Laws, c. 65).’ The possession they seized by immediately sending state troopers, who, by force, put the plaintiff off the property and have maintained exclusive possession ever since.

At the time of these ex parte acts, the defendants did not have the means to pay the fair market value of the property, and did not have on hand or appropriated to their use moneys or property to pay its worth. On the contrary, the legislative appropriation of $200,000 to their use for the acquisition of land had theretofore been almost exhausted, and they had received nothing from any other source. No such expenditure had been authorized in the annual budget. Defendants had no means wherewith to make an offer of purchase.

The defendants forthwith exercised acts of dominion over the property, began changing its nature and destroying portions thereof, and they intend and are about to raze the buildings, cut timber, and convert the place into a park, to the plaintiff's irreparable injury. Their adverse possession of the property depreciates it in value and renders it unmarketable. The defendants seized the property with knowledge and notice that their action was illegal and that they were destroying the lawful rights of the owner.

The complaint demands judgment that the acts of the defendants be adjudged void and in violation of the rights of the plaintiff under the laws and Constitutions of the state and of the United States; that the action of the defendants be judicially canceled and annulled; that the defendants be enjoined from further interference with the property and plaintiff's right thereto; and that the plaintiff have judgment for the damages which it has sustained.

The defendants maintain (a) that their acts were the acts of the state of New York, and that they are immune from suit by reason thereof, and (b) that they proceeded within the limits of the act creating the Long Island state park commission (Laws 1924, c. 112) in acquiring the lands in question for park purposes, and that they might enter upon and take title to the lands in question although no appropriation of moneys to pay therefor had been made by the Legislature. The sections under which they purport to act are sections 16-18 and section 21 of the Long Island Park Act and section 59 of the Conservation Law (Consol. Laws, c. 65) which contain a plan for acquiring lands by giving jurisdiction to the Court of Claims to hear claims for the value of lands taken and render judgment therefor. It is thereby provided:

‘Upon filing in the office of said commission, and in the office of the comptroller, a certified copy of the judgment of the Court of Claims, and a certificate of the Attorney General that no appeal from such judgment has been, or will be taken, by the state, or, if an appeal has been taken a certified copy of the final judgment of the Appellate Court affirming in whole or in part the judgment of the Court of Claims, the comptroller shall issue his warrant for the payment of the amount due the claimant by such judgment, with interest from the date of the judgment until the 30th day after the entry of such final judgment, and such amounts shall be paid by the treasurer.’

[1] The first question that is presented is as to the jurisdictionof the court over the subject of the action. So far as the purpose of the action is to try the title of the state, the state may not be sued without its consent, and, so far as the action is an action against the state for that purpose, an action against the state park commission cannot be maintained. Sanders v. Saxton, 182 N. Y. 477, 75 N. E. 529;Saranac Land & Timber Co. v. Reberts, 195 N. Y. 303, 321,88 N. E. 753. ‘But, though the state cannot be subjected to hostile litigation at the instance of the individual, that immunity is not possessed by its officers, who can be held responsible for illegal trespasses or torts on the rights of an individual, even though they act or assume to act under the authority and pursuant to the directions of the state.’ Sanders v. Saxton, supra. In that case it was held that an action to quiet title will not lie against the state or its grantee on a tax sale at the suit of one in possession of the real property. But it was pointed out that actions to restrain the commission of unlawful acts by the state or government officers for which the command of their principal was no justification or to recover property held equally without warrant of right were clearly to be distinguished from the action before the court. If the plaintiff in the Sanders Case had been ejected from possession by the state or its grantee, he might have indirectly tested the title of the state by actions in the courts against the individuals claiming to act under authority of the state. So here the individual defendants are subject to suit to restrain them from wasting plaintiff's lands under claim of authority from the state. The validity of their acts may thus be tested. The defendants say: ‘The state is the sovereign and the sovereign can do no wrong.’ But the sovereign's agents are not above the law. The illegality of the official's act does not place him under the immunity of the sovereign. He must justify himself by showing that he acted rightfully as a public officer. Litchfield v. Bond, 186 N. Y. 66, 78 N. E. 719;Saratoga State Waters Corp. v. Pratt, 227 N. Y. 429, 447, 125 N. E. 834;Tindal v. Wesley, 167 U. S. 204,17 S. Ct. 700,42 L. Ed. 137;United States v. Lee, 106 U. S. 196, 1 S. Ct. 240, 27 L. Ed. 171. So far as the complaint states a cause of action against the individual defendants who are the members of the state park commission, the law creating the commission furnishes no shield, except for acts done in conformity with the law. So far as the action is against the state, the commission, and its members as such, it will not lie. The title of the state cannot be bested, but the legality of the acts of the state's agents may be tested.

[2] The power of the state to appropriate private property for public use can be held subject to no further limitation than that the statute under which the property is taken shall recognize on the taking of the property the absolute right of the owner to just compensation and make provision for the prompt determination and payment of such compensation from the public funds. Kahlen v. New York, 223 N. Y. 383, 389,119 N. E. 883. We may assume that compensation need not be specifically provided by an appropriation of moneys therefor before the property is appropriated. The faith of the state may be ample security if it opens the door...