Paulk v. City of Sycamore

• Decision Date: 11 April 1898
• Parties: PAULK v. MAYOR, ETC., OF CITY OF SYCAMORE.
• Court: Georgia Supreme Court

30 S.E. 417

104 Ga. 24

PAULK v. MAYOR, ETC., OF CITY OF SYCAMORE.

Supreme Court of Georgia

April 11, 1898

Syllabus by the Court.

1. Courts of equity will not by injunction prevent the institution of prosecutions for criminal offenses, whether the same be violations of state statutes or municipal ordinances; nor will they, upon a petition for an injunction of this nature, inquire into the constitutionality of a legislative act, or the validity or reasonableness of an ordinance making penal the act or acts for the doing of which prosecutions are threatened.

2. There was no error in denying the injunction.

Error from superior court, Irwin county; C. C. Smith, Judge.

Suit by J. E. Paulk against the mayor and aldermen of the city of Sycamore to enjoin certain criminal proceedings. From an order refusing to grant temporary injunction, plaintiff brings error. Affirmed.

W. A Hawkins and Thomson & Whipple, for plaintiff in error.

W. T Williams and J. H. Martin, for defendant in error.

FISH J.

The plaintiff in error brought his petition to enjoin criminal proceedings against him and his employés, under the provisions of the charter of Sycamore prohibiting and making penal the sale of intoxicating liquors within its incorporate limits, and to enjoin similar proceedings under a municipal ordinance prohibiting, under penalty of fine or imprisonment the keeping of such liquors in the city for the purpose of sale or barter. He alleged that the municipal ordinance in question is void, and has been repealed, and that, if the corporate authorities are allowed to institute and carry on the threatened prosecutions, "it will not only harass and jeopardize his personal liberty, without any lawful authority, but it will also interfere with him in the enjoyment of his civil rights, break up his business, and cause him to sacrifice and lose his *** property and stock of goods, and damage him in a large amount, and all without authority and without adequate redress," and that his damages will be irreparable.

In Gault v. Wallis, 53 Ga. 675, it was held that "courts of equity have no jurisdiction to interfere with the administration of the criminal laws of the state by injunction or otherwise." And in Phillips v. Mayor, etc., of Stone Mountain, 61 Ga. 386, it was held: "No injunction, or order in the nature of an injunction, will be granted to restrain proceedings in a criminal matter." In Garrison v. City of Atlanta, 68 Ga. 64, where these decisions were followed, the principle is reaffirmed in the following language: "Injunction will not be granted to restrain a criminal proceeding." These decisions seem to be decisive of the questions raised in the present case, and but for a later decision of this court, which is invoked in behalf of the plaintiff in error, and which we shall presently consider, we should not deem it necessary or profitable, in this opinion, to do more than cite and follow these adjudications. The case in 61 Ga. 386, is especially in point, owing to its similarity to the case now under consideration. In that case certain retail liquor dealers sought to enjoin prosecutions under a municipal ordinance, which was passed after they had obtained their licenses to sell, on the ground that the ordinance was void, and materially restricted their business. This court, speaking through Bleckley, J., who delivered the opinion, said: "Whatever may be the infirmities of the penal ordinance of Stone Mountain, an injunction in the present case was properly denied. If unlawful convictions take place before a municipal court, reversal can be had in the superior court, as a court of law, by certiorari. This is a plain and adequate remedy, and a court of equity need not and cannot interfere. Chancery takes no part in the administration of criminal law. It neither aids the criminal courts in the exercise of jurisdiction, nor restrains or obstructs them." The principle upon which these decisions are founded has long been well settled by a great current of authority, both in this country and in England. In Re Sawyer, 124 U.S. 200, 8 S.Ct. 482, it was reaffirmed by the supreme court of the United States in the most emphatic terms. The first headnote in that case is: "A court of equity has no jurisdiction of a bill to stay criminal proceedings." And in the opinion of the court it is said: "The office and jurisdiction of a court of equity, unless enlarged by express statute, are limited to the protection of the rights of property. It has no jurisdiction over the prosecution, punishment, or pardon of crimes or misdemeanors, or over the appointment or removal of public officers. To assume such a jurisdiction, or to sustain a bill in equity to restrain or relieve against proceedings for the punishment of offenses, or for the removal of public officers, is to invade the domain of courts of common law, or of the executive and administrative department of the government." Further on, in the same opinion, after stating that "the modern decisions in England, by eminent equity judges, concur in holding that a court of chancery has no power to restrain criminal proceedings, unless they are instituted by a party to a suit already pending before it, and to try some right that is in issue there," and that "Mr. Justice Story, in his Commentaries on Equity Jurisprudence, affirms the same doctrine," it is said: "And in the American courts, so far as we are informed, it has been strictly and uniformly upheld, and has been applied alike whether the prosecutions or arrests sought to be restrained arose under statutes of the state or under municipal ordinances," -citing West v. Mayor, etc., 10 Paige, 539; Davis v. American Soc., 75 N.Y. 362; Tyler v. Hamersley, 44 Conn. 419, 422; Stuart v. Board of Sup'rs, 83 Ill. 341; Devron v. First Municipality, 4 La. Ann. 11; Levy v. City of Shreveport, 27 La. Ann. 620; Moses v. Mayor, etc., 52 Ala. 198; Gault v. Wallis, 53 Ga. 675; Phillips v. Mayor, etc., of Stone Mountain, 61 Ga. 386; Cohen v. Goldsboro Com'rs, 77 N.C. 2; Waters Peirce Oil Co: v. City of Little Rock, 39 Ark. 412; Spink v. Francis, 19 F. 670, 20 F. 567; Suess v. Noble, 31 F. 855.

To this formidable and strong array of authorities we might ourselves add a number of more recent decisions to the same effect by our American courts, but we do not deem it necessary to do so. Counsel representing the plaintiff in error, recognizing the fact that the three Georgia decisions that we have cited particularly the one rendered in 61 Ga. 386, in the Stone Mountain Case, are against their contentions, rely upon the ruling of this court in City of Atlanta v. Gate City Gaslight Co., 71 Ga. 106; and considering the principle announced in the fifth headnote to that case simply as an abstract proposition, applicable to all cases in which some sort of a property right may be injuriously affected by a criminal prosecution, we can understand the confidence with which they invoke that decision in behalf of their client. But the principle there announced is to be considered and applied in the light of the...