Paul v. Glendale Neurological Assocs., PC.

• Decision Date: 20 February 2014
• Docket Number: Docket No. 309927.
• Parties: PAUL v. GLENDALE NEUROLOGICAL ASSOCIATES, PC.
• Court: Court of Appeal of Michigan — District of US

304 Mich.App. 357

848 N.W.2d 400

PAUL

v.GLENDALE NEUROLOGICAL ASSOCIATES, PC.

Docket No. 309927.

Court of Appeals of Michigan.

Submitted Jan. 15, 2014, at Detroit.

Decided Feb. 20, 2014, at 9:05 a.m.

Adler Stillman, PLLC, Farmington Hills (by Barry D. Adler), and Donald M. Fulkerson for plaintiff.

The Juip Richtarik Law Firm, Bloomfield Hills (by Randall A. Juip and Anthony D. Pignotti) for defendant.

Before: SERVITTO, P.J., and MURRAY and BOONSTRA, JJ.

BOONSTRA, J.

Plaintiff appeals by right the opinion and order of the trial court granting summary disposition to defendant, denying plaintiff's motion for summary disposition, and dismissing plaintiff's complaint with prejudice. We affirm.

I. PERTINENT FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Plaintiff allegedly injured her shoulder while at work and filed a workers' compensation claim. Plaintiff's employer's insurance company, Citizens Management, Inc., hired Medicolegal Services, Inc. to obtain an independent medical evaluation (IME) of plaintiff. Plaintiff was examined by Dr. Joseph Salama, who had been contracted by Medicolegal Services. Salama ordered an MRI and an arthrogram of plaintiff's left shoulder, for which Medicolegal Services hired defendant.¹

Plaintiff underwent the MRI and arthrogram procedures on January 4, 2011. A report was then sent to Salama, who authored his own report and sent it to Citizens. On February 8, 2011, plaintiff's counsel wrote to defendant and requested copies of plaintiff's “medical chart including office notes, diagnostic test results, consulting physician reports, correspondence, and related documents[.]” Defendant declined to send the requested records.

Plaintiff filed suit, alleging that defendant denied her access to records of those procedures in violation of the Medical Records Access Act (MRAA), MCL 333.26261 et seq., and that this denial also constituted “an unfair, unconscionable, or deceptive method, act or practice in the conduct of trade or commerce” in violation of the Michigan Consumer Protection Act (MCPA), MCL 445.901 et seq. Defendant answered and denied that plaintiff was “a patient” because the services she received were “part of a legal evaluation pursuant to a [w]orker's [c]ompensation claim she had filed” and she “signed a consent [form] acknowledging that she was not receiving medical care and that no physician-patient relationship was being formed.”

Both parties moved for summary disposition pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(10). The trial court heard the motions on April 4, 2012. On April 6, 2012, the trial court entered a written opinion and order. It first found that plaintiff had standing to sue under the MRAA because her “allegations that she is a patient of [d]efendant and is entitled to access her records give her a substantial interest in the MRAA that confers standing.” It then found that the records plaintiff sought were not “medical records” as defined by the MRAA because plaintiff “present[ed] no evidence that [d]efendant performed any part of its evaluation, ordered the MRI, or created any medical records while caring for [p]laintiff's health,” ² and, therefore, plaintiff did not “demonstrate that she has a right to access the records. Thus, [d]efendant [was] entitled to summary disposition of [p]laintiff's MRAA claim.” Finally, the trial court held that the MCPA did not apply to plaintiff's claim because the independent medical examination was “requested and paid for by the worker's compensation insurance carrier for the sole purpose of evaluating the merits of [p]laintiff's worker's compensation claim,” and, citing Zine v. Chrysler Corp., 236 Mich.App. 261, 273, 600 N.W.2d 384 (1999), the MCPA does not apply to services purchased primarily for business or commercial, rather than personal, purposes. This appeal followed.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

We review a trial court's decision on a motion for summary disposition de novo. Anzaldua v. Neogen Corp., 292 Mich.App. 626, 629, 808 N.W.2d 804 (2011). We also review issues of statutory interpretation de novo. In re Conservatorship of Townsend, 293 Mich.App. 182, 186, 809 N.W.2d 424 (2011).

A motion for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(10) tests the factual sufficiency of the complaint. Corley v. Detroit Bd. of Ed., 470 Mich. 274, 278, 681 N.W.2d 342 (2004). Summary disposition is appropriate if “there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” McCoig Materials, LLC v. Galui Constr., Inc., 295 Mich.App. 684, 693, 818 N.W.2d 410 (2012). “A genuine issue of material fact exists when the record, giving the benefit of reasonable doubt to the opposing party, leaves open an issue upon which reasonable minds could differ.” Bronson Methodist Hosp. v. Auto–Owners Ins. Co., 295 Mich.App. 431, 441, 814 N.W.2d 670 (2012). “This Court reviews the motion by considering the pleadings, admissions, and other evidence submitted by the parties in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.” Auto Club Group Ins. Ass'n v. Andrzejewski, 292 Mich.App. 565, 569, 808 N.W.2d 537 (2011). “When a motion under [MCR 2.116(C)(10) ] is made and supported as provided in this rule, an adverse party may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of his or her pleading, but must ... set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” MCR 2.116(G)(4); Coblentz v. City of Novi, 475 Mich. 558, 569, 719 N.W.2d 73 (2006).

“A court's primary purpose in interpreting a statute is to ascertain and effectuate legislative intent.” Mich. Ed. Ass'n v. Secretary of State ( On Rehearing ), 489 Mich. 194, 217, 801 N.W.2d 35 (2011). “[T]his task begins by examining the language of the statute itself. The words of a statute provide the most reliable evidence of [the Legislature's] intent....” United States Fidelity Ins. & Guaranty Co. v. Michigan Catastrophic Claims Ass'n (On Rehearing), 484 Mich. 1, 13, 795 N.W.2d 101 (2009) (quotation marks and citation omitted). “The words used by the Legislature are given their common and ordinary meaning. If the statutory language is unambiguous, we presume that the Legislature intended the meaning that it clearly expressed, and further construction is neither required nor permitted.” Joseph v. Auto Club Ins. Ass'n, 491 Mich. 200, 206, 815 N.W.2d 412 (2012).

III. PLAINTIFF'S CLAIM UNDER THE MRAA

Plaintiff first argues that the trial court erred both when it granted summary disposition in favor of defendant on the basis that the records plaintiff sought were not within the scope of the MRAA and when it denied plaintiff's motion for summary disposition. The MRAA provides in relevant part that “[e]xcept as otherwise provided by law or regulation, a patient or his or her authorized representative has the right to examine or obtain the patient's medical record.” MCL 333.26265(1). A “patient” means “an individual who receives or has received health care from a health care provider or health facility.” MCL 333.26263(n). “Health care” means “any care, service, or procedure provided by a health care provider or health facility to diagnose, treat, or maintain a patient's physical condition, or that affects the structure or a function of the human body.” MCL 333.26263(d). Finally, the MRAA defines “medical record” as “information oral or recorded in any form or medium that pertains to a patient's health care, medical history, diagnosis, prognosis, or medical condition and that is maintained by a health care provider or health facility in the process of caring for the patient's health.” MCL 333.26263(i).

The trial court granted defendant's motion for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(10), reasoning that the records plaintiff sought were not “medical records” as defined by the MRAA because plaintiff “present[ed] no evidence that [d]efendant performed any part of its evaluation, ordered the MRI, or created any medical records while caring for [p]laintiff's health,” and, therefore, plaintiff did not “demonstrate that she has a right to access the records. Thus, [d]efendant [was] entitled to summary disposition of [p]laintiff's MRAA claim.” We agree.

An IME differs significantly from the typical interaction between a physician and patient. “In the particularized setting of an IME, the physician's goal is to gather information for the examinee or a third party to use in employment or related financial decisions. It is not to provide a diagnosis or treatment of medical conditions.” Dyer v. Trachtman, 470 Mich. 45, 51, 679 N.W.2d 311 (2004). The relationship is a “limited” one that “does not involve the full panoply of the physician's typical responsibilities to diagnose and treat the examinee for medical conditions.” Id. at 50, 679 N.W.2d 311. “[T]he general duty of diagnosis and treatment is inappropriate in the IME setting given the purpose of the examination.” Id. at 52, 679 N.W.2d 311.

Plaintiff urges this Court to adopt a definition of the words “caring” and “care,” culled from a dictionary,³ that defines “caring” as “to give care,” and that further defines “care” as “responsibility,” “watchful attention,” and “charge, supervision.” Plaintiff further argues that adoption of these definitions necessarily results in finding that defendant was engaged “in the process of caring for [plaintiff's] health” when plaintiff underwent the examinations at issue. We disagree, because we do not find “the process of caring for the patient's health” to be consistent with the limited nature of a physician's duty in an IME context. Our Supreme Court has stated that, in the context of an IME, a physician owes a “limited duty” to “exercise care consistent with his professional training and expertise so as not to cause physical harm by negligently conducting the examination.” Dyer, 470 Mich. at 55, 679 N.W.2d 311.⁴ However, this duty does not constitute a duty to diagnose or treat an examinee's medical conditions. Id. at 51, 679 N.W.2d 311. We decline to adopt plaintiff's proposed definition of ...