Paulo v. Williams

• Docket Number: 2:19-cv-00474-CDS-NJK
• Decision Date: 14 December 2023
• Parties: Justin Paulo, Plaintiff v. Brian Williams, et al., Defendants
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Nevada

1

Justin Paulo, Plaintiff v. Brian Williams, et al., Defendants

No. 2:19-cv-00474-CDS-NJK

United States District Court, D. Nevada

December 14, 2023

ORDER DENYING PAULO'S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION AND GRANTING PAULO'S MOTION FOR JUDGMENT

[ECF NOS. 123, 126]

Presently before this court are several motions brought by pro se plaintiff Justin Paulo in response to this court's decision regarding the parties' summary judgment motions. ECF No. 121. Paulo brings a motion for reconsideration (ECF No. 123) and a motion for judgment (ECF No 125).^[1] For the following reasons, I deny the motion for reconsideration and grant the motion for judgment.

I. Relevant Procedural History

On May 2, 2022, defendants filed a motion for summary judgment on all counts. Mot. Summ. J., ECF No. 88. On July 14, 2022, Paulo filed a cross motion for summary judgment on all counts. Mot. Summ. J., ECF No. 108. In connection with claim I, Paulo also filed a motion for preliminary injunction. Mot. Prelim. Inj., ECF No. 114. On June 13, 2023, I granted Paulo summary judgment on claims II and III, denied his motion on the remaining claims, and granted defendants summary judgment as to claims I, IV, V, VI, and VII, and denied their motion as to claims II and III. Order, ECF No. 121. Further, because I granted defendants summary judgment on claim I, I denied Paulo's request for a preliminary injunction. Id.

Paulo now brings a motion for reconsideration asking the court to reconsider granting defendants summary judgment for claim I, and to reconsider its dismissing defendants Williams and Wickham for lack of personal involvement regarding claims II and III. Mot. for Recons., ECF No. 123 at 5-12. In the same motion, Paulo also notes that defendant Calderin was sued in his “individual capacity” and asserts that he is subject to monetary damages as such under claim II. Id. at 13.^[2] Paulo requests that, in the event the court denies his motion for reconsideration on claim I, that the court enter final judgment as to claim I pursuant to Rule 54(b). Mot. for Final J., ECF No. 126. To assist the court in better assessing Paulo's motion for reconsideration, the court ordered defendants to file additional briefing on the administrative exhaustion issue. Order, ECF No. 133. Defendants complied with my order and filed supplemental briefing on November 11, 2023. Resp., ECF No. 138.

II. Legal standards

The following sets forth the applicable law and authority regarding the pending motions before the court. As a general matter, I liberally construe documents filed by pro se litigants and afford them the benefit of any doubt. Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (per curiam). Nonetheless, despite Paulo's pro se status, he must comply with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the Local Rules of the United States District Court of Nevada. See Ghazali v. Moran, 46 F.3d 52, 54 (9th Cir. 1995) (pro se parties must still comply with rules and case law); Briones v. Riviera Hotel & Casino, 116 F.3d 379, 382 (9th Cir. 1997) (stating that “pro se litigants are not excused from following court rules”).

A. Motion for Reconsideration

A motion to reconsider a final appealable order is appropriately brought under either Rule 59(e) or Rule 60(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. United States v. Martin, 226 F.3d 1042, 1048 n.8 (9th Cir. 2000). A motion for reconsideration is not an avenue to present arguments already raised; that is, a motion for reconsideration is not a mechanism for an unsuccessful party to reiterate arguments previously presented. See Maraziti v. Thorpe, 52 F.3d 252, 255 (9th Cir. 1995); Khan v. Fasano, 194 F.Supp.2d 1134, 1136 (S.D. Cal. 2001) (“A party cannot have relief under this rule merely because he or she is unhappy with the judgment.”). “In order for a party to demonstrate clear error, the moving party's arguments cannot be the same as those made earlier.” Glavor v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 879 F.Supp. 1028, 1033 (N.D. Cal. 1994), aff'd, 89 F.3d 845 (9th Cir. 1996) (citing Backlund v. Barnhart, 778 F.2d 1386, 1388 (9th Cir. 1985)).

Pursuant to Rule 60(b), reconsideration is appropriate only upon a showing of: (1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; (2) newly discovered evidence; (3) an adverse party's fraud, misrepresentation, or other misconduct; (4) a void judgment; (5) a satisfied, released, or discharged judgment; or (6) any other reason justifying relief from the operation of the judgment. Fed.R.Civ.P. 60(b); see also Kona Enterprises, Inc. v. Est. of Bishop, 229 F.3d 877, 890 (9th Cir. 2000) (a motion for reconsideration should not be granted, absent highly unusual circumstances, unless the district court is presented with newly discovered evidence, committed clear error, or if there is an intervening change in the controlling law).

A party can obtain relief under Rule 60(b) only upon an adequate showing of exceptional or extraordinary circumstances. Maraziti, 52 F.3d at 254. A Rule 60(b) motion must be filed within a reasonable time: for reasons (1) through (3), that time is not more than one year after the judgment, order, or proceeding was entered. Fed.R.Civ.P. 60(b). Errors of law are cognizable under Rule 60(b)(1). Kingvision Pay-Per-View Ltd. v. Lake Alice Bar, 168 F.3d 347, 350 (9th Cir. 1999).

This district's local rules regarding civil cases require that any motion for reconsideration “must state with particularity the points of law or fact that the court has overlooked or misunderstood. Changes in legal or factual circumstances that may entitle the movant to relief also must be stated with particularity.” LR 59-1 (emphasis added).

B. Motions to Enter Judgment

“Federal courts of appeals have jurisdiction over only appeals from ‘final decisions' of federal district courts.” Nuwintore v. United States, 2014 WL 7335215, at *1 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 19, 2014) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1291). “Ordinarily, an order which terminates fewer than all claims, or claims against fewer than all parties, does not constitute a ‘final' order for purposes of appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.” Id. (quoting Carter v. City of Philadelphia, 181 F.3d 339, 343 (3d Cir. 1999)); see Jones v. McDaniel, 717 F.3d 1062, 1068 (9th Cir. 2013) (“Orders granting partial summary judgment ‘are not final appealable orders.'”). Under Rule 54(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, however, “the court may direct entry of a final judgment as to one or more, but fewer than all, claims or parties only if the court expressly determines that there is no just reason for delay.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 54(b); McDaniel, 717 F.3d at 1068 (“parties ordinarily must obtain Rule 54(b) certification in order to appeal partial summary judgments.”).

The U.S. Supreme Court directs how a district court certifies a case under Rule 54(b). First, a district court must determine that it is dealing with a “final judgment.” It must be a “judgment” in the sense that it is a decision upon a cognizable claim for relief, and it must be “final” in the sense that it is “an ultimate disposition of an individual claim entered in the course of a multiple claims action.” Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Mackey, 351 U.S. 427, 436 (1956). Once the court determines finality, the district court must next determine whether there is any just reason for delay. Not all final judgments on individual claims should be immediately appealable, even if they are in some sense separable from the remaining unresolved claims. The function of the district court under the Rule is to act as a “dispatcher.” Id. at 435. It is left to the sound judicial discretion of the district court to determine the “appropriate time” when each final decision in a multiple claims action is ready for appeal. Id. This discretion is to be exercised “in the interest of sound judicial administration.” Id. at 437.

In deciding whether there are no just reasons to delay the appeal of individual final judgments in setting such as this, a district court must consider judicial administrative interests as well as the equities involved. Consideration of the former is necessary to assure that application of the Rule effectively “preserves the historic federal policy against piecemeal appeals.” Id. at 438.

III. Analysis

I proceed by first denying Paulo's motion for reconsideration of my order granting summary judgment on claim I and dismissing defendants Williams and Wickham for lack of personal involvement regarding claims II and III. Next, I grant Paulo's motion for judgment on claim I.

A. Paulo does not set forth a basis for this court to reconsider its prior order.

As explained herein, Paulo's motion for reconsideration fails to demonstrate any mistake, newly discovered factual circumstance, or intervening law that would suggest I reconsider my prior order. For that reason, it is denied.

1. Reconsideration regarding claim I is denied.

Paulo asks this court to reconsider its finding that claim I is barred under the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PRLA) based on his failure to exhaust administrative remedies because he “respectfully disagrees with the Court's analysis of the facts and evidentiary record.” ECF No. 123 at 5. I liberally construe this as an argument that the court made a mistake in granting summary judgment on this count and requesting relief under Fed.R.Civ.P. 60(b)(1). Paulo's main contention for why this court erred in granting summary judgment for failure to exhaust includes evidence that he believes the court overlooked: (1) Paulo's statement “that prison officials continued to ‘lose' pages to [Paulo's] grievance and that Warden Pickett confiscated [Paulo's] grievance” and (2) an October 17, 2018 High Desert State Prison (HDSP) memorandum in which Warden Pickett explained that “[Paulo's] grievance may not be...