Paul v. United States

• Citation: 687 F.2d 364
• Decision Date: 25 August 1982
• Docket Number: No. 566-77,593-77.,566-77
• Parties: Frederick PAUL v. The UNITED STATES. Barry JACKSON and Thomas Fenton v. The UNITED STATES
• Court: Court of Federal Claims

687 F.2d 364

Frederick PAUL v. The UNITED STATES.

Barry JACKSON and Thomas Fenton v. The UNITED STATES

Nos. 566-77, 593-77.

United States Court of Claims.

August 25, 1982.

Blair F. Paul, Seattle, Wash., attorney of record, for plaintiffs. Paul, Johnson, Paul & Riley, Seattle, Wash., of counsel.

Susan V. Cook, Washington, D. C., with whom was Asst. Atty. Gen. Carol E. Dinkins, Washington, D. C., for defendant. Thomas J. Riley, Washington, D. C., of counsel.

Before DAVIS, KASHIWA and SMITH, Judges.

ON CROSS-MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

DAVIS, Judge:

Plaintiffs are attorneys who say that they entered into valid contracts with Alaska Native groups and entities to perform legal services (in connection with the Natives' land claims in Alaska), but did not receive the payment to which they claim to be entitled under those fee-arrangements because the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act of 1971, 43 U.S.C. §§ 1601 et seq. (the Settlement Act), severely restricted such attorneys' compensation. Their claim here is that this part of the Act amounted to a taking of their property (the pre-existing right to fees) for which they should receive just compensation from the United States. Both parties here moved for summary judgment,¹ and after oral argument we hold that the case should be decided for the defendant without remand for fact-finding.

I

The agreements plaintiffs claim to have made with Alaska Native bodies were consummated in 1966-1968. There is a sharp dispute over the validity of all these agreements except three made by plaintiffs Jackson and Fenton (with the Alaskan villages of Minto, Nenana, and Tanacross). For the purposes of this case, however, we assume (without in any way deciding) that all of the fee-arrangements plaintiffs claim to have made were valid and accepted (or assumed to be accepted) by the Interior Department. Each of the agreements contained a compensation clause giving plaintiffs contingent compensation (contingent on the Natives' receipt of benefits) in an amount "equitably due," but not to exceed 10 percent of the recovery.

We shall also assume, without deciding, that (a) plaintiffs performed substantial legal services (in an amount worth more than they received under the Settlement Act, see infra) and (b) their clients received benefits in an amount which could sustain greater recovery by plaintiffs than they actually obtained under the Settlement Act.²

In 1971, Congress enacted the Settlement Act under which the Natives of Alaska received, without need for litigation, large amounts of land and money in settlement of their claims of aboriginal land ownership. See generally, United States v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 612 F.2d 1132 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 888, 101 S.Ct. 244, 66 L.Ed.2d 113 (1980). The considerable sums of money provided by the Act were deposited in the Alaska Native Fund. Section 6(a) of the Settlement Act, 43 U.S.C. § 1605(a).³ The Fund has been distributed as called for by the Settlement Act.

The Act outlined in detail the method for paying attorneys who had participated in the legislative settlement or in the court prosecution (or before the Indian Claims Commission) of a claim required to be dismissed by the Act as part of the settlement. Section 20, 43 U.S.C. § 1619. Claims of that type were to be presented to the Chief Commissioner of this court who would hear and determine them. The total amount of legal fees, however, was limited by Congress to $1,900,000 ($100,000 going to consultants), to be paid out of the Alaska Native Fund; if the approved claims exceeded that aggregate amount, the Chief Commissioner was to authorize payment of the claims on a pro rata basis. Section 20(d)(4), 43 U.S.C. § 1619(d)(4). The Act also prohibited receipt by a claiming attorney of additional compensation (of the type properly includable in a fee claim under the Act) and made it a criminal offense to receive such extra remuneration. Section 20(f)(1) and (2), 43 U.S.C. § 1619(f)(1) and (2). Finally, Congress forebade payment of any part of the revenues and land granted by the Settlement Act under any attorney contract providing for a percentage fee, and made such fee contracts unenforceable against Alaskan Natives. Section 22(a), 43 U.S.C. § 1621(a).

The three plaintiffs filed claims with the Chief Commissioner under the Settlement Act. In December 1974, all the attorneys who filed such claims agreed on the portion of the total compensation each should receive.⁴ Under this stipulation, and after taking account of the compensable legal work performed, the Chief Commissioner allowed plaintiff Paul (and his firm) the amount of $697,000 (Paul receiving $276,000 personally). Jackson and Fenton received $130,082. The maximum of $1,900,000 was divided among all the claiming attorneys.

II

Before the present suit was pursued, plaintiffs sought through other litigation to recover additional sums for their legal work. Paul sued — naming as defendants several federal officials, Alaskan entities organized under the Settlement Act, and the parties to his retainer contracts — in the Western District of Washington. He sought all kinds of relief, including a holding that sections 20 and 22 of the Settlement Act, supra, were unconstitutional. The District Court ruled that it had no jurisdiction because section 10 of the Settlement Act confined litigation challenging the constitutionality of the Act to timely suits in the District of Alaska.⁵ In 1980, the Ninth Circuit affirmed. Paul v. Andrus, 639 F.2d 507. Both the District Court and the Court of Appeals held the time and venue provisions of section 10 to be valid, even though the limitation of party plaintiffs to Alaska officials might well be unconstitutional. Paul's suit was dismissed because he filed it nearly three and one-half years after the time limitation (December 18, 1972) established in section 10, and he did not file suit in the District of Alaska.⁶

The current suits for just compensation were reactivated and pursued after the failure of the District Court litigation.

III

The thrust of plaintiffs' present position is that (a) the limitations on attorney compensation embodied in sections 20 and 22 of the Settlement Act (see Part I, supra) are invalid unless the Act is construed as an eminent domain taking of plaintiffs' pre-existing contract rights for which they were not properly compensated through the Chief Commissioner's proceedings in this court, and (b) the Settlement Act must therefore be understood as such a taking. There are at least three major defects in that contention.

The first is that plaintiffs are now precluded from challenging the constitutionality of sections 20 and 22, and we are precluded from considering those provisions as invalid. Not only is the Ninth Circuit's ruling in Paul v. Andrus binding on plaintiffs under the principles of former adjudication,⁷ but we agree with that holding and believe it to be correct. Congress deliberately adopted the time and venue restrictions of section 10 because, as that provision explicitly puts it: "The purpose of this limitation on suits is to insure that, after the expiration of a reasonable period of time, the right, title, and interest of the United States, the Natives, and the State of Alaska will vest with certainty and finality and may be relied upon by all other persons in their relations with the State, the Natives, and the United States." Section 10.

That stated objective, as Paul v. Andrus said, is a rational ground for the time and venue restrictions (regardless of the possible unconstitutionality of the restriction to the State of Alaska of the sole right to make all constitutional challenges).⁸ Under the Supreme Court's jurisprudence, reasonable time and venue limitations of that type are constitutionally acceptable. See, e.g., Lockerty v. Phillips, 319 U.S. 182, 63 S.Ct. 1019, 87 L.Ed. 1339 (1943); Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414, 64 S.Ct. 660, 88 L.Ed. 834 (1944).

Plaintiff Paul made no showing in Paul v. Andrus why he could not have filed a timely suit in Alaska attacking sections 20 and 22, and plaintiffs here have done no better. Having failed to pursue the special route Congress opened to them, they are barred from asking us to consider sections 20 and 22 as invalid in any way. Conversely, we cannot take that view, without transgressing Congress' express direction as to the method for constitutional attacks. It follows that we have no basis in the putative invalidity of sections 20 and 22 (considered by themselves) for holding that Congress must have exercised its eminent domain powers in order to save those otherwise (assumedly) invalid provisions.

IV

The second, independent flaw in plaintiffs' argument is that, even if we are wholly free to assess the validity of sections 20 and 22, we cannot see those provisions as unconstitutional. There is a long history of legislation and administrative action limiting an attorney's share of the funds he helped to procure from the Federal Government, despite a private contract he may have, or have had, with the client for whom he obtained the federal money. In the field of native rights, Indian statutes are prime examples, especially the Indian Claims Commission Act, 25 U.S.C. § 70 et seq. (1976) and the regular practice of the Bureau of Indian Affairs (in approving attorneys' contracts) to restrict the amount of legal compensation. The Supreme Court has repeatedly upheld such limitation provisions in various contexts. Kendall v. United States, 74 U.S. (7 Wall) 113, 114, 118, 19 L.Ed. 85 (1868); Frisbie v. United States, 157 U.S. 160, 165-66, 15 S.Ct. 586, 588, 39 L.Ed. 657 (1895); Ball v. Halsell, 161 U.S. 72, 16 S.Ct. 554, 40 L.Ed. 622 (1896); Capital Trust Co. v. Calhoun, 250 U.S. 208, 213-14, 218-20, 39 S.Ct. 486, 486-87, 488-89, 63 L.Ed. 942 (1919); Calhoun v. Massie, 253 U.S. 170, 173-75, 176-77, 40 S.Ct. 474, 474, 476, 64 L.Ed. 843 (1920); Margolin v. United States, 269 U.S....